Analytic Culture In The United States Intelligence Community

Identifies and describes conditions and variables that negatively affect intelligence analysis. Investigates analytic culture, methodology, error, and failure within the Intelligence Community. Uses an applied anthropological methodology that includes interviews, direct and participant observation, and focus groups. Contains a bibliography.

It is a rare season when the intelligence story in the news concerns intelligence analysis, not secret operations abroad. The United States is having such a season as it debates whether intelligence failed in the run-up to both September 11 and the second Iraq war, and so Rob Johnston's wonderful book is perfectly timed to provide the back-story to those headlines. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is to be commended for having the good sense to find Johnston and the courage to support his work, even though his conclusions are not what many in the world of intelligence analysis would like to hear. He reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthro-pologist-conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis-and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better. Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most com¬mon practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analy¬sis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable-for instance, the Directorate of Operation's (DO) "clean¬ing" of spy reports doesn't permit testing of their validity-reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises. The analytic process is driven by current intelligence, especially the CIA's crown jewel analytic product, the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which might be caricatured as "CNN plus secrets." Johnston doesn't put it quite that way, but the Intelligence Community does more reporting than in-depth analysis. None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. Training is driven more by the druthers of individual analysts than by any strategic view of the agencies and what they need. Most training is on-the-job. Johnston identifies the needs for analysis of at least three different types of consumers-cops, spies, and soldiers. The needs of those consumers produce at least three distinct types of intelligence-investigative or operational, stra tegic, and tactical. The research suggests the need for serious study of analytic methods across all three, guided by professional methodologists. Analysts should have many more opportunities to do fieldwork abroad. They should also move much more often across the agency "stovepipes" they now inhabit. These movements would give them a richer sense for how other agencies do analysis. Together, the analytic agencies should aim to create "communities of practice," with mentoring, analytic practice groups, and various kinds of on-line resources, including forums on methods and problem solving. These communities would be linked to a central repository of lessons learned, based on after-action post-mortems and more formal reviews of strategic intelligence products. These reviews should derive lessons for individuals and for teams and should look at roots of errors and failures. Oral and written histories would serve as other sources of wherewithal for lessons. These communities could also begin to reshape organizations, by rethinking organizational designs, developing more formal socialization programs, testing group configurations for effectiveness, and doing the same for management and leadership practices. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

From the Foreword: It is a rare season when the intelligence story in the news concerns intelligence analysis, not secret operations abroad. The United States is having such a season as it debates whether intelligence failed in the run-up to both September 11 and the second Iraq war, and so Rob Johnston's wonderful book is perfectly timed to provide the back-story to those headlines. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is to be commended for having the good sense to find Johnston and the courage to support his work, even though his conclusions are not what many in the world of intelligence analysis would like to hear. He reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthropologist-conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis-and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better. Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable-for instance, the Directorate of Operations' (DO) "cleaning" of spy reports doesn't permit testing of their validity-reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises. The analytic process is driven by current intelligence, especially the CIA's crown jewel analytic product, the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which might be caricatured as "CNN plus secrets." Johnston doesn't put it quite that way, but the Intelligence Community does more reporting than in-depth analysis. None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. Training is driven more by the druthers of individual analysts than by any strategic view of the agencies and what they need. Most training is on-the-job. Johnston identifies the needs for analysis of at least three different types of consumers-cops, spies, and soldiers. The needs of those consumers produce at least three distinct types of intelligence-investigative or operational, strategic, and tactical. The research suggests the need for serious study of analytic methods across all three, guided by professional methodologists. Analysts should have many more opportunities to do fieldwork abroad. They should also move much more often across the agency "stovepipes" they now inhabit. These movements would give them a richer sense for how other agencies do analysis. CHAPTER ONE - Definitions * CHAPTER TWO - Findings * CHAPTER THREE - A Taxonomy of Intelligence Variables * CHAPTER FOUR - Testing the Intelligence Cycle Through Systems Modeling and Simulation * CHAPTER FIVE - Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Experts * CHAPTER SIX - The Question of Foreign Cultures: Combating Ethnocentrism in Intelligence Analysis * CHAPTER SEVEN - Instructional Technology: Effectiveness and Implications for the Intelligence Community * CHAPTER EIGHT - Organizational Culture: Anticipatory Socialization and Intelligence Analysts * CHAPTER NINE - Recommendations: The First Step: Recognizing A Fundamental Problem * CHAPTER TEN - Survey Methodology * CHAPTER ELEVEN - Q-Sort Methodology * CHAPTER TWELVE - The "File-Drawer" Problem and Calculation of Effect Size

Johnson, an anthropologist, writes on the basis of an intimate knowledge of the world of intelligence. He conducted hundreds of interviews & observed & participated in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis. Contents: Research Findings; Ethnography of Analysis: A Taxonomy of Intelligence Variables; & Testing the Intelligence Cycle Through Systems Modeling & Simulation; Areas for Improvement: Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Experts; The Question of Foreign Cultures: Combating Ethnocentrism in Intelligence Analysis; Instructional Technology: Effectiveness & Implications for the Intelligence Community; Organizational Culture: Anticipatory Socialization & Intelligence Analysis; & Recommendations. Bibliography. Illus.

This report assesses the tradecraft of intelligence analysis across the main U.S. intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and recommends improvements. The report makes a number of recommendations for improving analysis for a world of threats very different from that of the Cold War. It focuses on the two essentials of analysis-first, people; second, the tools they have available. The December 2004 intelligence reform legislation set in motion initiatives that move in the right direction. The creation of a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis will provide a real hub for developing tradecraft and tools and for framing critical tradeoffs. The establishment of a National Intelligence University will provide a focal point for training in analysis. The creation of a National Counterterrorism Center will shift intelligence analysis toward problems or issues, not agencies or sources. The building of a Long Term Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council can lead away from the prevailing dominance of current intelligence. And the formation of an Open Source Center can create a seed bed for making more creative use of open-source materials. These specific initiatives are promising but they are just the beginnings. For all the language about the importance of intelligence analysis, data-sharing, fusion, and the like, the national and Intelligence Community leadership today devalues intelligence analysis. A fundamental change is also needed in attitudes and existing organizational cultures.

The intelligence community (IC) plays an essential role in the national security of the United States. Decision makers rely on IC analyses and predictions to reduce uncertainty and to provide warnings about everything from international diplomatic relations to overseas conflicts. In today's complex and rapidly changing world, it is more important than ever that analytic products be accurate and timely. Recognizing that need, the IC has been actively seeking ways to improve its performance and expand its capabilities. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to synthesize and assess evidence from the behavioral and social sciences relevant to analytic methods and their potential application for the U.S. intelligence community. In Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the NRC offers the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recommendations to address many of the IC's challenges. Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow asserts that one of the most important things that the IC can learn from the behavioral and social sciences is how to characterize and evaluate its analytic assumptions, methods, technologies, and management practices. Behavioral and social scientific knowledge can help the IC to understand and improve all phases of the analytic cycle: how to recruit, select, train, and motivate analysts; how to master and deploy the most suitable analytic methods; how to organize the day-to-day work of analysts, as individuals and teams; and how to communicate with its customers. The report makes five broad recommendations which offer practical ways to apply the behavioral and social sciences, which will bring the IC substantial immediate and longer-term benefits with modest costs and minimal disruption.

The U.S. intelligence community (IC) is a complex human enterprise whose success depends on how well the people in it perform their work. Although often aided by sophisticated technologies, these people ultimately rely on their own intellect to identify, synthesize, and communicate the information on which the nation's security depends. The IC's success depends on having trained, motivated, and thoughtful people working within organizations able to understand, value, and coordinate their capabilities. Intelligence Analysis provides up-to-date scientific guidance for the intelligence community (IC) so that it might improve individual and group judgments, communication between analysts, and analytic processes. The papers in this volume provide the detailed evidentiary base for the National Research Council's report, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The opening chapter focuses on the structure, missions, operations, and characteristics of the IC while the following 12 papers provide in-depth reviews of key topics in three areas: analytic methods, analysts, and organizations. Informed by the IC's unique missions and constraints, each paper documents the latest advancements of the relevant science and is a stand-alone resource for the IC's leadership and workforce. The collection allows readers to focus on one area of interest (analytic methods, analysts, or organizations) or even one particular aspect of a category. As a collection, the volume provides a broad perspective of the issues involved in making difficult decisions, which is at the heart of intelligence analysis.