An Abstract Of A Book Lately Published Entituled A Treatise Of Human Nature Etc Wherein The Chief Argument Of That Book Is Farther Illustrated And Explained

The two original volumes of the Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science, and Social Policy were published in 2007. Those two volumes included 848 entries from nearly 300 contributors and included a wide range of entries in three general categories: entries exploring Catholic social thought at a theoretical level, entries reflecting the learning of various social science and humanistic disciplines as this learning relates to Catholic social thought, and entries examining specific social policy questions. This third, supplemental volume continues the approach of the original two. First, the volume includes entries that explore Catholic social thought at its broadest, most theoretical level; for example, an entry on Pope Benedict’s important social encyclical Caritas in Veritate. Second, the volume includes entries that discuss recent social science research that bears on issues important to Catholic social thought; for example, an entry on the social costs of pornography draws on recent research on the topic. Third, the volume includes entries discussing specific issues of social policy that have become increasingly important in recent years; for example, an entry on embryo adoption and/or rescue. This third volume contains 202 entirely new entries from over 100 contributors. The contributors include distinguished scholars such as Father Robert John Araujo, S.J. (Loyola University of Chicago), Father Kevin L. Flannery, S.J. (Gregorian University), Robert P. George (Princeton University), William E. May (John Paul Institute and the Culture of Life Foundation), D. Q. McInerny (Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary), and Michael Novak (Ave Maria University). The work will appeal to anyone who is looking for a clear and accurate introduction to Catholic social thought.

This is the first edition in over a century to present David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Dissertation on the Passions, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and Natural History of Religion in the format he intended: collected together in a single volume. Hume has suffered a fate unusual among great philosophers. His principal philosophical work is no longer published in the form in which he intended it to be read. It has been divided into separate parts, only some of which continue to be published. This volume repairs that neglect by presenting the four pieces that Hume in later life desired to "alone be regarded as containing [his] philosophical sentiments and principles" in the format he preferred, as a single volume with an organization that parallels that of his early Treatise of Human Nature. This edition’s introduction comments on the historical origins and evolution of the four parts and draws attention to how they mutually inform and support one another. The text is based on the first (1758) edition of Hume’s Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Notes advise the reader of the changes made in the final (1777) edition. Excerpts from the work of some of Hume’s most important contemporary critics are included as appendices. Hume’s abundant references to ancient historians, geographers, poets, and philosophers—many of them now quite obscure—are rendered accessible in this volume through extensive textual notes and a bibliography of online sources.

"This book addresses the problem of how the human visual system organizes inputs that are fragmented in space and time into coherent, stable perceptual units - objects. In doing so it addresses the following questions: what kinds of segmentation and grouping abilities exist in human perceivers? What information and computational processes achieve segmentation and grouping? What are the psychological consequences of perceiving whole objects?" "From Fragments to Objects: Segmentation and Grouping in Vision takes a comprehensive cognitive science approach to object perception, brings together separate lines of research in object perception in one volume, gives an integrated and up-to-date review of theory and empirical research and offers directions for future study."--Jacket.

Many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. But what do they mean by that term? Popular naturalist slogans like, "there is no first philosophy" or "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" are far from illuminating. "Understanding Naturalism" provides a clear and readable survey of the main strands in recent naturalist thought. The origin and development of naturalist ideas in epistemology, metaphysics and semantics is explained through the works of Quine, Goldman, Kuhn, Chalmers, Papineau, Millikan and others. The most common objections to the naturalist project - that it involves a change of subject and fails to engage with "real" philosophical problems, that it is self-refuting, and that naturalism cannot deal with normative notions like truth, justification and meaning - are all discussed. "Understanding Naturalism" distinguishes two strands of naturalist thinking - the constructive and the deflationary - and explains how this distinction can invigorate naturalism and the future of philosophical research.

This book offers the first detailed examination of the influence of the English-speaking world on the development of Nietzsche's philosophy. In recent years, Nietzsche's reputation has undergone a transformation and he is today seen as one of the greatest defenders of human freedom. His is more than just a model for political liberty. It is a grand vision of what humanity could be if it really unleashed its creative power. And Nietzsche owes more than just a passing debt to the Anglo-Saxon world in the construction of this vision. Yet much of what Nietzsche has to say about the British philosophy reaches the pitch of denunciation and personal insult. He refers to Darwin as 'mediocre'; and to John Stuart Mill as 'that flathead'. While he gladly acknowledges the French roots of his thought, very little has been said about the English giants whose influence abounds in his work. Louise Mabille fills a gap in the scholarship on Nietzsche by offering an important and fascinating account of his engagement with the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition.

Frederick F. Schmitt offers a systematic interpretation of David Hume's epistemology, as it is presented in the indispensable A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's text alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism in epistemology. Interpretations of his epistemology have tended to emphasise one of these apparently conflicting positions over the others. But Schmitt argues that the positions can be reconciled by tracing them to a single underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability quietly at work in the text, an epistemology according to which truth is the chief cognitive merit of a belief, and knowledge and probable belief are species of reliable belief. Hume adopts Locke's dichotomy between knowledge and probability and reassigns causal inference from its traditional place in knowledge to the domain of probability—his most significant departure from earlier accounts of cognition. This shift of causal inference to an associative and imaginative operation raises doubts about the merit of causal inference, suggesting the counterintuitive consequence that causal inference is wholly inferior to knowledge-producing demonstration. To defend his associationist psychology of causal inference from this suggestion, Hume must favourably compare causal inference with demonstration in a manner compatible with associationism. He does this by finding an epistemic status shared by demonstrative knowledge and causally inferred beliefs—the status of justified belief. On the interpretation developed here, he identifies knowledge with infallible belief and justified belief with reliable belief, i.e., belief produced by truth-conducive belief-forming operations. Since infallibility implies reliable belief, knowledge implies justified belief. He then argues that causally inferred beliefs are reliable, so share this status with knowledge. Indeed Hume assumes that causally inferred beliefs enjoy this status in his very argument for associationism. On the reliability interpretation, Hume's accounts of knowledge and justified belief are part of a broader veritistic epistemology making true belief the chief epistemic value and goal of science. The veritistic interpretation advanced here contrasts with interpretations on which the chief epistemic value of belief is its empirical adequacy, stability, or fulfilment of a natural function, as well as with the suggestion that the chief value of belief is its utility for common life. Veritistic interpretations are offered of the natural function of belief, the rules of causal inference, scepticism about body and matter, and the criteria of justification. As Schmitt shows, there is much attention to Hume's sources in Locke and to the complexities of his epistemic vocabulary.

Report for 1932/3 contains "Constitution adopted at annual general meeting ... 6 June, 1932" (p. 49).