A Pluralist Theory Of Age Discrimination

This book provides a comprehensive theory of age discrimination that can guide the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. The Act holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age and measures that are on their face age-neutral but have the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups are lawful only if the treatment can be shown either to be a 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim' or if the treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception. In this way, the proportionality test distinguishes justified and unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former legally permissible. This book outlines and defends a pluralist theory of age discrimination that assists in making the distinction between justified and unjustified age-differential treatment. The theory identifies the principles that explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and the principles that can justify this treatment. It is a pluralist theory because it recognises that age-differential treatment can wrong people for a number of different, overlapping reasons, and these different reasons should inform how we apply age discrimination law. The pluralist approach to age discrimination theory can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination cases by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests that are at stake in age discrimination claims. In constructing the theory, the book adopts the reflective equilibrium method. This requires that we examine our initial moral beliefs about age discrimination by seeking coherence with beliefs we have about similar moral and philosophical issues and revising the initial beliefs as a result of challenges to them. In applying this method, the book identifies the following five principles to form a pluralist theory of age discrimination: equality of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency.

This book provides a comprehensive theory of age discrimination that can guide the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. The Act holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age and measures that are on their face age-neutral but have the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups are lawful only if the treatment can be shown either to be a 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim' or if the treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception. In this way, the proportionality test distinguishes justified and unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former legally permissible. This book outlines and defends a pluralist theory of age discrimination that assists in making the distinction between justified and unjustified age-differential treatment. The theory identifies the principles that explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and the principles that can justify this treatment. It is a pluralist theory because it recognises that age-differential treatment can wrong people for a number of different, overlapping reasons, and these different reasons should inform how we apply age discrimination law. The pluralist approach to age discrimination theory can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination cases by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests that are at stake in age discrimination claims. In constructing the theory, the book adopts the reflective equilibrium method. This requires that we examine our initial moral beliefs about age discrimination by seeking coherence with beliefs we have about similar moral and philosophical issues and revising the initial beliefs as a result of challenges to them. In applying this method, the book identifies the following five principles to form a pluralist theory of age discrimination: equality of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency.

This book defends an original and pluralist theory of when and why discrimination wrongs people. Starting from actual legal cases in which claimants have alleged wrongful discrimination by other people or by the state, Sophia Moreau argues that we can best understand these people's complaints by thinking of them as complaints about different ways in which they have not been treated as equals in their societies--in particular, through unfair subordination, through the violation of their right to a particular deliberative freedom, or through the denial to them of access to a basic good, that is, a good that this person must have access to if they are to be, and to be seen as, an equal in their society. The book devotes a chapter to each of these wrongs, exploring in detail what unfair subordination consists of; what deliberative freedoms are, and when each of us has a right to them; and what it means to deny someone access to a basic good. The author explains why these wrongs are each distinctive, but are each a different way of failing to treat some people as the equals of others. Finally the author argues that both the state and we as individuals have a duty to treat others as equals, in these three specific senses.

New Private Law Theory is pluralist, comparative, application-oriented, transnational and reflects critical approaches.

When he nished writing, he raised his eyes and looked at me. From that day I have thought about Doktor Pannwitz many times and in many ways. I have asked myself how he really functioned as a man; how he lled his time, outside of the Polymerization and the Indo- Germanic conscience; above all when I was once more a free man, I wanted to meet him again, not from a spirit of revenge, but merely from a personal curiosity about the human soul. Because that look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have explained the essence of the great insanity of the third Germany. PRIMO LEVI [If this is a man, pp. 111–112, in, If this is a man and The truce, trans. S. Woolf, Abacus, London, 1987] If all propositions, even the contingent ones, are resolved into identical propositions, are they not all necessary? My answer is: certainly not. For even if it is certain that what is more perfect is what will exist, the less perfect is nevertheless still possible. In propositions of fact, existence is involved. LEIBNIZ [Samtlic ̈ he schriften und briefe vol VI pt 4 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1449A VI 4] We live in a rule-constrained world.

This text addresses these three issues: What is discrimination? What makes it wrong?; What should be done about wrongful discrimination? It argues that there are different concepts of discrimination; that discrimination is not always morally wrong and that when it is, it is so primarily because of its harmful effects.

Rainer Baubock is the world's leading theorist of transnational citizenship. He opens this volume with a question that is crucial to our thinking on citizenship in the twenty-first century: who has a claim to be included in a democratic political community? Baubock's answer addresses the majortheoretical and practical issues of the forms of citizenship and access to citizenship in different types of polity, the specification and justification of rights of non-citizen immigrants as well as non-resident citizens, and the conditions under which norms governing citizenship can legitimatelyvary. This argument is challenged and developed in responses by Joseph Carens, David Miller, Iseult Honohan, Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson, David Owen and Peter J. Spiro. In the concluding chapter, Baubock replies to his critics.