What Explains The Success Or Failure Of Structural Adjustment Programs

June 1998 A few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time. To select promising candidates for adjustment, the World Bank must do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not. Being more selective may mean smaller volumes of lending. In the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments (such as roads and dams) to promoting policy reform. This change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment. After nearly 20 years' experience with policy-based or conditional lending, there have now been many studies of adjustment lending, most of which take a case-study approach. Many conclude that policy-based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform. Dollar and Svensson examine a database of 220 World Bank-supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail. They find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time. Variables under the World Bank's control-resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions-have no relationship with an adjustment program's success or failure. What development agencies must do, then, is select promising candidates for adjustment support. When the candidate is a poor selection, devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform. To improve its success rate with adjustment lending, the World Bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not. That is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans, unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers. To become more effective at supporting policy reform, the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending. This paper-a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to examine aid effectiveness. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Economic Policies and the Effect of Foreign Aid (RPO 681-70). The authors may be contacted at [email protected]. or [email protected].

A few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time. To select promising candidates for adjustment, the World Bank must do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not. Being more selective may mean smaller volumes of lending.In the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from financing investments (such as roads and dams) to promoting policy reform. This change came because of a growing awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for investment.After nearly 20 years' experience with policy-based or conditional lending, there have now been many studies of adjustment lending, most of which take a case-study approach. Many conclude that policy-based lending works if countries have decided on their own to reform.Dollar and Svensson examine a database of 220 World Bank-supported reform programs to identify why adjustment programs succeed or fail.They find that a few political economy variables can successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan 75 percent of the time. Variables under the World Bank's control-resources devoted to preparation and supervision or number of conditions-have no relationship with an adjustment program's success or failure.What development agencies must do, then, is select promising candidates for adjustment support. When the candidate is a poor selection, devoting more administrative resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of successful reform.To improve its success rate with adjustment lending, the World Bank must become more selective and do a better job of understanding which environments are promising for reform and which are not. That is likely to lead to fewer adjustment loans, unless there is a significant change in the number of promising reformers. To become more effective at supporting policy reform, the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending.This paper - a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to examine aid effectiveness. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Economic Policies and the Effect of Foreign Aid (RPO 681-70).

Our Continent, Our Future presents the emerging African perspective on this complex issue. The authors use as background their own extensive experience and a collection of 30 individual studies, 25 of which were from African economists, to summarize this African perspective and articulate a path for the future. They underscore the need to be sensitive to each country's unique history and current condition. They argue for a broader policy agenda and for a much more active role for the state within what is largely a market economy. Finally, they stress that Africa must, and can, compete in an increasingly globalized world and, perhaps most importantly, that Africans must assume the leading role in defining the continent's development agenda.

Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts examines the problems associated with Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and reveals the damaging impacts they can have. The book looks at how the debt crisis of the 1970's forced developing countries to seek external help and then reviews what constitutes as a standard adjustment programme, detailing the political, economic, social and environmental impacts of SAPs. The final section draws together theories and political responses and presents a case for alternatives to the programmes.

Assessing Aid determines that the effectiveness of aid is not decided by the amount received but rather the institutional and policy environment into which it is accepted. It examines how development assistance can be more effective at reducing global poverty and gives five mainrecommendations for making aid more effective: targeting financial aid to poor countries with good policies and strong economic management; providing policy-based aid to demonstrated reformers; using simpler instruments to transfer resources to countries with sound management; focusing projects oncreating and transmitting knowledge and capacity; and rethinking the internal incentives of aid agencies.

In the last ten to fifteen years, profound structural reforms have moved Latin America and the Caribbean from closed, state-dominated economies to ones that are more market-oriented and open. Policymakers expected that these changes would speed up growth. This book is part of a multi-year project to determine whether these expectation have been fulfilled. Focusing on technological change, the impact of the reforms on the process of innovation is examined. It notes that the development process is proving to be highly heterogenous across industries, regions and firms and can be described as strongly inequitable. This differentiation that has emerged has implications for job creation, trade balance, and the role of small and medium sized firms. This ultimately suggests, amongst other things, the need for policies to better spread the use of new technologies.

The twenty-one contributions in this book assess the controversy surrounding the Fund and provide judgments about the criteria for Fund lending which should help readers understand and analyze both its ongoing role in smoothing adjustment to international payments imbalances and its currently critical position in responding to the debt crisis.