A Priori

In recent years many influential philosophers have advocated that philosophy is an a priori science. Yet very few epistemology textbooks discuss a priori knowledge at any length, focusing instead on empirical knowledge and empirical justification. As a priori knowledge has moved centre stage, the literature remains either too technical or too out of date to make up a reasonable component of an undergraduate course. Edwin Mares book aims to rectify this. This book seeks to make accessible to students the standard topics and current debates within a priori knowledge, including necessity and certainty, rationalism, empiricism and analyticity, Quine's attack on the a priori, Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mathematical knowledge, moral knowledge, logical knowledge and philosophical knowledge.

The major divide in contemporary epistemology is between those who embrace and those who reject a priori knowledge. Albert Casullo provides a systematic treatment of the primary epistemological issues associated with the controversy. By freeing the a priori from traditional assumptions about the nature of knowledge and justification, he offers a novel approach to resolving these issues which assigns a prominent role to empirical evidence. He concludes by arguing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessity and analyticity, are misguided.

The prevailing interpretation of Kant&’s First Critique in Anglo-American philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as basically a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge (or experience), or the a priori conditions for that possibility (the representations of space and time and the categories). Instead, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge&—the very possibility of the possibility of empirical knowledge in the first place. Greenberg advances four central theses:(1) the Critique is primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects, of a priori, not empirical knowledge, and Kant&’s theory of that possibility is defensible; (2) Kant&’s transcendental ontology must be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment, in Kant&’s discussion of the Table of Judgments, should be seen according to his transcendental logic as having content, not as being just logical forms of judgment making; (4) Kant&’s distinction between and connection of ordering relations (Verhaltnisse) and reference relations (Beziehungen) have to be kept in mind to avoid misunderstanding the Critique. At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these dominant interpretations, but by being more true to Kant&’s own intent it holds promise for making better sense out of what have been seen as the First Critique&’s discordant themes.

This volume provides philosophers and students with important contemporary investigations on a priori knowledge by well-known and influential philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, W. V. Quine, Barry Stroud, and C. I. Lewis.

Originally published in 1966, this pivotal work of Mikel Dufrenne revises Kant’s notion of a priori, a concept previously given insufficient attention by philosophers, to realize a rich understanding that finally does justice to one of Kant’s most troubling cruxes. Following the Husserlian analytics of phenomenology, Dufrenne postulates a dualistic conception of the a priori as a structure that expresses itself outside the human subject, but also as a virtual knowledge that points to a philosophy of immediate apprehension or feeling. A friend of Paul Ricoeur, with whom he was detained as a prisoner of war during World War II, Dufrenne’s work until now has been sorely overlooked by American philosophers.

The topics of a priori knowledge and a priori justification have long played a prominent part in epistemology and the theory of meaning. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the proper explication of these notions. These newly commissioned essays, by a distinguished, international group of philosophers, will have a substantial influence on later work in this area. They discuss the relations of the a priori to meaning, justification, definition and ontology; they consider the role of the notion in Leibniz, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein; and they address its role in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind. Particular attention is also paid to the a priori in logic, science and mathematics. The authors exhibit a wide variety of approaches, some remaining sceptical of the notion itself, some proposing that it receive a non-factualist treatment, and others proposing novel ways of explicating and defending it. The editors' Introduction provides a helpful route into the issues.

This book deals with questions about the nature of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge. Until the twentieth century, it was more or less taken for granted that there was such a thing as a priori knowledge, that is, knowledge whose source is in reason and reflection rather than sensory experience. With a few notable exceptions, philosophers believed that mathematics, logic and philosophy were all a priori. Although the seeds of doubt were planted earlier on, by the early twentieth century, philosophers were widely skeptical of the idea that there was any nontrivial existence of a priori knowledge. By the mid to late twentieth century, it became fashionable to doubt the existence of any kind of a priori knowledge at all. Since many think that philosophy is an a priori discipline if it is any kind of discipline at all, the questions about a priori knowledge are fundamental to our understanding of philosophy itself.

In recent years many influential philosophers have advocated that philosophy is an a priori science. Yet very few epistemology textbooks discuss a priori knowledge at any length, focusing instead on empirical knowledge and empirical justification. As a priori knowledge has moved centre stage, the literature remains either too technical or too out of date to make up a reasonable component of an undergraduate course. Edwin Mares book aims to rectify this. This book seeks to make accessible to students the standard topics and current debates within a priori knowledge, including necessity and certainty, rationalism, empiricism and analyticity, Quine's attack on the a priori, Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mathematical knowledge, moral knowledge, logical knowledge and philosophical knowledge.