Behavioural Incentive Design For Health Policy

Behavioural economics has become a popular way of tackling a broad range of issues in public policy. By presenting a more descriptive and possibly accurate representation of human behaviour than traditional economics, Behavioural Incentive Design for Health Policy tries to make sense of decisions that follow a wider conception of welfare, influenced by social norms and narratives, pro-social motivations and choice architectures which were generally neglected by standard economics. The authors show how this model can be applied to tackle a wide range of issues in public health, including smoking, the obesity crisis, exercise uptake, alcoholism, preventive screenings and attitudes towards vaccinations. It shows not only how behavioural economics allows us to better understand such challenges, but also how it can design effective incentives for addressing them. This book is an extensive reassessment of the interaction between behavioural incentives and health.

Whatever the theoretical attractiveness of certain policy options, the fact that public employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles can set bounds on how well government agencies can deliver promised services, such as universal health care, including in rural areas. Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible.

This volume contains selected papers from the First European Conference on Health Economics, held in Barcelona on 19-21 September 1989. The meeting was organized by the Spanish Health Economics Association (AES) and chaired by L. Bohigas. The following groups participated: the English Health Economists' Study Group, the Associa

Policy-making in public health is highly complex, which is one reason why the behavioural turn is now playing a significant role in this field. Against this backdrop, this book aims to develop a theoretical understanding of how policymakers take up public health challenges and how policies change over the course of time. Accordingly, the book reveals policy-makers' underlying assumptions, which influence the way in which public policy seeks to promote the health status of citizens. In a second step, the book presents a typology of policy instruments and applies this to the field of health promotion. This typology introduces an option that adds behaviourally informed insights to the toolbox of political analysis. Empirical evidence of behavioural health policies can be found in various countries around the world, and the book presents both relevant country studies and examples from the supra- and international level. Finally, the book discusses the implications of the rise of behavioural health policies, proposes a specific concept of health citizenship and reviews state-citizen relations. The book is useful for academics from health-related disciplines, such as political science, sociology, and public health, as well as for policy-makers, practitioners and students.

Health systems in most low-income countries are under-resourced and underused, failing to meet the needs of those who need health care the most. But what if health service providers-or even patients-were rewarded partially on the basis of their performance? Based on a review of experiences to date, the authors of this volume argue that performance incentives have great potential to improve health care for the world's poor. They are one way to use funding dedicated to individual diseases or interventions to strengthen core health system functions. In Part I, Eichler and Levine provide clear guidance about how to design, implement, and evaluate such programs, whether they target health care providers, patients, or both. Part II comprises a set of case studies that examine the use of such incentives to address a range of health conditions and challenges in diverse countries. Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential and Pitfalls will help policymakers and program managers in developing countries and in the donor community improve health care systems through the strategic use of performance incentives. Book jacket.

Social problems in many domains, including health, education, social relationships, and the workplace, have their origins in human behavior. The documented links between behavior and social problems have compelled governments and organizations to prioritize and mobilize efforts to develop effective, evidence-based means to promote adaptive behavior change. In recognition of this impetus, The Handbook of Behavior Change provides comprehensive coverage of contemporary theory, research, and practice on behavior change. It summarizes current evidence-based approaches to behavior change in chapters authored by leading theorists, researchers, and practitioners from multiple disciplines, including psychology, sociology, behavioral science, economics, philosophy, and implementation science. It is the go-to resource for researchers, students, practitioners, and policy makers looking for current knowledge on behavior change and guidance on how to develop effective interventions to change behavior.

February 2001 Whatever the theoretical attractiveness of certain policy options, the fact that public employees are people who make independent decisions about their careers and lifestyles can set bounds on how well government agencies can deliver promised services, such as universal health care, including in rural areas. Hammer and Jack examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible. The goal of providing universal primary health care has been hard to meet, in part because of the difficulty of staffing rural medical posts with conscientious caregivers. The problem is providing physicians with incentives at a reasonable cost. Governments are often unable to purchase medical services of adequate quality even from civil servants. Using simple microeconomic models of contracts and competition, Hammer and Jack examine questions about: * The design of rural service requirements and options for newly trained physicians. * The impact of local competition on the desirable level of training for new doctors. * The incentive power that can be reasonably expected from explicit contracts. One problem a government faces is choosing how much training to give physicians it wants to send to rural areas. Training is costly, and a physician relocated to the countryside is outside the government's direct control. Should rural doctors face a ceiling on the prices they charge patients? Can it be enforced? Hammer and Jack discuss factors to consider in determining how to pay rural medical workers but conclude that we might have to set realistic bounds on our expectations about delivering certain kinds of services. If we can identify reasons why the best that can be expected is not particularly good, it might lead us to explore entirely different policy systems. Maybe it is too hard to run certain decentralized systems. Maybe we should focus on less ambitious but more readily achievable goals, such as providing basic infrastructure. This paper--a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze service delivery in the social sectors. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

An accessible introduction to how behavioural economics is used to influence and inform developments in public policy.