Air Interdiction In World War Ii Korea And Vietnam An Interview With Generals Partridge Smart Vogt Jr

Three distinguished USAF Generals offer their wisdom on Aerial Interdiction. In the long evolution of American air power in the twentieth century the professional experiences and judgments of these senior air leaders are both representative and instructive. Over one hundred years of military service are contained in this oral history interview, almost all of it concerned with the application of a new kind of military force—air power—to the oldest of military questions: how to defeat enemy armies. In discussing their experiences in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, these men focus on those air campaigns which have come to be considered classics of air interdiction: in World War II, Operation Strangle in Italy, March-May 1944, and operations in support of the Normandy Invasion, April-June 1944; in the Korean War, all campaigns, especially Operation Strangle, May-October 1951; in the Vietnam War, the air interdiction part of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, March 1965-November 1968, the air campaign in Southern Laos, 1965-1972, and especially the air interdiction portions of Linebacker I and II, May-October and December 1972. In addition, the discussion turns in the latter stages to the impact of electronics—laser guided weapons, electronic suppression devices, drone air planes, and immediate air intelligence—on air interdiction operations. Generals Partridge, Smart, and Vogt offer definitions, clarifications, examples, generalizations, and advice. Their purpose, and that of the Office of Air Force History, is to further the dialogue among military professionals so that the past can help us to meet the challenges of the future.

CONTENTS Foreword Introduction Air Interdiction in World War II, Korea and Vietnam Air Interdiction Defined World War II The Korean War The Vietnam War The General Problem of Air Interdiction Bibliography Index

This book is the second of a series of group oral interviews focused on major areas of U.A. Air Force operations in the past. Begun in 1981, these interviews attempt to capture the recollections and insights of those former air leaders who shaped the history of the Air Force. The topic of these second series of interviews was air interdiction: how it had been defined, planned, and executive in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The participants - General Earle E. "Pat" Partridge, Gen. Jacob E. Smart, and Gen. John W. Vogt - reflected on the purposes and objectives of air interdiction. Their recollections and insights ranged from pre-World War II tactical air doctrine to air campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and Northern France in World War II, to air interdiction campaigns in Korea, and finally, to more recent examples in Vietnam. Throughout their discussions certain issues recurred: coordinating air with ground and sea forces; allocating aircraft to different air combat missions; collecting and interpreting intelligence; planning and targeting air interdiction missions; and applying air power within a framework of political restraints. Each of these issues is discussed through the lens of personal recollection: a single individual remembering an air battle or campaign at a fixed moment in the past. Consequently, readers should treat this collection as the source material upon which history rests. This book is a collective memoir, elicited by historians from air commanders who flew, fought, and commanded air forces in three wars.

Tre flyvergeneraler, der har deltaget i kamphandlinger som unge piloter, stabsofficerer og som flyverchefer, taler om air interdiction og peger på den lære, der kan drages af erfaringerne.