Young Hearts And Minds Understanding Malaysian Gen Z S Political Perspectives And Allegiances

The 15th general election (GE15) in Malaysia produced surprising results. The conservative coalition of PN emerged as the dark horse of the election, overtaking the longest-ruling coalition, BN, by a significant margin. The two largest coalitions post-GE15, PH and PN, represent ideological opposites, which may spell a polarized future for Malaysian youths. This paper intends to understand what happened to the youth votes and provide possible hypotheses for future trends. In West Malaysia, constituencies with a larger share of young voters (under 30 years old) registered a higher voter turnout rate. A majority of seats with 30 per cent or more of voters under 30 years old (considered “young” seats) were won by PN, followed by PH, and thirdly BN. This demonstrated PN’s relatively stronger hold on young seats in GE15. Discrepancies between pre-GE15 survey findings and actual results could be explained by the Shy PN factor—or PN-leaning voters’ reticence towards revealing their preference—and a swing from BN to PN. Of all voter groups, PN voters have shown the highest loyalty and affinity to their coalition of choice, largely led by PAS voters. This is followed by PH and then BN, where the latter has shown the lowest support durability and the highest likelihood of swing. Unsurprisingly, voters from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum of PN and PH share a high degree of coldness towards each other, implying that a middle ground will be hard to reach between the two voter groups. Increasingly, a clean and Islamic government would become a feature that Malay youth voters would favour. PN currently fits this trend the best, although this may change depending on the political climate. BN had over the years lost its clean government credentials, especially with the criminal charges against its party leaders, whereas PH continues to struggle in shedding its image as being dominated by the Chinese community. PN and PH voters were almost equal in passive forms of political engagement such as following political news. However, PN consistently ranked higher in active political engagement and belief that their vote matters, which was probably what translated into a marginally higher voter turnout rate. Under all circumstances, BN voters were the least engaged, either actively or passively. In GE15, seats won by PN had a consistently higher median voter turnout rate than non-PN seats.

This report presents findings from a nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,627 Malaysians between March and April 2021 regarding public perceptions on the Election Commission (EC) and on election management. Malaysians by and large hold a cautious, moderate affirmation of the state of democracy in Malaysia, and of it has made notable progress over the past decade. A quarter of respondents regard the 2018 general election to be very free or/and fair, while 43 percent think that it was free/fair though not without problems. This perception appears to have been influenced by the fact that there was a change in the federal government. Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the election management process and the EC is weakly affirmative, as revealed by a majority expressing a lack of confidence in an eventual online voting system being handled transparently. Urban residents generally have a greater distrust of state institutions. Some notable contrasts in regional trends: -- Sarawakians have a high level of trust in state institutions. -- Sabahans have the lowest appreciation for the progress made in the state of democracy in the country, the lowest satisfaction with civil liberty, or the lowest trust in state institutions except for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the EC. -- West Malaysians have the lowest level of trust in the MACC and EC but express the highest level of appreciation for the progress that has been made in the state of democracy.

When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal government fell in February 2020, PH also lost control over the states of Johor, Malacca, Perak and Kedah. In Sabah, PH-aligned Warisan was replaced by the PN-aligned United Alliance of Sabah. PH maintained its hold on three states—Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. Selangor’s position is of unique interest, given the largest share of PH assemblypersons comprising members from the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR), the party which has faced significant elite splits in 2020. The present stability of PH’s survival in Selangor can be accounted for by the sheer majority it possesses within the legislative assembly, comprising forty-one out of fifty-six state seats. Unless a significant share of assemblypersons were to defect, the change in state government would be highly unlikely. PH built a strong base in Selangor during its time in power over more than a decade, securing performative legitimacy and rooting itself strongly within the community. PH has benefited from the highly urbanized and educated demographic profile of Selangor. However, the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed the landscape, which may in turn affect how constituents will now respond to goodies offered by the federal government. Although PH in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year’s political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH’s ability to maintain its strong margin. The political fragmentation that continues to unfold will see further party and coalitional realignment, which will invariably impact PH’s strength in Selangor.

This report examines the issues of terrorism, extremism, conflict and violence, which are much in ascendancy and afflict Commonwealth countries as well as the rest of the world, and considers methods of countering disaffection and violence through civil means.

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This book describes the living-room artifacts, clothing styles, and intellectual proclivities of American classes from top to bottom.