Will Terrorists Go Nuclear

"Brian Michael Jenkins goes beyond what the experts know about terrorists' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear black markets, "suitcase bombs," and mysterious substances like red mercury to examine how terrorists themselves think about such weapons." "Jenkins notes that terrorists have become increasingly adept at creating an atmosphere of nuclear terror. In fact, al Qaeda may have succeeded in becoming the world's first terrorist nuclear power without possessing a single nuclear weapon. The psychological effects of nuclear terror are fueled by American culture, which churns out novels and movies in which every conceivable horror scenario is played out. Political factions on both the right and the left also view nuclear terrorism as fodder to support their own arguments. In such an atmosphere, it is difficult for the average citizen to separate real from imagined dangers."--BOOK JACKET.

A leading strategist opens our eyes to the greatest terrorist threat of all-and how to prevent it before it's too late Americans in the twenty-first century are keenly aware of the many forms of terrorism: hijackings, biological attacks, chemical weapons. But rarely do we allow ourselves to face squarely the deadliest form of terrorism, because it is almost too scary to think about-a terrorist group exploding a nuclear device in an American city. In this urgent call to action, Graham Allison, one of America's leading experts on nuclear weapons and national security, presents the evidence for two provocative, compelling conclusions. First, if policy makers in Washington keep doing what they are currently doing about the threat, a nuclear terrorist attack on America is likely to occur in the next decade. And if one lengthens the time frame, a nuclear strike is inevitable. Second, the surprising and largely unrecognized good news is that nuclear terrorism is, in fact, preventable. In these pages, Allison offers an ambitious but feasible blueprint for eliminating the possibility of nuclear terrorist attacks. The United States once relied on the threat of mutually assured destruction to deter the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear strike. But in today's fragmented world, a new strategy is needed, especially with nuclear material vulnerable to theft or sale through black-market channels. The choice is ours: to grab this beast by the horns or to be impaled on those horns. We do not have the luxury of hoping the problem will go away, and Allison shows why.

"Nuclear terrorism is such a disturbing prospect that we shy away from its details. Yet as a consequence, we fail to understand how best to defeat it. Michael Levi takes us inside nuclear terrorism and behind the decisions a terrorist leader would be faced with in pursuing a nuclear plot. Along the way, Levi identifies the many obstacles, large and small, that such a terrorist scheme might encounter, allowing him to discover a host of ways that any plan might be foiled. Surveying the broad universe of plots and defenses, this accessible account shows how a wide-ranging defense that integrates the tools of weapon and materials security, law enforcement, intelligence, border controls, diplomacy, and the military can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibility that nuclear terrorists will fail. Levi draws from our long experience with terrorism and cautions us not to focus solely on the most harrowing yet most improbable threats. Nuclear terrorism shares much in common with other terrorist threats--and as a result, he argues, defeating it is impossible unless we put our entire counterterrorism and homeland security house in order. As long as we live in a nuclear age, no defense can completely eliminate nuclear terrorism. But this book reminds us that the right strategy can minimize the risks and shows us how to do it."

The very mention of nuclear terrorism is enough to rouse strong emotions, and understandably so, because it combines the most terrifying weapons and the scariest people in a single phrase. The possibility that terrorists could use nuclear weapons deserves the best possible analysis, but discussion has all too often has been contaminated with exaggeration, even hysteria, that flows in at least some cases from the political interests commentators have in exaggerating the terrorist threat. For example, it has been claimed that nuclear terrorism poses an "existential threat" to the United States. This Adelphi Paper develops a more measured analysis of the risk of nuclear terrorism, defined here as the detonation by terrorists of a device with a true nuclear yield. It attacks the problem from two angles: the very considerable, possibly insurmountable technical challenges involved in getting a functional nuclear weapon, whether "home-made" or begged, borrowed, or stolen from a state arsenal, and the related question of the strategic, political, and psychological motivation to "go nuclear." It concludes, with some other writers, that nuclear terrorism is not a significant threat, and that, among terrorists, Muslim extremists are not the most likely to go use nuclear weapons.--Publisher description.

Many policymakers and scholars contend that nuclear weapons remain inaccessible to terrorists, and that nuclear means are inconsistent with or disproportionate to their goals. Nevertheless, the historical pattern of nuclear proliferation suggests a trend toward nonstate actor acquisition, a notion supported by recent developments in the black market. Additional evidence suggests that some specific groups have expressed an interest in nuclear weapons. This thesis proposes that there is a terrorist demand for nuclear weapons. Further, its findings suggest that the possibility of terrorist acquisition has grown; and that these nonstate adversaries will enjoy significant advantage over states during nuclear crisis. Terrorists, like states, pursue political objectives and have similar concerns regarding power and security. Lacking state resources, terrorists employ instrumental targeting in pursuit of those objectives, while remaining relatively invulnerable to retaliation. This dynamic will encourage terrorists to acquire and exploit nuclear potential, thereby overturning traditional theories of deterrence. Wishful thinking about nuclear terrorism has discouraged thoughtful analysis of this dilemma. The prospect is sufficiently dire, that a preventive campaign must be launched to stop terrorist acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Policymakers must also prepare for the possible failure of preventive efforts, and search for options that may mitigate nuclear terrorism.

The very mention of nuclear terrorism is enough to rouse strong reactions, and understandably so, because it combines the most terrifying weapons and the most threatening of people in a single phrase. The possibility that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear weapons deserves careful analysis, but discussion has all too often been contaminated with exaggeration, even hysteria. For example, it has been claimed that nuclear terrorism poses an ‘existential threat’ to the United States. This Adelphi Paper develops a more measured analysis of the risk of terrorists detonating a true fission device. The problem is attacked from two perspectives: the considerable, possibly insurmountable, technical challenges involved in obtaining a functional nuclear weapon, whether ‘home-made’ or begged, borrowed or stolen from a state arsenal; and the question of the strategic, political and psychological motivations to ‘go nuclear’. The conclusions are that nuclear terrorism is a less significant threat than is commonly believed, and that, among terrorists, Muslim extremists are not the most likely to use nuclear weapons.

This volume aims to improve understanding of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terrorism is perceived as one of the most immediate and extreme threats to global security today. While the international community has made important progress in securing fissile material, there are still important steps to be made with nearly 2,000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material spread around the globe. The volume addresses this complex phenomenon through an interdisciplinary approach: legal, criminal, technical, diplomatic, cultural, economic, and political. Despite this cross-disciplinary approach, however, the chapters are all linked by the overarching aim of enhancing knowledge of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The volume aims to do this by investigating the different types of nuclear terrorism, and subsequently discussing the potential means to prevent these malicious acts. In addition, there is a discussion of the nuclear security regime, in general, and an important examination of both its strengths and weaknesses. In summary, the book aims to extend the societal and political debate about the threat of nuclear terrorism. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, nuclear governance, terrorism studies, international organizations, and security studies in general.