Banking Crises

Explores the Origin of the Recent Banking Crisis and how to Preclude Future Crises Shedding new light on the recent worldwide banking debacle, The Banking Crisis Handbook presents possible remedies as to what should have been done prior, during, and after the crisis. With contributions from well-known academics and professionals, the book contains exclusive, new research that will undoubtedly assist bank executives, risk management departments, and other financial professionals to attain a clear picture of the banking crisis and prevent future banking collapses. The first part of the book explains how the crisis originated. It discusses the role of subprime mortgages, shadow banks, ineffective risk management, poor financial regulations, and hedge funds in causing the collapse of financial systems. The second section examines how the crisis affected the global market as well as individual countries and regions, such as Asia and Greece. In the final part, the book explores short- and long-term solutions, including government intervention, financial regulations, efficient bank default risk approaches, and methods to evaluate credit risk. It also looks at when government intervention in financial markets can be ethically justified.

Why do banks collapse? Are financial systems more fragile in recent decades? Can policies to fix the banking system do more harm than good? What's the history of banking crises? With dozens of brief, non-technical articles by economists and other researchers, Banking Crises offers answers from diverse scholarly viewpoints.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

WBI Learning Resources Series. Water is a vital element for agricultural production and for economic development in general. However, the spatial and temporal distribution of water in Mexico restrains its use. Because of this distribution, it has been necessary to build a large infrastructure to capture, store, and allot this element among water users. Around the world, countries that once promoted more government involvement in irrigation management are adopting new policies that do just the opposite, creating incentives for farmers to take over the management of operations and maintenance, while government agencies focus on improving the management of water at the main system level. Is this just another management fad; or will the pendulum that is now swinging toward greater management control by farmers soon swing back the other way, toward greater state control? This volume reports on four countries where the state's role in irrigation management has undergone fundamental change and where the result has been a much greater management role for farmers. These studies address the political antecedents of participatory irrigation management (PIM) policies, the process of implementing the policies, and the second-generation challenges of sustaining PIM. These experiences will prove useful to policymakers and irrigation professionals who are facing similar challenges in their own countries.

Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

If you’ve got money in the bank, chances are you’ve never seriously worried about not being able to withdraw it. But there was a time in the United States, an era that ended just over a hundred years ago, when bank customers had to pay close attention to the solvency of the banking system, knowing they might have to rush to retrieve their savings before the bank collapsed. During the National Banking Era (1863–1913), before the establishment of the Federal Reserve, widespread banking panics were indeed rather common. Yet these pre-Fed banking panics, as Gary B. Gorton and Ellis W. Tallman show, bear striking similarities to our recent financial crisis. Fighting Financial Crises thus turns to the past to better understand our uncertain present, investigating how panics during the National Banking Era played out and how they were eventually quelled and prevented. The authors then consider the Fed’s and the SEC’s reactions to the recent crisis, building an informative new perspective on how the modern economy works.

Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.