A Cold War Turning Point

In February 1972, President Nixon arrived in Beijing for what Chairman Mao Zedong called the "week that changed the world." Using recently declassified sources from American, Chinese, European, and Soviet archives, Chris Tudda's A Cold War Turning Point reveals new details about the relationship forged by the Nixon administration and the Chinese government that dramatically altered the trajectory of the Cold War. Between the years 1969 and 1972, Nixon's national security team actively fostered the U.S. rapprochement with China. Tudda argues that Nixon, in bold opposition to the stance of his predecessors, recognized the mutual benefits of repairing the Sino-U.S. relationship and was determined to establish a partnership with China. Nixon believed that America's relative economic decline, its overextension abroad, and its desire to create a more realistic international framework aligned with China's fear of Soviet military advancement and its eagerness to join the international marketplace. In a contested but calculated move, Nixon gradually eased trade and travel restrictions to China. Mao responded in kind, albeit slowly, by releasing prisoners, inviting the U.S. ping-pong team to Beijing, and secretly hosting Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prior to Nixon's momentous visit. Set in the larger framework of international relations at the peak of the Vietnam War, A Cold War Turning Point is the first book to use the Nixon tapes and Kissinger telephone conversations to illustrate the complexity of early Sino-U.S. relations. Tudda's thorough and illuminating research provides a multi-archival examination of this critical moment in twentieth-century international relations.

The expert contributors examine the end of détente and the beginning of the new phase of the cold war in the early 1980s, Reagan's radical new strategies aimed at changing Soviet behavior, the peaceful democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary, the events that brought about the reunification of Germany, the role of events in Third World countries, the critical contributions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and more.

Despite the ongoing drawdown of strategic forces under the terms of START, both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch. Under the most optimistic current scenarios, these arsenals will remain very large and launch-ready for more than a decade. This book, by a distinguished group of coauthors, critically evaluates the current policy of retaining and operating large nuclear arsenals. It reviews U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression by former Cold War adversaries and other countries with weapons of mass destruction. The risks of inadvertent as well as deliberate nuclear attack are assessed. The authors argue that small arsenals (low hundreds) on low alert satisfy all justifiable requirements for nuclear weapons. They present a blueprint for making deep cuts in U.S. and Russian deployments, and for lowering their alert level. They explain the implications of shifting to small arsenals for further constraining anti-ballistic missile defenses, strengthening verification, and capping or reducing the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and Britain as well as the threshold nuclear states. The political challenges and opportunities, both domestic and international, for achieving deep reductions in the size and readiness of nuclear forces are analyzed by the authors and by distinguished experts from other countries. The coauthors are Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, James Goodby, Steve Fetter, Hal Feiveson, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel. An appendix with international perspectives by Li Bin (China), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Therese Delpech (France), Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan), Shai Feldman (Israel), Harald Mueller (Germany), and Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (South Asia).

During a pivotal few months in the middle of the First World War all sides-Germany, Britain, and America-believed the war could be concluded. Peace at the end of 1916 would have saved millions of lives and changed the course of history utterly. Two years into the most terrible conflict the world had ever known, the warring powers faced a crisis. There were no good military options. Money, men, and supplies were running short on all sides. The German chancellor secretly sought President Woodrow Wilson's mediation to end the war, just as British ministers and France's president also concluded that the time was right. The Road Less Traveled describes how tantalizingly close these far-sighted statesmen came to ending the war, saving millions of lives, and avoiding the total war that dimmed hopes for a better world. Theirs was a secret battle that is only now becoming fully understood, a story of civic courage, awful responsibility, and how some leaders rose to the occasion while others shrank from it or chased other ambitions. "Peace is on the floor waiting to be picked up!" pleaded the German ambassador to the United States. This book explains both the strategies and fumbles of people facing a great crossroads of history. The Road Less Traveled reveals one of the last great mysteries of the Great War: that it simply never should have lasted so long or cost so much.

“[Matlock’s] account of Reagan’s achievement as the nation’s diplomat in chief is a public service.”—The New York Times Book Review “Engrossing . . . authoritative . . . a detailed and reliable narrative that future historians will be able to draw on to illuminate one of the most dramatic periods in modern history.”—Los Angeles Times Book Review In Reagan and Gorbachev, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and principal adviser to Ronald Reagan on Soviet and European affairs, gives an eyewitness account of how the Cold War ended. Working from his own papers, recent interviews with major figures, and unparalleled access to the best and latest sources, Matlock offers an insider’s perspective on a diplomatic campaign far more sophisticated than previously thought, waged by two leaders of surpassing vision. Matlock details how Reagan privately pursued improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations even while engaging in public saber rattling. When Gorbachev assumed leadership, however, Reagan and his advisers found a willing partner in peace. Matlock shows how both leaders took risks that yielded great rewards and offers unprecedented insight into the often cordial working relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Both epic and intimate, Reagan and Gorbachev will be the standard reference on the end of the Cold War, a work that is critical to our understanding of the present and the past.

Vividly written and based on up-to-date scholarship, this title provides an interpretive overview of the international history of the Cold War.

Finalist for the 1971 National Book Award In early 1968, Communist forces in Vietnam launched a surprise offensive that targeted nearly every city, town, and major military base throughout South Vietnam. For several hours, the U.S. embassy in Saigon itself came under siege by Viet Cong soldiers. Militarily, the offensive was a failure, as the North Vietnamese Army and its guerrilla allies in the south suffered devastating losses. Politically, however, it proved to be a crucial turning point in America's involvement in Southeast Asia and public opinion of the war. In this classic work of military history and war reportage—long considered the definitive history of Tet and its aftermath—Don Oberdorfer moves back and forth between the war and the home front to document the lasting importance of this military action. Based on his own observations as a correspondent for the Washington Post and interviews with hundreds of people who were caught up in the struggle, Tet! remains an essential contribution to our understanding of the Vietnam War.

Shows students how to analyze foreign policy choices