Why International Cooperation Is Failing

Since the global financial crisis of 2008/09, international cooperation has failed to curb volatile financial markets. Changes in the global rules of finance discussed in the G20 during the last decade remain limited, and it is uncertain whether they are suitable to help mitigate and manage future crises to come. This book offers an alternative to the popular notion that this failure is the result of the 'nature' of the international system, the clash of national egoisms, or lack of leadership. It instead investigates problems of international cooperation by looking at their deeper structural origins in the competition of different models of capitalism. US finance-led, EU integration-led, and East Asian state-led capitalism complement each other globally but have conflicting preferences on how to regulate international finance. This interdependence of capitalist models is relatively stable but also prone to crises caused by volatile financial flows, global economic imbalances, and 'currency wars'. By bringing together approaches from International Political Economy and Comparative Capitalism, this book shows that regulating international finance is not a technocratic exercise of fine-tuning the machinery of international institutions, but rather a political process. International cooperation can only be successful if it goes hand in hand with deep domestic changes in each of these capitalist models.

The issues that increasingly dominate the 21st century cannot be solved by any single country acting alone, no matter how powerful. To manage the global economy, prevent runaway environmental destruction, reign in nuclear proliferation, or confront other global challenges, we must cooperate. But at the same time, our tools for global policymaking - chiefly state-to-state negotiations over treaties and international institutions - have broken down. The result is gridlock, which manifests across areas via a number of common mechanisms. The rise of new powers representing a more diverse array of interests makes agreement more difficult. The problems themselves have also grown harder as global policy issues penetrate ever more deeply into core domestic concerns. Existing institutions, created for a different world, also lock-in pathological decision-making procedures and render the field ever more complex. All of these processes - in part a function of previous, successful efforts at cooperation - have led global cooperation to fail us even as we need it most. Ranging over the main areas of global concern, from security to the global economy and the environment, this book examines these mechanisms of gridlock and pathways beyond them. It is written in a highly accessible way, making it relevant not only to students of politics and international relations but also to a wider general readership.

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

The UN, World Bank, and the IMF were all created in the radically different world of the 1940s. It is becoming increasingly apparent that our global structures are struggling to cope with the new globalized, interconnected challenges of the twenty-first century. Ian Goldin looks to the future to consider radical new approaches to our world order.

It is now conventional wisdom to see the great policy challenges of the 21st century as inherently transnational. It is equally common to note the failures of the international institutions the world relies on to address such challenges. As the acclaimed 2013 book Gridlock argued, the world increasingly needs effective international cooperation, but multilateralism appears unable to deliver it in the face of deepening interdependence, rising multipolarity, and the growing complexity and fragmentation that characterise the global order. The Gridlock authors have now partnered with a group of leading experts to offer a trenchant reassessment of elements of the argument. Comparing anomalies and exceptions to multilateral dysfunction across a number of spheres of world politics, Beyond Gridlock explores seven pathways through and beyond gridlock. While multilateralism continues to fall short, Beyond Gridlock identifies systematic means to avoid or resist these forces and turn them into collective solutions. This book offers a vital new perspective on world politics as well as a practical guide for positive change in global policy.

Ten years after the global financial crisis of 2008/09 there is widespread scepticism about the ability to curb volatile financial markets and achieve true international cooperation. Changes in the global rules of finance discussed in the G20 during the last decade remain limited, and it is uncertain whether they are suitable to help mitigate and manage future crises to come. This book offers an alternative to the popular notion that this failure is the result of the 'nature' of international relations, the clash of national egoisms, or ineffective national leadership. It instead provides an understanding of recent lapses in international cooperation by revealing their deeper structural origins in the competing models of capitalism operating across the globe. US finance-led, EU integration-led, and East Asian state-led capitalism complement each other globally yet have conflicting preferences on how to complement their distinct domestic regulations at the international level. This interdependence of capitalist models is relatively stable but also prone to crises caused by volatile financial flows, global economic imbalances, and 'currency wars'. To understand international economic cooperation, we must understand the diverse dynamics of the different models of capitalism on a domestic level, not only in financial markets but also in areas of corporate structure, labour markets, and welfare regimes. By establishing a deeper integration of approaches from International Political Economy and Comparative Capitalism, this book shows that regulating international finance is not a technocratic exercise of fine-tuning the machinery of international institutions, but rather a political process dependent on the dynamic of institutional change on a national and regional level

This open access handbook analyses the role of development cooperation in achieving the 2030 Agenda in a global context of 'contested cooperation'. Development actors, including governments providing aid or South-South Cooperation, developing countries, and non-governmental actors (civil society, philanthropy, and businesses) constantly challenge underlying narratives and norms of development. The book explores how reconciling these differences fosters achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Sachin Chaturvedi is Director General at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), a New Delhi, India-based think tank. Heiner Janus is a researcher in the Inter- and Transnational Cooperation programme at the German Development Institute. Stephan Klingebiel is Chair of the Inter- and Transnational Cooperation programme at the German Development Institute and Senior Lecturer at the University of Marburg, Germany. Xiaoyun Li is Chair Professor at China Agricultural University and Honorary Dean of the China Institute for South-South Cooperation in Agriculture. Prof. Li is the Chair of the Network of Southern Think Tanks and Chair of the China International Development Research Network. André de Mello e Souza is a researcher at the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a Brazilian governmental think tank. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is Chief Executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs. She has co-edited Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers: New Partners or Old Patterns (2012) and Institutional Architecture and Development: Responses from Emerging Powers (2015). Dorothea Wehrmann is a researcher in the Inter- and Transnational Cooperation programme at the German Development Institute.

Formed in 1947, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) was the first postwar international organization dedicated to economic cooperation in Europe. Linking the universalism of the UN to European regionalism, both Cold War superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, were founding members of the UNECE. Building on the League of Nations' difficult heritage, and in an increasingly challenging political environment, the UNECE's mission was to facilitate European cooperation transcending the boundaries set by the Cold War . With a number of competitor organizations set against it, the UNECE managed to carve out a niche for itself, setting norms and standards that still have an impact on the everyday lives of millions in Europe and beyond today. Working against an overwhelming geopolitical trend, UNECE succeeded in bridging the Cold War divide on several occasions, and maintained a broad system of contacts across the Iron Curtain. This book provides a unique study of this important but hitherto under-researched international organization. Incorporating research on the Cold War, the history of internationalism and European integration, Stinsky weaves these different threads of historical enquiry into a single analytical narrative.