Battle For Skyline Ridge

“An incredibly powerful account of a little-known chapter in the Vietnam War saga” written by a CIA veteran who fought in the Secret War (Booklist, starred review). In the 1960s and ’70s, the Laotian Civil War became a covert theater for the conflict in Vietnam, with the US paramilitary backing the Royal Lao government in what came to be known among the CIA as the Secret War. In late 1971, the North Vietnamese Army launched Campaign Z, invading northern Laos on a mission to defeat the Royal Lao Army. General Giap had specifically ordered the NVA troops to kill the CIA army and occupy its field headquarters in the Long Tieng valley. The NVA faced the small rag-tag army of Vang Pao, mostly Thai irregulars recruited to fight for the CIA. But thousands more were quickly recruited, trained, and rushed into position in Laos to defend against the impending NVA invasion. Despite overwhelming odds in the NVA’s favor, the battle raged for more than one hundred days—the longest battle in the Vietnam War. In the end, it all came down to Skyline Ridge. Whoever won Skyline, won Laos. Historian James E. Parker Jr. served as a CIA paramilitary officer in Laos. In this authoritative and personal account, Parker draws from his own firsthand experience as well as extensive research into CIA files and North Vietnamese after-action reports in order to tell the full story of the battle of Skyline Ridge.

The Vietnam War was, in the words of a preeminent scholar of the conflict (George C. Herring), "America's longest war." The Indochina conflict spanned the first generation of the larger Cold War and lasts to this day in American memory and cultural representation. Although the war remains a sensitive subject for many, a consensus exists that would echo the words of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his memoir, In Retrospect, "We were wrong, we were terribly wrong." The six volumes in this series pull together the best article literature on the History of American Involvement in Vietnam. The scholars writing in the first volume explore the roots of U.S. intervention, which followed in the wake of France's failed effort (supported and financed in Washington) to assert imperial control over Indochina. Volume II analyzed military aspects of the Vietnam War's history Volume V focuses on the lessons and legacies of the conflict, the source of a particularly sharp debate during the first administration of President Ronald W. Reagan. The final volume in the series analyzes the Vietnam War's extensive afterlife - in memory, film, literature, and popular discourse. Available individually by volume. Volume 1. The Origins of Intervention (0-8153-3531-8) Volume 2. Military Strategy and Escalation (0-8153-3532-6) Volume 3. Executive- Legislative Relations, Tracing the Impact of the War on U.S. Governmental Structures and Policies (0-8153-3533-4) Volume 4. The Diplomacy of War (0-8153-3534-2) Volume 5. The Anti-War Movement (0-8153-3535-0) Volume 6. Representation, Memories, and Legacies (0-8153-3536-9)

1960. President Eisenhower was focused on Laos, a tiny Southeast Asian nation. Washington feared the country would fall to communism, triggering a domino effect in the rest of Southeast Asia. In January 1961, Eisenhower approved the CIA's Operation Momentum, a plan to create a proxy army of ethnic Hmong to fight communist forces in Laos. Kurlantzick shows how the brutal war lasted nearly two decades, killed one-tenth of Laos's total population, and changed the nature of the CIA forever.

[Includes 2 tables, 3 charts, 21 maps and 88 illustrations] On 3 October 1944 American forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas received a directive to seize positions in the Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto). Okinawa is the most important island of the Ryukyu Group, the threshold of the four main islands of Japan. The decision to invade the Ryukyus signalized the readiness of the United States to penetrate the inner ring of Japanese defenses. For the enemy, failure on Okinawa meant that he must prepare to resist an early invasion of the homeland or surrender. The present volume [Of the United States Army in WWII series] concerns one of the most bitterly fought battles of the Pacific war, in which the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy all played a vital part. In order to make the Army’s role and the campaign as a whole as intelligible as possible the historians have treated in detail the operations of the Marine Corps units attached to Tenth Army, and have also sketched the contribution of the Navy both in preliminary operations against Okinawa and in the campaign itself. Another characteristic of this as of other volumes on Pacific campaigns is that tactical action is treated on levels lower than those usually presented in the history of operations in the European theaters. The physical limitations of the terrain fought over in the Pacific restricted the number and size of the units which could be employed and brought into sharp focus the operations of regiments, battalions, and smaller units. A wealth of verified material on such operations is available for all theaters, but it is only that of the Pacific which can be used extensively, since in other theaters the actions of smaller units are lost in the broad sweep of great distances and large forces. The description of small-unit action has the merit of giving the nonprofessional reader a fuller record of the nature of the battlefield in modern war, and the professional reader a better insight into troop leading.

"Okinawa: the last battle: Here the Imperial Army braced for its last stand. From the bloody victories that brought U.S. forces to Okinawa, to the desperate, suicidal resistance of the Japanese, this is the complete story of the final beachhead battle of the Pacific campaign.

"Okinawa: the last battle: Here the Imperial Army braced for its last stand. From the bloody victories that brought U.S. forces to Okinawa, to the desperate, suicidal resistance of the Japanese, this is the complete story of the final beachhead battle of the Pacific campaign.