Austere Realism

A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true. The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, Horgan and Potrc consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts. The arguments in Austere Realism are powerfully made and concisely and lucidly set out. The authors' contentions and their methodological approach—products of a decade-long collaboration—will generate lively debate among scholars in metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy.

This collection of influential essays illustrates the range, depth, and importance of moral realism, the fundamental issues it raises, and the problems it faces.

Trout advances scientific realism as a behavioural science. He introduces measured realism which characterizes a kind of uneven but indisputable theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences.

The gap between the U.S. military and society has widened in recent years, posing problems for the constitutional order. The gap is especially acute in major universities. Arms and the University probes various dimensions of the tense relationship between the military and the university. Developing and applying a theory of civic and liberal education, this book shows how some military presence on campus can contribute to the diversity of ideas and the education of all students.

This volume of new essays brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address central questions in the philosophy of perception.

Political realism is a highly diverse body of international relations theory. This substantial reference work examines political realism in terms of its history, its scientific methodology and its normative role in international affairs. Split into three sections, it covers the 2000-year canon of realism: the different schools of thought, the key thinkers and how it responds to foreign policy challenges faced by individual states and globally. It brings political realism up-to-date by showing where theory has failed to keep up with contemporary problems and suggests how it can be applied and adapted to fit our new, globalised world order.

Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? This book is about these two questions. The essays in its pages variously defend and critique answers to each, grapple over the proper methodology for addressing them, and wonder whether either question is worth pursuing. In so doing, they carry on a long and esteemed tradition - for our two questions are among the oldest of philosophical issues, and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy and original answers to debates which have been the focus of a tremendous amount of interest in the last three decades both within philosophy and the culture at large.

There has been a resurgence of interest in the problem of realism, the idea that the world exists in the way it does independently of the mind, within contemporary Continental philosophy. Many, if not most, of those writing on the topic demonstrates attitudes that range from mild skepticism to outright hostility. Richard Sebold argues that the problem with this is that realism is correct and that the question should then become: what happens to Continental philosophy if it is committed to the denial of a true doctrine? Sebold outlines the reasons why realism is superior to anti-realism and shows how Continental philosophical arguments against realism fail. Focusing on the work of four important philosophers, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl, all of who have had a profound influence on more recent thinkers, he provides alternative ways of interpreting their apparently anti-realist sentiments and demonstrates that the insights of these Continental philosophers are nevertheless valuable, despite their problematic metaphysical beliefs.