Atomic Diplomacy

Probes the complex military and diplomatic factors which ultimately led to the American decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan

'A daring and elaborate work of historical reconstruction.' New York Review of Books'Since its publication almost everyone who has written about the beginning of the atomic age has praised or denounced the book.' New York Times'Tightly written and well presented [this seminal work] is very accessible.' Bob Hulteen, Sojourners (Canada)'Atomic Diplomacy is a classic account of the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and its connections with America's confrontation with the Soviet Union. Fifty years after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is more important than ever that we understand how political and military leaders make decisions about the use of nuclear weapons. Atomic Diplomacy is, therefore a timely book. It is also a very readable book, admirably researched. It should be essential reading for all politicians.' Medicine & WarHailed as a classic on its first publication in the 1960s, Atomic Diplomacy, has now been reissued in a completely revised and expanded edition. Alperovitz provides important new evidence to support the thesis that the primary reason for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not to end the war in Japan, as was said at the time, but to 'make the Russians more manageable'. Drawing on recently released diaries and records of Truman, Eisenhower and others, Alperovitz reevaluates the assumptions, hesitations and decisions that precipitated the use of atomic weapons and traces how possession of the bomb changed American strategy toward the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference and helped to set it on a course that contributed to the swift beginning of the Cold War.Most historians of the period now agree that diplomatic considerations related to the Soviet Union played a major role in the decision to use the bomb. Atomic Diplomacy pioneered this new understanding. Today we still live in Hiroshima's shadow; this path breaking work is timely and urgent reading for anyone interested in the history -- and future -- of peace and war.

This book discusses the decision to use the atomic bomb. Libraries and scholars will find it a necessary adjunct to their other studies by Pulitzer-Prize author Herbert Feis on World War II. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A study of nuclear warfare’s key role in triggering the post-World War II confrontation between the US and the USSR After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep bipolar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War. “Sprightly and well-argued…. The complicated history of how the bomb influenced the start of the war has never been explored so well."—Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University “An outstanding new interpretation of the origins of the Cold War that gives equal weight to American and Soviet perspectives on the conflict that shaped the contemporary world.”—Geoffrey Roberts, author of Stalin’s Wars

With a new preface by the author Controversial in nature, this book demonstrates that the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb against Japan. Alperovitz criticizes one of the most hotly debated precursory events to the Cold War, an event that was largely responsible for the evolution of post-World War II American politics and culture.

These essays from the journal International Security examine the effects of the nuclear revolution on the international system and the role nuclear threats have played in international crises. The authors offer important new interpretations of the role of nuclear weapons in preventing a third world war, of the uses of atomic superiority, and of the effectiveness of nuclear threats.Sean M. Lynn-Jones is the Managing Editor of International Security. Steven E. Miller is a Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and co-editor of the journal. Stephen Van Evera is an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.Contributors: John Mueller. Robert Jervis. Richard K. Betts. Marc Trachtenberg. Roger Digman. Scott D. Sagan. Gordon Chang. H. W. Brands, Jr. Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart.

With startling revelations, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa rewrites the standard history of the end of World War II in the Pacific. By fully integrating the three key actors in the story—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan—Hasegawa for the first time puts the last months of the war into international perspective. From April 1945, when Stalin broke the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and Harry Truman assumed the presidency, to the final Soviet military actions against Japan, Hasegawa brings to light the real reasons Japan surrendered. From Washington to Moscow to Tokyo and back again, he shows us a high-stakes diplomatic game as Truman and Stalin sought to outmaneuver each other in forcing Japan’s surrender; as Stalin dangled mediation offers to Japan while secretly preparing to fight in the Pacific; as Tokyo peace advocates desperately tried to stave off a war party determined to mount a last-ditch defense; and as the Americans struggled to balance their competing interests of ending the war with Japan and preventing the Soviets from expanding into the Pacific. Authoritative and engrossing, Racing the Enemy puts the final days of World War II into a whole new light.