Aristotle On Perception

Stephen Everson presents a comprehensive new study of Aristotle's account of perception and related mental capacities. Recent debate about Aristotle's theory of mind has focused on this account, which is Aristotle's most sustained and detailed attempt to describe and explain the behaviour of living things. Everson places it in the context of Aristotle's natural science as a whole, showing how he applies the explanatory tools developed in other works to the study of perceptual cognition. Everson demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of many recent scholars, Aristotle is indeed concerned to explain perceptual activity as the activity of a living body, in terms of material changes in the organs which possess the various perceptual capacities. By emphasizing the unified nature of the perceptual system, Everson is able to explain how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive not only such things as colours and sounds but material objects in our environment. This rich and broad-ranging book will be essential reading not only for students of Aristotle's theory of mind but for all those concerned to understand the explanatory principles of his natural science. 'No part of Aristotle's psychological theory has been of greater interest to scholars over the past few years than his account of perception. . . . this excellent book . . . will appeal to Aristotelian scholars and philosophers of mind alike . . . Everson manifests a thorough understanding of much of the literature on Aristotle's psychological theory and displays a talent for offering sophisticated arguments that are informed by the conceptual possibilities demarcated in both ancient and modern philosophy . . . Everson has presented a rich and insightful critique of a thesis which has had significant impact upon contemporary discussions of Aristotle's psychological theory. Further, in offering ths critique, he has avoided many of the snares and entanglements to which others have fallen prey.' John E. Sisko, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

In this timeless and profound inquiry, Aristotle presents a view of the psyche that avoids the simplifications both of the materialists and those who believe in the soul as something quite distinct from body. On the Soul also includes Aristotle's idiosyncratic and influential account of light and colors. On Memory and Recollection continues the investigation of some of the topics introduced in On the Soul. Sachs's fresh and jargon-free approach to the translation of Aristotle, his lively and insightful introduction, and his notes and glossaries, all bring out the continuing relevance of Aristotle's thought to biological and philosophical questions.

Perception in Aristotle's Ethics seeks to demonstrate that living an ethical life requires a mode of perception that is best called ethical perception. Specifically, drawing primarily on Aristotle’s accounts of perception and ethics in De anima and Nicomachean Ethics, Eve Rabinoff argues that the faculty of perception (aisthesis), which is often thought to be an entirely physical phenomenon, is informed by intellect and has an ethical dimension insofar as it involves the perception of particulars in their ethical significance, as things that are good or bad in themselves and as occasions to act. Further, she contends, virtuous action requires this ethical perception, according to Aristotle, and ethical development consists in the achievement of the harmony of the intellectual and perceptual, rational and nonrational, parts of the soul. Rabinoff's project is philosophically motivated both by the details of Aristotle’s thought and more generally by an increasing philosophical awareness that the ethical agent is an embodied, situated individual, rather than primarily a disembodied, abstract rational will.

"Marmodoro's monograph engages with Aristotle's views on a philosophically challenging question regarding perception, which has been central in the history of philosophy and is very much the focus of current debates in a number of philosophical and psychological disciplines: How do we become perceptually aware of objects in the world? Despite the significance of the question, the ways in which ancient philosophers have addressed it have only just begun to be be explored. There is a great wealth of insight on this question to be found in Aristotle, regarding our ability to perceive items in our environment, which he develops through his very demanding metaphysics, and Marmodo explores these insights in depth here. Aristotle's attempts at accounting for our awareness of complex perceptual content were highly original, drawing on and building on the metaphysics he has developed elsewhere in his works, but have not been adequately explored to date"--

Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study in the philosophy of perception written in the medium of historiography. He considers the phenomenology and metaphysics of sensory presentation through the examination of an ancient aporia. Specifically, he argues that a puzzle about perception at a distance is behind Empedocles' theory of vision. Empedocles conceives of perception as a mode of material assimilation, but this raises a puzzle about color vision, since color vision seems to present colors that inhere in distant objects. But if the colors inhere in distant objects how can they be taken in by the organ of sight and so be palpable to sense? Aristotle purports to resolve this puzzle in his definition of perception as the assimilation of sensible form without the matter of the perceived particular. Aristotle explicitly criticizes Empedocles, though he is keen to retain the idea that perception is a mode of assimilation, if not a material mode. Aristotle's notorious definition has long puzzled commentators. Kalderon shows how, read in light of Empedoclean puzzlement about the sensory presentation of remote objects, Aristotle's definition of perception can be better understood. Moreover, when so read, the resulting conception of perception is both attractive and defensible.

Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's senses are active. Observing that lower animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the 'common sense' or sensus communis. Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. Pavel Gregoric offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. Aristotle on the Common Sense begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, Gregoric provides a detailed examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us - a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This text argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics.