Wellington S Two Front War

Sir Arthur Wellesley's 1808–1814 campaigns against Napoleon's forces in the Iberian Peninsula have drawn the attention of scholars and soldiers for two centuries. Yet, until now, no study has focused on the problems that Wellesley, later known as the Duke of Wellington, encountered on the home front before his eventual triumph beyond the Pyrenees. In Wellington's Two-Front War, Joshua Moon not only surveys Wellington's command of British forces against the French but also describes the battles Wellington fought in England—with an archaic military command structure, bureaucracy, and fickle public opinion. In this detailed and accessible account, Moon traces Wellington's command of British forces during the six years of warfare against the French. Almost immediately upon landing in Portugal in 1808, Wellington was hampered by his government's struggle to plan a strategy for victory. From that point on, Moon argues, the military's outdated promotion system, political maneuvering, and bureaucratic inertia—all subject to public opinion and a hostile press—thwarted Wellington's efforts, almost costing him the victory. Drawing on archival sources in the United Kingdom and at the United States Military Academy, Moon goes well beyond detailing military operations to delve into the larger effects of domestic policies, bureaucracy, and coalition building on strategy. Ultimately, Moon shows, the second front of Wellington's "two-front war" was as difficult as the better-known struggle against Napoleon's troops and harsh conditions abroad. As this book demonstrates, it was only through strategic vision and relentless determination that Wellington attained the hard-fought victory. Moon's multifaceted examination of the commander and his frustrations offers valuable insight into the complexities of fighting faraway battles under the scrutiny at home of government agencies and the press—issues still relevant today.

The leading Wellington historian’s fascinating reassessment of the Iron Duke’s most famous victory and his role in the turbulent politics after Waterloo. For Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington, his momentous victory over Napoleon was the culminating point of a brilliant military career. Yet Wellington’s achievements were far from over: he commanded the allied army of occupation in France to the end of 1818, returned home to a seat in Lord Liverpool’s cabinet, and became prime minister in 1828. He later served as a senior minister in Peel’s government and remained commander-in-chief of the army for a decade until his death in 1852. In this richly detailed work, the second and concluding volume of Rory Muir’s definitive biography, the author offers a substantial reassessment of Wellington’s significance as a politician and a nuanced view of the private man behind the legend of the selfless hero. Muir presents new insights into Wellington’s determination to keep peace at home and abroad, achieved by maintaining good relations with the Continental powers and resisting radical agitation while granting political equality to the Catholics in Ireland rather than risk civil war. And countering one-dimensional pictures of Wellington as a national hero, Muir paints a portrait of a well-rounded man whose austere demeanor on the public stage belied his entertaining, gossipy, generous, and unpretentious private self. “[An] authoritative and enjoyable conclusion to a two-part biography.” —Lawrence James, Times (London) “Muir conveys the military, political, social and personal sides of Wellington’s career with equal brilliance. This will be the leading work on the subject for decades.” —Andrew Roberts, author of Napoleon and Wellington: The Long Duel

At last, in this absorbing and authoritative study, the story of the epic struggle on Spains eastern front during the Peninsular War has been told. Often overlooked as not integral to the Duke of Wellingtons main army and their campaigns in Portugal and western Spain, they were, in point of fact, intrinsically linked. Nick Lipscombe, a leading historian of the Napoleonic Wars and an expert on the fighting in the Iberian peninsula, describes in graphic detail the battles fought by the French army of General Suchet against the Spanish regulars and guerrillas and subsequently the Anglo-Sicilian force sent by the British government to stabilize the region. Despite Suchet's initial successes and repeated setbacks for the allied armies, by late 1813 the east coast of Spain held a key to Wellington's invasion of France and the ultimate defeat of Napoleon's armies in the Peninsula. At a tactical level the allies were undeniably successful and made an important contribution to the eventual French defeat.

War is changing. Unlike when modern military doctrine was forged, the United States no longer mobilizes massive land forces for direct political gain. Instead, the US fights small, overseas wars by global mandate to overthrow dictators, destroy terrorist groups, and broker regional peace. These conflicts hardly resemble the total wars fought and expected by foundational military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, yet their paradigms are ingrained in modern thinking. The twenty-first-century's new geopolitical situation demands new principles for warfare—deemphasizing decisive land victory in favor of airpower, intelligence systems, and indigenous ground forces. In Thoughts on War, Phillip S. Meilinger confronts the shortcomings of US military dogma in search of a new strategic doctrine. Inter-service rivalries and conventional theories failed the US in lengthy Korea, Vietnam, and Middle East conflicts. Jettisoning traditional perspectives and their focus on decisive battles, Meilinger revisits historical campaigns looking for answers to more persistent challenges—how to coordinate forces, manipulate time, and fight on two fronts. This provocative collection of new and expanded essays offers a fresh, if controversial, perspective on time-honored military values, one which encourages a critical revision of US military strategy.

Although an army’s success is often measured in battle outcomes, its victories depend on strengths that may be less obvious on the field. In Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword, military historian Andrew Bamford assesses the effectiveness of the British Army in sustained campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars. In the process, he offers a fresh and controversial look at Britain’s military system, showing that success or failure on campaign rested on the day-to-day experiences of regimental units rather than the army as a whole. Bamford draws his title from the words of Captain Moyle Sherer, who during the winter of 1816–1817 wrote an account of his service during the Peninsular War: “My regiment has never been very roughly handled in the field. . . But, alas! What between sickness, suffering, and the sword, few, very few of those men are now in existence.” Bamford argues that those daily scourges of such often-ignored factors as noncombat deaths and equine strength and losses determined outcomes on the battlefield. In the nineteenth century, the British Army was a collection of regiments rather than a single unified body, and the regimental system bore the responsibility of supplying manpower on that field. Between 1808 and 1815, when Britain was fighting a global conflict far greater than its military capabilities, the system nearly collapsed. Only a few advantages narrowly outweighed the army’s increasing inability to meet manpower requirements. This book examines those critical dynamics in Britain’s major early-nineteenth-century campaigns: the Peninsular War (1808–1814), the Walcheren Expedition (1809), the American War (1812–1815), and the growing commitments in northern Europe from 1813 on. Drawn from primary documents, Bamford’s statistical analysis compares the vast disparities between regiments and different theatres of war and complements recent studies of health and sickness in the British Army.

Explores British soldiers' violence and restraint towards enemy combatants and civilians in sieges during the Napoleonic era.

The United States has the most expensive and seemingly unstoppable military in the world. Yet, since World War II the nation’s military success rate has been meager. The Korean War was a draw, while Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. What differentiates the failures from the successes? Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. Phillip S. Meilinger’s new book advocates strategies that limit risks in war as well as achieve measurable goals. Instead of large numbers of conventional ground troops, the author argues in favor of a focus on asymmetric capabilities—a combination of airpower, special operation forces, intelligence, and indigenous ground troops—to achieve the desired political outcomes.

Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, lives on in popular memory as the "Invincible General," loved by his men, admired by his peers, formidable to his opponents. This incisive book revises such a portrait, offering an accurate--and controversial--new analysis of Wellington's remarkable military career. Unlike his nemesis Napoleon, Wellington was by no means a man of innate military talent, Huw J. Davies argues. Instead, the key to Wellington's military success was an exceptionally keen understanding of the relationship between politics and war.Drawing on extensive primary research, Davies discusses Wellington's military apprenticeship in India, where he learned through mistakes as well as successes how to plan campaigns, organize and use intelligence, and negotiate with allies. In India Wellington encountered the constant political machinations of indigenous powers, and it was there that he apprenticed in the crucial skill of balancing conflicting political priorities. In later campaigns and battles, including the Peninsular War and Waterloo, Wellington's genius for strategy, operations, and tactics emerged. For his success in the art of war, he came to rely on his art as a politician and tactician. This strikingly original book shows how Wellington made even unlikely victories possible--with a well-honed political brilliance that underpinned all of his military achievements.