Aux Origines Du Contr Le De Constitutionnalit Xviiie Xxe Si Cle

Les origines du contrôle de constitutionnalité en France sont, parfois ignorées, souvent mal connues, et en tous les cas, rarement mises en perspective. C'est l'objet de cette publication issue d'un colloque du Centre d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques de Paris II de tenter de les retracer à la fois dans le temps - de la révolution française aux années trente - mais aussi dans l'espace, en recherchant l'influence - ou la non-influence des " modèles étrangers ". Enfin la jurisprudence tant judiciaire qu'administrative éclairent, chacune à leur manière à la fois le refus de contrôle et ses prémisses.

This book discusses the impact of war on the complex interactions between various actors involved in justice: individuals and social groups on the one hand and ‘the justice system’ (police, judiciary and professionals working in the prison service) on the other. It also highlights the emergence of new expectations of justice among these actors as a result of war. Furthermore, the book addresses justice practices, strategies for coping with the changing circumstances, new forms of negotiation, interactions, relationships between populations and the formal justice system in this specific context, and the long-term effects of this renegotiation. Ten out of the eleven chapters focus on Belgian issues, covering the two world wars in equal measure. Belgium’s diverse war experiences in the twentieth century mean that a study of the country provides fascinating insights into the impact of war on the dynamics of ‘doing justice’. The Belgian army fought in both world wars, and the vast majority of the population experienced military occupation. The latter led to various forms of collaboration with the enemy, which required the newly reinstalled Belgian government to implement large-scale judicial processes to repress these ‘antipatriotic’ behaviours, in order to restore both its authority and legitimacy and to re-establish social peace.

This book provides an up to date review of subnational and multicultural issues in Western multinational states.

This book addresses the democratic accommodation of national pluralism through federal rules. The key question is: can federalism be a fair and workable way of articulating multinational societies according to revised liberal-democratic patterns? In recent years, scholarly discussion on this issue has undergone a change. Nowadays, the answer to this question is much more complex than the one that traditional political liberalism and federalism used to give us. In the past, these two political approaches usually addressed the question of political pluralism without seriously including national pluralism in the discussion, a theoretical attitude that has often misrepresented and impoverished the moral discussions and the institutional practices of multinational democratic federations. Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism has been awarded the prize for the best book in 2005 by the Spanish Political Science Association (AECPA).

Federal Democracies examines the evolution of the relationship between federalism and democracy. Taking the late 18th century US Federal Experience as its starting-point, the book uses the contributions of Calhoun, Bryce and Proudhon as 19th century conceptual prisms through which we can witness the challenges and changes made to the meaning of this relationship. The book then goes on to provide a series of case studies to examine contemporary examples of federalism and includes chapters on Canada, USA, Russia, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland and the emerging European Union. It features two further case studies on Minority Nations and a Federal Europe, and concludes with two chapters providing comparative empirical and theoretical perspectives, and comparative reflections on federalism and democracy. Bringing together international experts in the field this book will be vital reading for students and scholars of federalism, comparative politics and government.

The political make-up of the contemporary world changes with such rapidity that few attempts have been made to consider with adequate care, the nature and value of the concept of sovereignty. What exactly is meant when one speaks about the acquisition, preservation, infringement or loss of sovereignty? This book revisits the assumptions underlying the applications of this fundamental category, as well as studying the political discourses in which it has been embedded. Bringing together historians, constitutional lawyers, political philosophers and experts in international relations, Sovereignty in Fragments seeks to dispel the illusion that there is a unitary concept of sovereignty of which one could offer a clear definition. This book will appeal to scholars and advanced students of international relations, international law and the history of political thought.

For Americans, legitimate government means self-government. In this brilliant and disturbing analysis, Paul W. Kahn shows that the American Constitution itself makes self-government impossible. Constitutional theory, he argues, has been a history of failed attempts to resolve this paradox.

In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.