An Opportunity Lost

In Opportunity Lost, Marcus D. Pohlmann examines the troubling issue of why Memphis city school students are underperforming at alarming rates. His provocative interdisciplinary analysis, combining both history and social science, examines the events before and after desegregation, compares a city school to an affluent suburban school to pinpoint imbalances, and offers critical assessments of various educational reforms. In addition to his analysis of the problems, Pohlmann lays out educational reforms that run the gamut from early intervention and parental involvement to increasing teacher compensation, improving time utilization, and more. Pohlmann?s illuminating and original study has wide application for a problem that bedevils inner-city children everywhere and prevents the promise of equality from reaching all of our nation?s citizens. -- Book cover.

"Examines Charles Brannan's agricultural plan, the farm policy debate, and Harry S. Truman's quest for a long-range agricultural program. Assesses Truman's relationships with farmers and with politicians and the search for a workable peacetime program, especially as it related to the parity price foundation and price supports"--Provided by publisher.

The Confederacy had a great opportunity to turn the Civil War in its favor in 1864, but squandered this chance when it failed to finish off a Union army cornered in Louisiana because of concerns about another Union army coming south from Arkansas. The Confederates were so confused that they could not agree on a course of action to contend with both threats, thus the Union offensive advancing from Arkansas saved the one in Louisiana and became known to history as the Camden Expedition. The Camden Expedition is intriguing because of the “might-have-beens” had the key players made different decisions. The author contends that if Frederick Steele, commander of the Federal VII Army Corps, had not received a direct order from General Ulysses S. Grant to move south, disaster would have befallen not only the Army of the Gulf in Louisiana but the entire Union cause, and possibly would have prevented Abraham Lincoln from winning reelection.

For James Longstreet, the transfer to the Western Theater in 1863 offered opportunity. For his opponent Ambrose Burnside, the hope of redemption. Longstreet, who Robert E. Lee called his “Old Warhorse,” had long labored in the shadow of both his army commander and the late Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. When Confederate fortunes took a turn for the worse in Tennessee, both Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee dispatched Longstreet and most of his First Corps to reinforce Braxton Bragg’s ill-starred Army of Tennessee. Within hours of his arrival Longstreet helped win the decisive victory at Chickamauga and drove the Union Army of the Cumberland back into Chattanooga. For a host of reasons, some military and some political, Bragg dispatched Longstreet and his troops to East Tennessee. Waiting for him there was Ambrose Burnside, whose early-war success melted away with his disastrous loss at Fredericksburg in late 1862 at the head of the Army of the Potomac, followed by the humiliation of “The Mud March.” Burnside was shuffled to the backwater theater of East Tennessee. Bragg’s investment in Chattanooga and subsequent arrival of Longstreet opened the door to Tennessee’s Union-leaning eastern counties and imperiled Burnside’s isolated force around Knoxville, the region’s most important city. A heavy Confederate presence threatened political turmoil for Federal forces and could cut off Burnside’s ability to reinforce Chattanooga. Longstreet finally had the opportunity to display his tactical and operational skills. The two old foes from the Virginia theater found themselves transplanted to unfamiliar ground The fate of East Tennessee, Chattanooga, and the reputations of the respective commanders, hung in the balance.

A Superb New Edition of the Tolstoy Classic A Lost Opportunity by Leo Tolstoy "A Lost Opportunity" is an 1889 fable by the Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy. The story was included in The Kreutzer Sonata and Other Stories publication of 1889. A Lost Opportunity is a fable by Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy. The story leads in with a quote from the King James Bible, St. Matthew's "The Parable of the Unforgiving Servant". Written as a fable, A Lost Opportunity follows two neighboring families who are, at first, loving and respectful of one another. They treated each other as they wanted to be treated. Then the head of the families changed and the relationship between the families changed. Ivan and Gavryl were now the men in charge of their respective families and small arguments led to outright accusations of theft. The two families begin to feud with each other over small things. The wisdom offered by Ivan's father is ignored and verbal assaults turned physical. The physical assaults climax into Gravyl burning down Ivan's house, and the sparks from Ivan's house ignite Gravyl's house - both houses burn to the ground. The story ends with the two families returning a respectful temperament with each other as they rebuild their houses. (Summary, with permission, by author C. B. Carter)

Ivan had plenty of everything-three horses, with one colt, a cow with calf, and fifteen sheep. The women made the men's clothes, and in addition to performing all the necessary household labor, also worked in the field; while the men's industry was confined altogether to the farm. What was left of the previous year's supply of provisions was ample for their needs, and they sold a quantity of oats sufficient to pay their taxes and other expenses. Thus life went smoothly for Ivan. The peasant's next-door neighbor was a son of Gordey Ivanoff, called "Gavryl the Lame." It once happened that Ivan had a quarrel with him; but while old man Gordey was yet alive, and Ivan's father was the head of the household, the two peasants lived as good neighbors should. If the women of one house required the use of a sieve or pail, they borrowed it from the inmates of the other house. The same condition of affairs existed between the men. They lived more like one family, the one dividing his possessions with the other, and perfect harmony reigned between the two families.

On 22 August 1914, on a battlefield one hundred kilometers wide, stretching from Luxembourg to the River Meuse, two French and two German armies clashed in a series of encounters known collectively as the Battle of the Ardennes. On that day 27,000 young French soldiers died, the bloodiest day in the military history of France, most of them in the Ardennes, and yet it is almost unknown to English-speaking readers. There has never been an operational study of the Battle of the Ardennes, in any language, at best a single chapter in a history of greater scope, at least a monograph of an individual tactical encounter within the overall battle. This book fills a glaring gap in the study of the opening phase of the First World War the Battles of the Frontiers and provides fresh insight into both French and German plans for the prosecution of what was supposed to be a short war. At the center of this book lies a mystery. In a key encounter battle one French army corps led by a future Minister of War, General Pierre Roques, outnumbered its immediate opposition by nearly six-to-one and yet dismally failed to capitalize on that superiority. The question is how, and why. Intriguingly there is a six-hour gap in the war diaries of all General Roques' units, it smacks of a cover-up. By a thorough investigation of German sources, and through the discovery of three vital messages buried in the French archives, it is now possible to piece together what happened during those missing hours and show how Roques threw away an opportunity to break the German line and advance unopposed deep into the hinterland beyond. The chimera of a clean break and exploitation, that was to haunt the Allied High Command for the next four years in the trenches of the Western Front, was a brief and tantalizing opportunity for General Roques. The final part of this book seeks to answer the question "why?" The history of both French and German pre-war preparation reveals the political, economic and cultural differences that shaped the two opposing national armies. Those differences, in turn, predicated the behavior of General Roques and his men as well as that of his German opponent. With a clear understanding of those differences, the reader may now understand how the French lost their best opportunity not only to stymie the Schlieffen Plan, but to change the course of the rest of the war. The author's text is supported by a separate map book containing 60 newly-commissioned color maps.