Appeasement In International Politics

Since the 1930s, appeasement has been labeled as a futile and possibly dangerous policy. In this landmark study, Stephen Rock seeks to restore appeasement to its proper place as a legitimate—and potentially successful—diplomatic strategy. Appeasement was discredited by Neville Chamberlain's disastrous attempt to satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial ambitions and avoid war in 1938. Rock argues, however, that there is very little evidence to support the belief that dissatisfied states and their leaders cannot be appeased or that appeasement undermines a state's credibility in later attempts at deterrence. Rock looks at five case studies from the past 100 years, revealing under what conditions appeasement can achieve its goals. From British appeasement of the United States near the beginning of the twentieth century to American conciliation of North Korea in the early 1990s, Rock concludes that appeasement succeeds or fails depending on the nature of the adversary, the nature of the inducements used on the antagonist, and the existence of other incentives for the adversary to acquiesce. Appeasement in International Politics suggests the type of appeasement strategy most appropriate for various situations. The options range from pure inducements, reciprocity, to a mixture of inducements and threats. In addition to this theoretical framework, Rock's explicit comparison of appeasement and deterrence offers important guidelines for policymakers on when and how to implement a strategy of appeasement. At a time when the strategy of engagement plays an increasingly central—and controversial—role in U.S. foreign policy, Appeasement in International Politics reestablishes the long-discredited use of inducements as an effective means of preventing conflict.

This work shows the importance of analysing the "low" politics of areas that have traditionally been dominated by "high" politics. The role of bodies such as the Liberal Summer School and the Women's Liberal Federation are examined, along with the work of thinkers such as JM Keynes.

The German original of this book has received the highest praise by international scholars and reviewers. It represents not merely an attempt to evaluate large amounts of primary sources from many archives, but also provides a comprehensive synthesis of Britain's policy of appeasement vis-a-vis Nazi Germany.

In this book historian R.J.Q. Adams examines the policy of appeasement--so frequently praised as realistic and statesman-like in its day and commonly condemned as wrong-headed and even wicked in ours. Exciting and thoroughly accessible, this work explains the motivations and goals of the principal policy-makers, including Chamberlain, Lord Hailfax, and Sir John Simon, as well as those of the chief critics: Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and others.

"The book details the course of that historiographical debate, beginning with the earliest accounts on appeasement from l938 through 1940.".

This book, first published in 1983, illustrates the domestic and internal dimension of appeasement and explores the political options open to the western powers in the run up to the Second World War. It looks at the factors pointing in the direction of a general settlement with the dictators: limitation of resources and strategic over-commitment by Britain; economic decline and financial exhaustion of France; lack of support from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Representing new scholarship on U. S. appeasement policy in 1930s Europe, these six essays enlarge the traditional focus of research beyond U.S.-German relations. The ideology of policymakers including Roosevelt, Joseph P. Kennedy, Neville Chamberlain, and their critics and the influence of various groups on appeasement policy development are scrutinized. The volume poses new questions about the role of antibolshevism, examines appeasement as part of the quest for stability in Europe, and provides new insights on the nature of U.S. foreign policy prior to World War II.

Appeasement is a controversial strategy of conflict management and resolution in world politics. Its reputation is sullied by foreign policy failures ending in war or defeat in which the appeasing state suffers diplomatic and military losses by making costly concessions to other states. Britain’s appeasement policies toward Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s are perhaps the most notorious examples of the patterns of failure associated with this strategy. Is appeasement’s reputation deserved or is this strategy simply misunderstood and perhaps improperly applied? Role theory offers a general theoretical solution to the appeasement puzzle that addresses these questions, and the answers should be interesting to political scientists, historians, students, and practitioners of cooperation and conflict strategies in world politics. As a social-psychological theory of human behavior, role theory has the capacity to unite the insights of various existing theories of agency and structure in the domain of world politics. Demonstrating this claim is the methodological aim in this book and its main contribution to breaking new ground in international relations theory.