A Manual For Commanders Of Large Units Provisional

The U.S. Cavalry, which began in the nineteenth century as little more than a mounted reconnaissance and harrying force, underwent intense growing pains with the rapid technological developments of the twentieth century. From its tentative beginnings during World War I, the eventual conversion of the traditional horse cavalry to a mechanized branch is arguably one of the greatest military transformations in history. Through Mobility We Conquer recounts the evolution and development of the U.S. Army's modern mechanized cavalry and the doctrine necessary to use it effectively. The book also explores the debates over how best to use cavalry and how these discussions evolved during the first half of the century. During World War I, the first cavalry theorist proposed combining arms coordination with a mechanized force as an answer to the stalemate on the Western Front. Hofmann brings the story through the next fifty years, when a new breed of cavalrymen became cold war warriors as the U.S. Constabulary was established as an occupation security-police force. Having reviewed thousands of official records and manuals, military journals, personal papers, memoirs, and oral histories -- many of which were only recently declassified -- George F. Hofmann now presents a detailed study of the doctrine, equipment, structure, organization, tactics, and strategy of U.S. mechanized cavalry during the changing international dynamics of the first half of the twentieth century. Illustrated with dozens of photographs, maps, and charts, Through Mobility We Conquer examines how technology revolutionized U.S. forces in the twentieth century and demonstrates how perhaps no other branch of the military underwent greater changes during this time than the cavalry.

In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.

Discusses the first Army headquarters in the European theater, from its activation in October 1943 to V-E Day in May 1945. Shows the Army headquarters of World War 2 as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. CMH Pub 70-60.

From the Preface: The following pages provide a narrative analysis of the U.S. Army's development of armored organizations and their related doctrine, materiel, and training activities in the period 1917-1945. This period marked the emergence of clear principles of armored warfare that became the underpinning of the Armor Branch, influencing armored developments long after World War II ended. A unique style of mounted maneuver combat emerged that reflected a mix of tradition an innovation. In the process, American military culture changed, particularly through the adoption of combined-arms principles. Conversely, political actions, budgetary considerations, and senior leadership decisions also shaped the course of armor development. The emergence of an American armored force involved more than simply tank development. It included the creation of an armored division structure steeped in combined-arms principles, organizational flexibility, and revolutionary command and control processes. Parallel developments included the establishment of specialized units to provide antitank, reconnaissance, and infantry support capabilities. Several Army branches played a role in determining the precise path of armored development, and one of them-the Cavalry-became a casualty as a result.

Captures the multifaceted development of the Armored Force from its inauspicious beginnings in World War 1 to its fully mature, operational status at the close of World War 2. Provides an excellent case study in force transformation. Gives attention to training maneuvers conducted in the interwar period. Source material includes reports, memorandums, and correspondence of the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels associated with armored development since World War I.