American Vietnamese Relations In The Wake Of War

When the Vietnam War ended with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975—27 months after a cease-fire had been signed in Paris—the differences between the United States and Vietnam were far from being resolved. Mutual bitterness regarding the war remained. Newly unified Vietnam wanted normalization of relations and the subsequent economic reconstruction aid promised in the Paris Peace Accords. Understandably wary of such diplomatic relations, the United States requested information regarding soldiers listed as missing in action and assistance with the repatriation of military remains. A series of misconceptions and misunderstandings as well as changes from a regional to a global U.S. foreign policy left both countries bereft of an easy solution. This book describes the negotiations during the late Ford and early Carter administrations (1975–1979) and discusses the repercussions the diplomatic stalemate had on the domestic and international politics of the United States and Vietnam, emphasizing the conflicting priorities and political goals of both countries, at home and abroad. This previously neglected period in United States-Vietnam relations deals with issues such as Hanoi’s constant exultation over the victory, American denial of responsibility, the division between the presidents’ public declarations and congressional policies, and both sides’ use of the MIA issue. Based primarily on recently declassified documents and former U.S. official Douglas Pike’s uncensored collection, the work also makes use of media press sources from America, Vietnam, Britain, France and China. Interviews with Vietnamese immigrants and former U.S. politicians provide insight unavailable in written histories. Appendices contain the February 1973 correspondence between President Nixon and the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, six diplomatic notes from 1976, and a January 30, 1979, letter from President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.

Today Vietnam is one of America’s strongest international partners, with a thriving economy and a population that welcomes American visitors. How that relationship was formed is a twenty-year story of daring diplomacy and a careful thawing of tensions between the two countries after a lengthy war that cost nearly 60,000 American and more than two million Vietnamese lives. Ted Osius, former ambassador during the Obama administration, offers a vivid account, starting in the 1990s, of the various forms of diplomacy that made this reconciliation possible. He considers the leaders who put aside past traumas to work on creating a brighter future, including senators John McCain and John Kerry, two Vietnam veterans and ideological opponents who set aside their differences for a greater cause, and Pete Peterson—the former POW who became the first U.S. ambassador to a new Vietnam. Osius also draws upon his own experiences working first-hand with various Vietnamese leaders and traveling the country on bicycle to spotlight the ordinary Vietnamese people who have helped bring about their nation’s extraordinary renaissance. With a foreword by former Secretary of State John Kerry, Nothing Is Impossible tells an inspiring story of how international diplomacy can create a better world.

During the Vietnam War the U.S. sprayed herbicides over South Vietnam to defoliate forests and destroy food crops. Most of the herbicides were code named Agent Orange and most of the Agent Orange was contaminated with dioxin, a highly toxic substance. Since 1991, scientists at the U.S. Institute of Medicine have shown dioxin to be a risk factor in a growing number of illnesses and birth defects. Their research is corroborated by the work of Vietnamese scientists. In 2007, 32 years after the end of the war, the governments of Vietnam and the United States began to address this war legacy on the ground in Vietnam. In the opening essay, How We Got Here and What¿s Next, Son and Bailey outline the moral reasoning for a fuller American response and present further steps the U.S. and Vietnam can each take in a joint humanitarian initiative to resolve the legacy of Agent Orange/ dioxin in Vietnam. The authors then address the critical issues of whether dioxin pollution still exists in Vietnam, what needs to be done to finish the job of clean up, how many victims of Agent Orange carry out their lives today, does dioxin exposure lead to birth defects, and the impact of Agent Orange on relations between the U.S. and Vietnam.

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period. Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

A new understanding of US policy toward Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War based on fresh archival discoveries.

Some will be shocked to find out that the United States and Ho Chi Minh, our nemesis for much of the Vietnam War, were once allies. Indeed, during the last year of World War II, American spies in Indochina found themselves working closely with Ho Chi Minh and other anti-colonial factions-compelled by circumstances to fight together against the Japanese. Dixee Bartholomew-Feis reveals how this relationship emerged and operated and how it impacted Vietnam's struggle for independence. The men of General William Donovan's newly-formed Office of Strategic Services closely collaborated with communist groups in both Europe and Asia against the Axis enemies. In Vietnam, this meant that OSS officers worked with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, whose ultimate aim was to rid the region of all imperialist powers, not just the Japanese. Ho, for his part, did whatever he could to encourage the OSS's negative view of the French, who were desperate to regain their colony. Revealing details not previously known about their covert operations, Bartholomew-Feis chronicles the exploits of these allies as they developed their network of informants, sabotaged the Japanese occupation's infrastructure, conducted guerrilla operations, and searched for downed American fliers and Allied POWs. Although the OSS did not bring Ho Chi Minh to power, Bartholomew-Feis shows that its apparent support for the Viet Minh played a significant symbolic role in helping them fill the power vacuum left in the wake of Japan's surrender. Her study also hints that, had America continued to champion the anti-colonials and their quest for independence, rather than caving in to the French, we might have been spared our long and very lethal war in Vietnam. Based partly on interviews with surviving OSS agents who served in Vietnam, Bartholomew-Feis's engaging narrative and compelling insights speak to the yearnings of an oppressed people-and remind us that history does indeed make strange bedfellows.

This book discusses Vietnam’s relations with ASEAN in the period from the early 1970s to mid-1990s. It focuses on the evolution of Hanoi’s view on ASEAN, from denial to integration in the organization. Further, it reveals the reasons behind Hanoi’s decision to join ASEAN in 1995 in the context of the transformation of the overall Vietnam’s foreign policy when the Cold War ended. Relaxation of the Cold War conditions allowed Hanoi to improve understanding of ASEAN that resulted in better Vietnam-ASEAN relations and subsequent Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN. The author has had access to documents and interviewees that few other researchers can rival. And the richness of the empirical evidence of this book makes a significant contribution to the studies of Vietnam foreign relations in specific and Southeast Asian international relations in general.