Arab Israeli Dispute January 1 July 26 1956

The book has three objectives: to expose students to the ways different US presidents handled major foreign policy making problems; to test the explanatory value of alternative decision-making models; And to reintroduce students to a wide range of critical US foreign policy issues.

This study analyzes the unique triangular relationship between Israel’s diplomatic representatives, pro-Israel advocates, and US administrations draws on a wealth of Hebrew and English primary documentation that includes; government archives, surveillance records, wiretappings, personal oral interviews, and diaries of key individuals. Natan Aridan demonstrates how a small new state succeeded in establishing a level of political, economic and military aid that has made for an alliance that is unique in the American experience. Revealed in considerable depth are the dilemmas facing Israeli and US leaders, and pro-Israel organizations and the extent to which individual Jewish leaders maneuvered as conduits between Israeli governments and US administrations, whose senior dramatis personae in turn attempted to influence, moderate, restrain, and change the course of policy decisions and actions. Each administration had multiple voices and international contingencies presented different challenges, all of which had a major impact in fluctuations, and shifts in policies toward Israel. There was nothing inevitable about military and financial support for Israel. It was only by the end of the period that a distinct pattern began to emerge. Eventual qualified US support took a long and complicated path developed over many decades on multidimensional levels. The book refutes insidious allegations that from Israel’s inception Jewish influence and a powerful Israel lobby hijacked US foreign policy to achieve unreserved military and financial support for Israel that undermined the best interests of the US. The author illustrates one of the poorly misunderstood aspects on the subject by demonstrating how Israeli governments were more astute and powerful than previous scholars have realized and that they were in fact pulling the strings far more than AIPAC and wealthy Jews. He also demonstrates that a contributing factor on the decision to aid Israel (understated in previous research) lay in Israel exploiting its ‘nuisance value.’

These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources, providing an essential reference source for the student of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its long history.

Ben-Zvi also shows how former Prime Minister Shamir's decision to build settlements in the occupied territories aggravated an already tense situation between the U.S. and Israel, and he concludes with comments on the Gulf War and the return to power of the Labor Party in 1992.

The official monthly record of United States foreign policy.

This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed – unsuccessfully – at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

These four volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between 1913 and 1956. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources ...