Afghan National Security Forces

Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time, documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan force from 2001 to 2009, and provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.

Since 2002, the U.S. has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The U.S. Dept. of Defense, through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Dept. of State, the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from a 2005 report on the ANSF, this report analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria that was previously recommended. The author also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ).

Details the establishment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Examines future prospects of this force by analyzing its strengths and weaknesses, and views these within a broader context of the civil, military, and economic conflict that affects both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war