A Transatlantic Bargain For The 21st Century

In the 21st century, the transatlantic bargain that has framed the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies is under more scrutiny than ever before. In a changed geopolitical environment, one characterized by the complexity of modern military operations, the growing power of China, and a climate of economic austerity in the West, a consensus has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic as to the need for a revised bargain to accommodate the changing dynamics of global politics. Washington is becoming less and less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance -- in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation -- and is sending clear signals to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply-entrenched culture of dependency. European allies are learning they must approach transatlantic relations with a new maturity, and as efforts at multinational defense collaboration accelerate across Europe, there is evidence of a new approach to thinking about transatlantic relations. The transatlantic bargain was a Cold War construct suited to its time; what is required now is a transatlantic bargain that generates a new culture of transatlantic partnership, between the United States, NATO, and the European Union.

In the 21st century, the transatlantic bargain that has framed the relationship between the United Statates and its NATO allies is under more scrutiny than ever before. In a changed geopolitical environment, one characterized by the complexity of modern military operations, the growing power of China, and a climate of economic austerity in the West, a consensus has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic as to the need for a revised bargain to accommodate the changing dynamics of global politics. Washington is becoming less and less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance-in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation-and is sending clear signals to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply-entrenched culture of dependency. European allies are learning they must approach transatlantic relations with a new maturity, and as efforts at multinational defense collaboration accelerate across Europe, there is evidence of a new approach to thinking about transatlantic relations. The transatlantic bargain was a Cold War construct suited to its time; what is required now is a transatlantic bargain that generates a new culture of transatlantic partnership, between the United States, NATO, and the European Union.

In the 21st century, the transatlantic bargain that has framed the relationship between the United Statates and its NATO allies is under more scrutiny than ever before. In a changed geopolitical environment, one characterized by the complexity of modern military operations, the growing power of China, and a climate of economic austerity in the West, a consensus has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic as to the need for a revised bargain to accommodate the changing dynamics of global politics. Washington is becoming less and less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance-in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation-and is sending clear signals to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply-entrenched culture of dependency. European allies are learning they must approach transatlantic relations...

In the 21st century, the transatlantic bargain that has framed the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies is under more scrutiny than ever before. In a changed geopolitical environment, one characterized by the complexity of modern military operations, the growing power of China, and a climate of economic austerity in the West, a consensus has emerged on both sides of the Atlantic as to the need for a revised bargain to accommodate the changing dynamics of global politics. Washington is becoming less and less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance -- in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation -- and is sending clear signals to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply-entrenched culture of dependency. European allies are learning they must approach transatlantic relations with a new maturity, and as efforts at multinational defense collaboration accelerate across Europe, there is evidence of a new approach to thinking about transatlantic relations. The transatlantic bargain was a Cold War construct suited to its time; what is required now is a transatlantic bargain that generates a new culture of transatlantic partnership, between the United States, NATO, and the European Union.

The same may be said of the transatlantic bargain that has underpinned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its founding and framed the relationship between the United States and its European allies. A source of both enduring stability as well as perpetual discord, the transatlantic bargain has always been a balancing act between a U.S. commitment to European security in return for a position of U.S. leadership and dominance of NATO, and the expectation that Europeans would accelerate efforts to provide for their own defense. Such a balance remains the essence of the bargain in the 21st century, but the context within which the bargain must operate has changed dramatically, and the nature of America's relationship with the Alliance is perhaps under more scrutiny than ever before.In the context of the contemporary security environment— one characterized by the complexity of modern operations requiring a range of civilian and military capabilities, and a changing world characterized by the diffusion of power and the rise of China—the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the transatlantic bargain that underpins it, must reorient itself to its changing landscape. The combined experiences of NATO's missions in the Balkans, a decade-long expeditionary operation in Afghanistan, and its most recent mission in Libya, coupled with a climate of fiscal austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, have placed the bargain under immense strain. During the first Barack Obama administration, it became evident that Washington is increasingly less willing to tolerate what it sees as fundamental gaps within the Alliance—in defense spending, capabilities, and military transformation. As a result, Washington is signaling more forcefully than ever to its European allies, as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater share of Alliance burdens, accelerate efforts to generate capabilities and resources, and move away from a deeply entrenched culture of dependency.Revising the bargain requires new ways of thinking, both in the United States and Europe. There are signs, however, that not only is there a consensus on the need to revise the transatlantic bargain, but that the outlines of what such a bargain might look like are beginning to emerge. U.S. rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific and a reduction in U.S. forces in Europe in no way signal a turning away from Europe, only recognition that the United States inhabits a changing world; this is a process that essentially has been under way since the end of the Cold War, but has been accelerated in the context of the challenges and demands of a decade of war, a climate of austerity, and the rise of new centers of power. U.S. political and military leaders should continue to affirm NATO's enduring importance and value for America. The United States has already begun to signal a shift in mindset; the U.S. military is reconfiguring its force posture to reflect the wider strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, but to offset European fears over a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe, the U.S. military should, and will, continue to support regular rotational deployments to conduct joint training with its European allies and ensure both sides are able to operate together on future missions. The U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) will continue to play a role—albeit reduced in size—in building partner capacity and fostering interoperability through ongoing training and exercises with European allies. Continuing multinational Landpower exercises of the kind currently undertaken by USAREUR will be another valuable tool in demonstrating the U.S. military's ongoing commitment to capacity building and partnership in Europe.

This book explores the evolution and future relevance of NATO from the perspective of the member-states. Addressing the overarching question of the relevance of transatlantic relations in the 21st century, the volume has three core objectives. The first is to reinforce the view that international alliances serve not only an external-oriented goal, but also a domestic-oriented aim, which is to control others’ behaviour. The second is to show that tensions amongst NATO allies have become more acute and, therefore, more dangerous. The third is to discuss current transatlantic relations through the adoption of a "second image" perspective; that is, one that emphasizes the multiple vertical linkages that connect NATO to the politics and the policies of each ally. The chapters presented here are built on a dual approach: on the one hand, they look at the place the Alliance occupies in the domestic public debate and the strategic culture of specific member states; on the other, they analyze how each of these countries contributes to NATO’s operations and what interests and visions they share for the Alliance’s future. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, international organizations, foreign policy, and security studies in general.

"Stanley Sloan has for many years been one of the most influential and authoritative analysts of the NATO Alliance. In his new book Permanent Alliance? he demonstrates once again his in-depth knowledge of NATO issues and his sound, balanced judgements of both the strengths and weaknesses of the Alliance as it strives to adapt to the 21st-century security challenges. This book should be at the top of the list for anyone who wants to understand today's NATO." Jamie Shea, Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO "Stanley Sloan, a distinguished NATO analyst, has been thinking, lecturing, and writing about the transatlantic bargain for over a generation. In this, his third book on the subject, he has produced a masterly re-examination of the sixty-year relationship between America and Europe. Cautiously optimistic about NATO's future, this authoritative study should be welcomed by scholars and policymakers alike. It will be a valuable text for my NATO history classes." Lawrence S. Kaplan, Emeritus Director, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies, Kent State University "Sloan's book is an outstanding study on the subject matter of transatlantic relations. He is an original thinker, an experienced researcher and---clearly visible---loves the subject matter. This study is a must both for teachers and students of political science and contemporary history." Bram Boxhoorn, Director, Netherlands Atlantic Association "I read Stan Sloan as I began teaching NATO affairs decades ago. I continue to read him today to learn. You will as well---read him." Lawrence Chalmer, National Defense University Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama examines how US-European relations are evolving in response to the many global trends that are changing the strategic environment for that relationship. The Obama Administration has taken responsibility for US participation in the transatlantic alliance as the allies prepare to implement a new strategic concept and try to shape NATO's future in view of these trends and the alliance's experience in Afghanistan. In this light, Sloan assesses whether NATO is becoming the permanent alliance President George Washington warned us against, or if it is nearing the end of its utility.