Bankers Bureaucrats And Central Bank Politics

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Central banks are among the most powerful government economic institutions in the world. This volume explores the economic and political contours of the struggle for influence over the policies of central banks such as the Federal Reserve, and the implications of this struggle for economic performance and the distribution of wealth and power in society.

Part of The Elgar Series on Central Banking and Monetary Policy, this book explores the relationship between central banking, monetary policy and the economy at large. It focuses on the specific relationship between central banking, monetary policy and social responsibility as central banks wake up to new realities

Theories and practices in central banking and monetary policy have changed radically over recent decades with independence and inflation targeting as the new keywords. This book offers interesting perspectives on the drivers of this development and its implication. It addresses contemporary questions on accountability, transparency and objectives for monetary policy as well as current policy problems related to globalization and financial imbalances. The book is topical, insightful and well written a must for everybody with an interest in central banking and monetary policy. Torben M. Andersen, University of Aarhus, Denmark The number of central banks in the world is approaching 180, a tenfold increase since the beginning of the twentieth century. What lies behind the spread of this economic institution? What underlying process has brought central banks to hold such a key role in economic life today? This book examines from a transatlantic perspective how the central bank has become the bank of banks. Thirteen distinguished economists and central bankers have been brought together to evaluate how central banks work, arrive at their policies, choose their instruments and gauge their success in managing economies, both in times of crisis and periods of growth. Central banks have gained greater independence from government control over the last 20 years. This widespread trend throws up new questions regarding the foundations, prerogatives and future of this economic institution. This book provides a better understanding of the current financial crisis through the in-depth study of the central bank. Researchers in the fields of monetary theory, monetary policy and central banking will find this volume of great interest. It will also appeal to students of economics, political economy, banking and finance, as well as economists, academics, and public policy advisers and analysts.

This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Fed members. The book attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy via Fed appointments? Second, who influences the process -- the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Fed appointment process? The study extends the analysis of the Fed to the European Central bank.

By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it.

Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions.

An original analysis of central banking as global governance, developing the social relations of money, credit, and debt.