Applied Differential Games

This book grew out of a set of lecture notes for a one semester course on dynamic game theory held at the University of Technology, Vienna. It is intended primarily at the graduate level for students in operations research, management science, applied mathematics, and eco nomics. I hope that I have been able to give the reader an accessible introduction to the subject of nonzero-sum dif ferential games with particular emphasis on applications. It would be irrational to try to re ach total com prehensiveness in a single volume. Therefore, I have resisted the temptation to "over-cannibalize" previous textbooks and monographs on the subject. It has rather been my desire to cover material that (I think) is impor tant and interesting, but gets left out of these publications. Writing a book is quite a game. In the beginning -before c10sing the binding agreement* with Plenum-I believed this to be a fi·nite horizon game. Time, however, * Key words will be explained in the text. 7 PREFACE 8 was a merciless arbiter. I am grateful to the Senior Editor, Dr. Ken Derharn, for allowing manuscript delivery to become a (restricted) free terminal time problem. Most of all, I thank my wife Grace for offering me the needed spiritual support, and my two-year-old daughter Sabrina for ignoring the paradoxical situation that there are games which prevent Dad from playing with her.

Graduate-level text surveys games of fixed duration, games of pursuit and evasion, the computation of saddle points, games of survival, games with restricted phase coordinates, and N-person games. 1971 edition.

One of the definitive works in game theory, this volume takes an original and expert look at conflict solutions. Drawing on game theory, the calculus of variations, and control theory, the author solves an amazing array of problems relating to military situations, pursuit and evasion tactics, athletic contests, and many more. Clearly detailed examples; numerous calculations. 1965 edition.

This book uses a small volume to present the most basic results for deterministic two-person differential games. The presentation begins with optimization of a single function, followed by a basic theory for two-person games. For dynamic situations, the author first recalls control theory which is treated as single-person differential games. Then a systematic theory of two-person differential games is concisely presented, including evasion and pursuit problems, zero-sum problems and LQ differential games. The book is intended to be self-contained, assuming that the readers have basic knowledge of calculus, linear algebra, and elementary ordinary differential equations. The readership of the book could be junior/senior undergraduate and graduate students with majors related to applied mathematics, who are interested in differential games. Researchers in some other related areas, such as engineering, social science, etc. will also find the book useful.

Twenty papers are devoted to the treatment of a wide spectrum of problems in the theory and applications of dynamic games with the emphasis on pursuit-evasion differential games. The problem of capturability is thoroughly investigated, also the problem of noise-corrupted (state) measurements. Attention is given to aerial combat problems and their attendant modelling issues, such as variable speed of the combatants, the three-dimensionality of physical space, and the combat problem, i.e. problems related to 'role determination'.

The subject theory is important in finance, economics, investment strategies, health sciences, environment, industrial engineering, etc.

Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.