Analogy And Exemplary Reasoning In Legal Discourse

This book brings together contributions from leading figures in legal studies on analogy and related forms of reasoning in the law. Analogical reasoning-which relies on the concept of two different things being in some way like each other-is hugely important not just in the practice of law, but it is nonetheless strongly contested. This volume raises key questions like: What is the logical, argumentative, rhetorical, or just heuristic force of analogy in law? Is analogy really different from extensive interpretation, reasoning by precedent and appeal to paradigm?

This book brings together contributions from leading figures in legal studies on analogy and related forms of reasoning in the law. Analogical reasoning-which relies on the concept of two different things being in some way like each other-is hugely important not just in the practice of law, but it is nonetheless strongly contested. This volume raises key questions like: What is the logical, argumentative, rhetorical, or just heuristic force of analogy in law? Is analogy really different from extensive interpretation, reasoning by precedent and appeal to paradigm? Bron: Flaptekst, uitgeversinformatie.

3 of law as an object that has always already been there, systematic and com plete. Quite the contrary. Some, indeed practically all of us, reject this sort of epistemology of law, and where the hypothesis of the coherence of the legal universe is put forward, this is in order to define it in very noticeably different terms from those traditionally used in legal scholarly accounts. If this referent, the law presented as a full discourses, runs through all of the contributions, this is because reasoning by analogy has to be found its specific place within this legal culture. It is the place to locate the problem of "lacunae" in law, which at bottom allows our various contributions to be classified. With Zaccaria and Maris, the question of lacunae is accepted as such (this is, we might say, the "traditionalist" aspect of these two articles, which is counterbalanced by - keeping to the same terminology - "modernist" emphases, sometimes Dworkinian in nature), and becomes the backdrop for considerations of purely hermeneutic type, in Zaccaria, ex tended in Maris to the field of ethics. The papers from Lenoble and Jackson, the former philosophical and the latter semiological, take as their main tar get this legal knowledge where the theory of lacunae finds its place.

At least since plato and Aristotle, thinkers have pondered the relationship between philosophical arguments and the "sophistical" arguments offered by the Sophists -- who were the first professional lawyers. Judges wield substantial political power, and the justifications they offer for their decisions are a vital means by which citizens can assess the legitimacy of how that power is exercised. However, to evaluate judicial justifications requires close attention to the method of reasoning behind decisions. This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.

In this book, the pervasive use of analogies in the reasoning of lawyers and judges is explained in clear, simple, untechnical prose.

This book provides an epistemological study of the great Islamic scholar of Banjarese origin, Syeikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (1710-1812) who contributed to the development of Islam in Indonesia and, in general, Southeast Asia. The work focuses on Arsyad al-Banjari’s dialectical use and understanding of qiyās or correlational inference as a model of parallel reasoning or analogy in Islamic jurisprudence. This constituted the most prominent instrument he applied in his effort of integrating Islamic law into the Banjarese society.This work studies how Arsyad al-Banjari integrates jadal theory or dialectic in Islamic jurisprudence, within his application of qiyās. The author develops a framework for qiyās which acts as the interface between jadal, dialogical logic, and Per Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT). One of the epistemological results emerging from the present study is that the different forms of qiyās applied by Arsyad al-Banjari represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning. The volume is divided into three parts that discuss the types of qiyās as well their dialectical and argumentative aspects, historical background and context of Banjar, and demonstrates how the theory of qiyās comes quite close to the contemporary model of parallel reasoning for sciences and mathematics developed by Paul Bartha (2010). This volume will be of interest to historians and philosophers in general, and logicians and historians of philosophy in particular.

Combining pragmatics, dialectics, analytics, and legal theory, this work translates interpretative canons into patterns of natural argument.

Universals in Legal Reasoning by Judges explores and expounds the usage of rules to justify judicial decisions. Inspired by Savigny's canons of interpretation, and informed by the author's years of study and teaching in Germany, the book constructs a matrix for all legal argumentation in place of the so-called rules of interpretation, classifying justificatory arguments into four categories: textual, historical, purposive, and system-contextual. Along these categories, the book reveals certain universals while dispelling the confusion and mystery surrounding reasoning from judicial case decisions. This it does — simply and elegantly — by equating reasoning from case decisions with reasoning from statute. A myriad of examples, primarily from Germany, California, and the United Kingdom, show how these arguments find universal application. From start to finish, this book is itself an argument: an argument for judicial transparency and candour, which requires that judges reveal their thoughts and motivations-their ultimate reasons. This is necessary to enhance the persuasiveness and efficacy of judicial precedents, to foster democratic legitimacy, and to permit political accountability.