A Short History Of Biological Warfare

This publication gives a history of biological warfare (BW) from the prehistoric period through the present, with a section on the future of BW. The publication relies on works by historians who used primary sources dealing with BW. In-depth definitions of biological agents, biological weapons, and biological warfare (BW) are included, as well as an appendix of further reading on the subject. Related items: Arms & Weapons publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT & CBRNE) publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/hazardous-materials-hazmat-cbrne

This short monograph reviews the history of biological warfare (BW) from prehistory to the present. It covers what we know about the practice of BW and briefly describes the programs that developed BW weapons based on the best available research. To the extent possible, it primarily draws on the work of historians who used primary sources, relying where possible on studies specifically focused on BW. By broadening our knowledge of BW, such studies have enabled us to write about the topic with more accuracy and detail than could have been done even a few years ago. This is an overview, not a definitive history. Much about BW remains unknown, either because it is unknowable (due in some cases to the deliberate destruction of records) or because it is knowable only to some people (such as those who might have access to classified information) or because of the absence of academic research. This survey breaks the history of BW into three periods. The first section examines prehistory to 1900-the period before scientific advances proved that microorganisms were the cause of many diseases. Despite many claims to the contrary, resort to BW was exceedingly rare during this era. Readers interested only in BW's modern history can skip this section. The second section looks at the years from 1900 through 1945. This period saw the emergence of state BW programs, the employment of biological weapons in both world wars, and the use of biological agents by nonstate actors, including criminals. This period witnessed the most significant resort to BW. It included the first organized state campaign to wage BW-sabotage operations organized by the German government during World War I. It also saw the most extensive use-the Japanese attacks in China. Almost all the known victims of BW were Chinese, mostly civilians, who were killed in these operations. This period also saw the initial efforts to control BW in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which essentially prohibited the first use of BW agents. Finally, the third section, covering the period from 1945 to the present, focuses mostly on developments during the Cold War, including descriptions of state BW programs as well as known uses of biological agents by states, terrorists, and criminals. Despite the development of highly sophisticated techniques for dissemination of biological agents by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (the two countries with the largest and most advanced BW programs ever organized), most of the known programs were small and possessed only crude dissemination capabilities. The known uses were unsophisticated as well, essentially no more advanced than what the Germans did during World War I. This era also saw the negotiation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). This history focuses on those agents covered by the BWC, which prohibited weapons disseminating biological agents or toxins. Biological agents are replicating biological entities, such as bacteria. Toxins, poisons of biological origin, are similar to chemical warfare agents and also have been banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

A timely account of how resources for biological weapons programs were mobilized and why such weapons have never been deployed in major conflicts offers an understanding of the relevance of the historical restraints placed on the use of biological weapons and looks at what can to done to prevent their proliferation in the post-September 11th world.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Army conducted atmospheric dispersion tests in many American cities using fluorescent particles of zinc cadmium sulfide (ZnCdS) to develop and verify meteorological models to estimate the dispersal of aerosols. Upon learning of the tests, many citizens and some public health officials in the affected cities raised concerns about the health consequences of the tests. This book assesses the public health effects of the Army's tests, including the toxicity of ZnCdS, the toxicity of surrogate cadmium compounds, the environmental fate of ZnCdS, the extent of public exposures from the dispersion tests, and the risks of such exposures.

In the wake of the anthrax letters following the attacks on the World Trade Center, Americans have begun to grapple with two difficult truths: that there is no terrorist threat more horrifying -- and less understood -- than germ warfare, and that it would take very little to mount a devastating attack on American soil. In Germs, three veteran reporters draw on top sources inside and outside the U.S. government to lay bare Washington's secret strategies for combating this deadly threat. Featuring an inside look at how germ warfare has been waged throughout history and what form its future might take (and in whose hands), Germs reads like a gripping detective story told by fascinating key figures: American and Soviet medical specialists who once made germ weapons but now fight their spread, FBI agents who track Islamic radicals, the Iraqis who built Saddam Hussein's secret arsenal, spies who travel the world collecting lethal microbes, and scientists who see ominous developments on the horizon. With clear scientific explanations and harrowing insights, Germs is a masterfully written -- and timely -- work of investigative journalism.

Scientific advances over the past several decades have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts, approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten U.S. citizens and military personnel. Making informed decisions about how to address such concerns requires a realistic assessment of the capabilities that could be misused. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology explores and envisions potential misuses of synthetic biology. This report develops a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology, assesses the levels of concern warranted for such advances, and identifies options that could help mitigate those concerns.

The United States and Biological Warfare] is a major contribution to our understanding of the past involvement by the US and Japanese governments with BW, with important, crucial implications for the future.... Pieces of this story, including the Korean War allegations, have been told before, but never so authoritatively, and with such a convincing foundation in historical research.... This is a brave and significant scholarly contribution on a matter of great importance to the future of humanity. --Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University The United States and Biological Warfare argues persuasively that the United States experimented with and deployed biological weapons during the Korean War. Endicott and Hagerman explore the political and moral dimensions of this issue, asking what restraints were applied or forgotten in those years of ideological and political passion and military crisis. For the first time, there is hard evidence that the United States lied both to Congress and the American public in saying that the American biological warfare program was purely defensive and for retaliation only. The truth is that a large and sophisticated biological weapons system was developed as an offensive weapon of opportunity in the post-World War II years. From newly declassified American, Canadian, and British documents, and with the cooperation of the Chinese Central Archives in giving the authors the first access by foreigners to relevant classified documents, Endicott and Hagerman have been able to tell the previously hidden story of the extension of the limits of modern war to include the use of medical science, the most morally laden of sciences with respect to the sanctity of human life. They show how the germ warfare program developed collaboratively by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States during the Second World War, together with information gathered from the Japanese at the end of World War II about their biological warfare technology, was incorporated into an ongoing development program in the United States. Startling evidence from both Chinese and American sources is presented to make the case. An important book for anyone interested in the history and morality of modern warfare.