Western Intervention In The Balkans

Conflicts involve powerful experiences. The residue of these experiences is captured by the concept and language of emotion. Indiscriminate killing creates fear; targeted violence produces anger and a desire for vengeance; political status reversals spawn resentment; cultural prejudices sustain ethnic contempt. These emotions can become resources for political entrepreneurs. A broad range of Western interventions are based on a view of human nature as narrowly rational. Correspondingly, intervention policy generally aims to alter material incentives ('sticks and carrots') to influence behavior. In response, poorer and weaker actors who wish to block or change this Western implemented 'game' use emotions as resources. This book examines the strategic use of emotion in the conflicts and interventions occurring in the Western Balkans over a twenty-year period. The book concentrates on the conflicts among Albanian and Slavic populations (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, South Serbia), along with some comparisons to Bosnia.

Examines the strategic use of emotion in the conflicts and interventions occurring in the Western Balkans over a twenty-year period.

Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.

An engrossing, clear-eyed look at the conflict in Kosovo and what it reveals about the limits of America's power to shape the world and impose democratic and humane values in countries under the control of ruthless dictators. 4 maps.

In the late 1990s, NATO led the Kosovo Force (KFOR), charged with stabilizing Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after genocide and other atrocities were carried out in the Balkan region. Operation Kinetic is not only a history of the origins and operations of the Kosovo Force but also a history of the vital operations conducted by the Canadian Army units and their allies assigned to KFOR during the crucial early days and months after entry into the province in 1999 and through 2000. Operating alongside American, British, French, Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish forces, these surveillance and response units were instrumental in preventing violence in numerous areas before it could escalate and draw in the Serbian Army, which could have led to further genocide or war in the region. Sean M. Maloney, a Canadian military historian with extensive field experience in the Balkans, draws on numerous interviews and firsthand accounts of an operation that would later serve as a model in preparing for similar efforts in Afghanistan and provide a blueprint for stabilizing operations around the world.

In First Do No Harm, David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering. The book focuses on the 1991--99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict. Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide. He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe. First Do No Harm argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.

Maria Todorova puts in conversation several fields that have been traditionally treated as discrete: Balkans, Eastern Europe, Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian empires. Applying different perspectives and different methodological approaches, it insists on the heuristic value of scales

This book examines the historical, cultural and political dimensions of the crisis in Bosnia and the international efforts to resolve it. It provides a detailed analysis of international proposals to end the fighting, from the Vance-Owen plan to the Dayton Accord, with special attention to the national and international politics that shaped them. It analyzes the motivations and actions of the warring parties, neighbouring states and international actors including the United States, the United Nations, the European powers, and others involved in the war and the diplomacy surrounding it. With guides to sources and documentation, abundant tabular data and over 30 maps, this should be a definitive volume on the most vexing conflict of the post-Soviet period.