A Terrorist State As A Frontline Ally

Pakistani Assistance For The Anti-Government Of India Activities Was Not Due To Only Its Revanchist Spirit Following Its Loss Of East Pakistan But For Keeping Itsmilitary Preoccupied With Internal Security Duties Thereby Trying To Neutralize The Superiority Of The Indian Armed Forces. Such A Policy Could Ultimately Weaken The Unity Of India Just As The Bleeding Of Soviet Troops In Afghanistan Contributed To The Break-Up Of Ussr. Terrorism Is An Absolute Evil And Has To Be Treated As Such.

While the war on terrorism may have provided the rationale for the latest U.S. engagement with Pakistan, the present relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is at the crossroads of many other issues, such as Pakistan¿s own reform efforts, America¿s evolving strategic relationship with South Asia, democracy in the Muslim world, and the dual problems of religious extremism and nuclear proliferation. This report examines the history and present state of U.S.-Pakistan relations, addresses the key challenges the two countries face, and concludes with specific policy recommendations for ensuring the relationship meets the needs of both the U.S. and Pakistan.

US foreign policy-making from the end of the Cold War to after 2001 is crucial to understanding the years of strong US engagement with Pakistan that would follow 9/11. This book explains Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s by examining the role of the United States in the shaping of Islamabad’s security goals. Drawing upon a diverse range of oral history interviews as well as available written sources, the book explains the American contribution to Pakistani security objectives during the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001). The author investigates and explains the dynamics which drove Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support for the Taliban and its approach towards the indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir. She argues that Clinton’s foreign policy contributed to the hardening of Islamabad’s security perspectives, creating space for the Pakistani military establishment to pursue its regional security goals. The book also discusses the argument that US-Pakistan relations during this period were driven by a Cold War mindset, causing a fissure between US global and Pakistan’s regional security goals. The Pakistani military and civilian leadership utilized these divergent and convergent trends to protect Islamabad’s India-centric strategic interests. The book addresses a gap in the relevant literature and moves beyond the available mono-causal explanations often distorted by a mixture of intellectual obfuscation and political rhetoric. It adds a Pakistani perspective and is a valuable contribution to the study of US-Pakistan relations.

Wars are born in human mind. Great military leaders belonging to all times and cultures have always tried to influence the minds of their foes and friends alike to facilitate their own victories by making their enemies hesitant. The minds concerned could be influenced with a variety of overt and covert actions that send right signals to the target audiences. In the words of Allied Supreme Commander of the World War II, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, these actions are: anything from the singing of a beautiful anthem to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage. This is Psychological Warfare and the most preferred action is communication. Dr. Arunkumar Bhatt, who being a defence journalist knows nuances of communication and unfolds here this soft-kill strategy and its tactics. He traces the history of the psychological warfare to establish how steadily its importance has grown. It became a war winning factor in the Great War and its role further expanded in the World War II. The Psywar as it has come to be known among many names has not looked back since then. The advances in science and technology, revolution in communication and information technologies have greatly enhanced the range and effectiveness of the psychological warfare in terms of both, time and space. The Revolution in Military Affairs has been further sharpening the Psywar weapons. Dedicated Psywar units and even commands backed by elements in formation staff are in the vogue. The Psychological Warfare has now found a place among ‘war by other means.’ It is recognised as a command function and is factored in planning at all levels. It is so important that the decision to deploy the psy-weapons is taken at the top echelon of the high command and this is done much ahead of the breaking out of hostilities. Where does India that has a poor strategic culture and still poorer awareness about its security, stand vis-à-vis Psywar? Indian culture has instances of the Psywar. It was being practised in the ancient period. Kautilya recommends it strongly. Different invaders used it. The British practised it in an institutionalised fashion to rule India. India did counter the British psywar but in a rather ‘irregular’ way. India used it successfully in some of the post-independence wars but the country needs to do much more to protect itself against Psywar attacks and to use it effectively to enhance its own security in the present day multi-threat scenario. This is an attempt to table a calling attention motion before the nation.

Established in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8 by the Australian army officer Major-General Walter Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff in the Pakistan Army, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for years remained an under-developed and obscure agency. In 1979, the organisation's growing importance was felt during the Soviet war in Afghanistan , as it worked hand in glove with the CIA to support the mujahideen resistance, but its activities received little coverage in news media. Since that time, the ISI has projected its influence across the region in 1988 its involvement in Indian Kashmir came under increasing scrutiny, and by 1995 its mentoring of what became the Afghan Taliban was well attested. But it was the organisation's alleged links with Al Qaeda and the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, at the heart of Pakistan's military zone, that really threw it under the spotlight. These controversies and many more have dogged the ISI, including its role in Pakistan's testing of a nuclear weapon in 1998 and its links with A.Q. Khan. Offering fresh insights into the ISI as a domestic and international actor based on intimate knowledge of its inner workings and key individuals, this startlingly original book uncovers the hitherto shady world of Pakistan's secret service.

Mumbai 26/11 saw a mix of commando-style attacks typical of the special forces of an army and indiscriminate killing of civilians typical of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Pakistani jihadi organization. The meticulous planning, the thorough training of the 10 LeT terrorists, who carried it out, and the close co-ordination of the attacks from the command and control of the LeT had the stamp of Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, both of which the LeT has a close relationship with. The LeT terrorists attacked a mix of targets—innocent Indian civilians in public places, Jewish people in a religious-cum-cultural centre and members of the Indian and foreign social and business elite in two five-star hotels. The attacks on the Jewish centre and the hotels lasted over 60 hours and were continuously telecast live by the TV channels. The success of the terrorist attacks, mounted from the sea, highlighted once again the serious deficiencies in India’s national security apparatus and the role of Pakistan in the spread of terrorism across the world. Have we drawn the right lessons in respect of both? Can the Indian people now expect at least a more robust counter-terrorism policy to prevent another 26/11?