America S First Battles 1775 1965

This volume, a collection of eleven original essays by many of the foremost U.S. military historians, focuses on the transition of the Army from parade ground to battleground in each of nine wars the United States has fought. Through careful analysis of organization, training, and tactical doctrine, each essay seeks to explain the strengths and weaknesses evidenced by the outcome of the first significant engagement or campaign of the war. The concluding essay sets out to synthesize the findings and to discover whether or not American first battles manifest a characteristic "rhythm." America's First Battles provides a novel and intellectually challenging view of how America has prepared for war and how operations and tactics have changed over time. The thrust of the book--the emphasis on operational history--is at the forefront of scholarly activity in military history.

This volume, a collection of eleven original essays by many of the foremost U.S. military historians, focuses on the transition of the Army from parade ground to battleground in each of nine wars the United States has fought. Through careful analysis of organization, training, and tactical doctrine, each essay seeks to explain the strengths and weaknesses evidenced by the outcome of the first significant engagement or campaign of the war. The concluding essay sets out to synthesize the findings and to discover whether or not American first battles manifest a characteristic "rhythm." America's First Battles provides a novel and intellectually challenging view of how America has prepared for war and how operations and tactics have changed over time. The thrust of the book, the emphasis on operational history, is at the forefront of scholarly activity in military history. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

An A–Z encyclopedia covering the principal battles and campaigns, key military and political figures, and the political maneuvering during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars. America's adventure into colonialism began with the destruction of the U.S. battleship Maine in 1898, presumably by a Spanish mine. The four month war against Spain that followed—the shortest declared war in U.S. history—resulted in the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. The young giant of the Western Hemisphere was transformed into a colonial power, and the balance of power in the world was changed forever. In this chronicle of an era that has escaped the attention it deserves, military historian Jerry Keenan explores America's war with Spain and the violence that followed. He shows how the United States muddled the administration of the sprawling Philippine archipelago, guided by a policy that President McKinley called "benevolent assimilation." Within a year, the United States was fighting a war against Philippine nationalists—a three year conflict that would give American soldiers their first bitter taste of counterinsurgency warfare in an Asian jungle.

How have the U.S. Army Rangers acted as special operations forces in military operations since 1942? Hogan's study examines the nature and purpose of the Rangers over the past fifty years and shows how they have served as scouts, raiders, assault troops, and elite infantry. They have spearheaded amphibious landings, raided enemy prison camps, patrolled behind enemy lines in Korea, served alongside Green Berets in Vietnam, and carried out special missions in Grenada. Professional officers, military historians, students, and general readers will find this a fascinating history. This analytical account opens with a short description of the origins of the Ranger legend in America and then moves to a discussion of their use in World War II, as commandos in 1942, then as spearheaders in 1943 and 1944, as line infantry in Europe and as special operations forces in the Pacific. This provocative assessment also traces the development of Ranger raider units in Korea, the special training and use of Green Berets as Rangers in Vietnam, and the shifting of Ranger roles into more complex and varied types of operations in Vietnam and Grenada and in a world of increasing terrorism and changing combat situations. Illustrations, maps, and a lengthy bibliography add to the usefulness of the study.

When the Civil War began, Northern soldiers and civilians alike sought a framework to help make sense of the chaos that confronted them. Many turned first to the classic European military texts from the Napoleonic era, especially Antoine Henri Jomini's Summary of the Art of War. As Carol Reardon shows, Jomini's work was only one voice in what ultimately became a lively and contentious national discourse about how the North should conduct war at a time when warfare itself was rapidly changing. She argues that the absence of a strong intellectual foundation for the conduct of war at its start--or, indeed, any consensus on the need for such a foundation--ultimately contributed to the length and cost of the conflict. Reardon examines the great profusion of new or newly translated military texts of the Civil War years, intended to fill that intellectual void, and draws as well on the views of the soldiers and civilians who turned to them in the search for a winning strategy. In examining how debates over principles of military thought entered into the question of qualifications of officers entrusted to command the armies of Northern citizen soldiers, she explores the limitations of nineteenth-century military thought in dealing with the human elements of combat.

Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

The book Infantry in battle by George Marshall was the inspiration for this book which has been written to reflect its own times, not Marshall's. The thirty-six chapters that follow have been chosen to reflect changes in the military art since Marshall's times. Each chapter deals with one case drawn from recent military history that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional soldier may someday have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed. The book is intentionally designed to be read piecemeal, a chapter at a time, in order to make it as broadly useful to professional soldiers no matter where or in what capacity they are serving-in the field, on the staff, or in the Army's institutions of higher military education. Recognizing that some readers may want to know more about a particular case, a bibliography following each is included.