Al Anbar Awakening V 1 American Perspectives U S Marines And Counterinsurgency In Iraq 2004 2009

Words like"won" or "victory" really do not apply when speaking of counterinsurgency operations. Insurgencies grow from problems and discontent within a given society.

"This two-volume anthology of interviews tells the story of the al-Anbar Awakening and the emergence of al-Anbar Province from the throes of insurgency. It presents the perspectives of both Iraqis (volume two) and Americans (volume one) who ultimately came to work together, in an unlikely alliance of former adversaries, for the stabilization and redevelopment of the province. The collection begins in the 2003-2004 time frame with the rise of the insurgency and concludes with observations from the vintage point of early-to-mid 2009. The anthology demonstrates that there is not one history of the Awakening, but several histories intertwined. It is not a complete collection, but one that provides a broad spectrum of candid, unvarnished perspectives from some of the leading players."--Preface.

This is the first of two volumes. Volume 1 is the American perspective. This volume is the Iraqi perspective. Each volume can stand alone. The interviews collected in the two volumes of this anthology do what no previous work has done-they attempt to tell the story of the al-Anbar Awakening from both sides, American and Iraqi.Not all the voices could be included, but there are many pertinent ones. The story they tell is a complex but important one, and it should be read with interest by all who want to truly understand what happened in Iraq between 2004 and 2009. This two-volume anthology of interviews tells the story of the al-Anbar Awakening and the emergence of al-Anbar Province from the throes of insurgency. It presents the perspectives of both Iraqis (volume two) and Americans (volume one) who ultimately came to work together, in an unlikely alliance of former adversaries, for the stabilization and redevelopment of the province. [e collection begins in the 2003-2004 time frame with the rise of the insurgency and concludes with observations from the vantage point of early to- mid 2009. The anthology demonstrates that there is not one history of the Awakening, but several histories intertwined. It is not a complete collection, but one that provides a broad spectrum of candid, unvarnished perspectives from some of the leading players. The American volume focuses on the roles and views of U.S. Marines, who were the primary Coalition force in al-Anbar from spring 2004 onward.At the time of their arrival, many military experts considered the province irredeemable.This collection chronicles the efforts of the Marines, and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians who worked with them, to consistently employ counterinsurgency tactics and to continue to reach out to the Iraqis during even the darkest days of the insurgency. The Iraqi volume collects from many of the key Awakening players their views on how and why Anbaris came to turn against the insurgency that many had initially supported and seek the aid-both military and economic-of the Americans.[ose interviewed include former Ba'ath Party military officers, senior officers in Iraq's new military, tribal sheikhs, Sunni imams, governmental representatives, and civilians.

Words like "won" or "victory" really do not apply when speaking of counterinsurgency operations. Insurgencies grow from problems and discontent within a given society. Solve the problems, and the insurgency goes away, as opposed to being defeated. [e difficulty is that a government is not always willing to address the root causes of the insurgency because it is often the government itself that the insurgents want to eliminate. In Iraq to a very large degree, we-the U.S.military and civilians- were the source of the insurgency. Honest men and women can argue the whys, what-ifs, and what might-have- beens, but ultimately, it was mostly about unfulfilled promises and the heavy-handed military approach taken by some over the summer of 2003 that caused events to spiral out of control. No doubt the insurgency radicalized over time with al-Qaeda and Shi'a extremists playing a key role, but the insurgents did not initiate the war and only took advantage of the discontent. If you asked Anbaris during my third tour in Iraq in 2008 why the insurgency began, most would look away and try to find a way not to answer.[ey would tell you that "we are friends now, and the causes are unimportant. It's all water under the bridge now." If pressed, they would talk about mutual misunderstandings and a lack of cultural awareness on both sides.[ey would say that expectations were too high on the part of the Iraqis about what America could do for them and how fast, but they seldom if ever blamed us directly. Press them further and they would mention the 29 April 2003 "massacre" in Fallujah, but more about the lack of an apology than the 70-plus unarmed citizens allegedly shot that day. Another factor they would bring up was the shock and humiliation of having their army disbanded.[e army was the one institution in Iraq everyone was proud of-Shi'a and Sunni alike- especially for what it had accomplished in protecting the nation against the Iranians in the 1980s.[ey perceived the disbanding as intentional contempt directed toward Iraq as a nation and as a people.[ey also saw it as the disarming of the nation. In the minds of many, this is when our status as liberators ended and that of occupier began. Press the Anbaris one more time, and they would look you in the eye-but only if you are considered a friend-and they would state that after Baghdad fell and throughout the summer of 2003, the Americans overreacted to small acts of resistance or violence and fought in a way that was cowardly and without honor. Here they would talk about the senseless use of firepower and midnight raids on innocent men.[ey said that by our escalation, we proved true the rhetoric of the nationalist firebrands about why we had invaded, and our actions played directly into the hands of organizations like Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq and Sadr's militia.Ask the same Anbari citizens why sometime in 2006 they began to turn against the by-then al-Qaeda-led insurgency, and the answer would be more direct. To them, their alliance with the radicals was a marriage of convenience to fight the U.S. occupation. Al-Qaeda brought dedication, organization, funding, and a willingness to die. Over time, however, it overplayed its hand and wore out its welcome by forcing an extreme Islamic agenda on a generally secular and very tribal culture. Al-Qaeda's campaign evolved from assistance, to persuasion, to intimidation, to murder in the most horrific ways, all designed to intimidate Anbari society-tribes and sheikhs alike-to adopt the most extreme form of Islam.

"This two-volume anthology of interviews tells the story of the al-Anbar Awakening and the emergence of al-Anbar Province from the throes of insurgency. It presents the perspectives of both Iraqis (volume two) and Americans (volume one) who ultimately came to work together, in an unlikely alliance of former adversaries, for the stabilization and redevelopment of the province. The collection begins in the 2003-2004 time frame with the rise of the insurgency and concludes with observations from the vintage point of early-to-mid 2009. The anthology demonstrates that there is not one history of the Awakening, but several histories intertwined. It is not a complete collection, but one that provides a broad spectrum of candid, unvarnished perspectives from some of the leading players."--Preface.

President Obama has declared that the greatest terrorist threat which America faces is attacks by lone wolf terrorists. This volume expands the lone wolf rubric to include autonomous cells: small groups of terrorists who cooperate, but operate independently. The challenge presented by lone wolves and autonomous cells, unlike the threat emanating from established terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, has proven intractable because of the difficulty of gathering intelligence on these actors or effectively countering their actions. Lone wolves operate under the radar, staging deadly attacks such as that at the Boston Marathon, and the 2011 attacks in Norway. This volume includes Theory and Policy Studies, individual case studies and the technological impacts of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as the impact of social media in the process of recruitment and radicalization. This book was originally published as a special issue of Terrorism & Political Violence.

"Adaptation Under Fire looks at the essential importance of military adaptation in winning wars. Every military must prepare for future wars despite inevitably having little confidence about the precise shape that those wars will take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." Despite this uncertainty, military organizations still must make choices. They must determine the nature of doctrine they will need to fight effectively, the type of weaponry and equipment they must procure to defeat their potential foe, and the kind of leaders they must select and develop to guide the force to victory. Since the U.S. military has global security responsibilities, it will have to make these choices without knowing when, where, or how the next war will unfold, nor even who the enemy may be. It will need to adapt quickly and successfully in the face of the unexpected in order to prevail. The book starts by providing a framework for understanding adaptation, and includes several historical examples of success and failure. The second section examines U.S. military adaptation during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and explains why certain forms of adaptation have proven so problematic. The final section argues that the U.S. military must become more adaptable in order to successfully address the fast-changing security challenges of the 21st century, and concludes with some recommendations on how it should do so. "--