Beneficial Ownership And Legal Responsibility

This book explores the connection between ownership, on one hand, and immunity from legal responsibility, on the other. It presents a definition of the concept of beneficial ownership, the reasons for its concealment, and failures in international legal structures and arrangements. Globally, States confront complex criminality, such as corruption, tax evasion, doctrinal fanaticism, trafficked slaves, terrorism and, war. At the personal level, men and women may seek to escape their creditors, to disinherit unwanted heirs, to cheat divorced partners, and to appear straightforward when this is not the case. The response of politicians and regulators has been a global State initiative to identify beneficial owners via public registers to promote transparency and accountability. Yet, at the same time, there is an equally powerful global and personal counter-initiative to promote beneficial ownership avoidance. Where there is no owner, there is no accountability. This book examines what “ownership” means in legal terms across multiple legal systems and explains why singling out “ownership” as being pivotal to State and personal accountability is a strategy both flawed and disingenuous. It is argued that an apparent lack of political will coupled with shape-shifting definitions of “ownership” have resulted in tokenism. Particular attention is paid to those “orphan” structures which have evolved from standard models, or which have been designed for the purpose in each case of facilitating ownership concealment and avoidance. The author explains how the virtual world of the blockchain, crypto-assets and cryptocurrency, and virtual entities such as the Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO), all of which elude legal classification, have opened a new world of possibilities. Applicable across all jurisdictions and legal systems, the book will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers, and policy-makers working in the areas of Financial Crime, Regulation, Compliance, Business, and Accountancy.

In 2016, the G20 called on the FATF and the Global Forum to propose ways to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. The Global Forum developed a framework of proposed actions to answer that call, including a plan to facilitate effective implementation through examples of good implementation and technical assistance. This toolkit is in furtherance of the Global Forum’s commitment to support countries’ effective implementation. It is intended to help jurisdictions to develop an understanding of the beneficial ownership concepts contained in the international standards of transparency and exchange of information, and for use in conjunction with technical assistance seminars. It will support policy and implementation discussions in conjunction with capacity building workshops and technical assistance activities carried out by the Global Forum Secretariat as well as other supporting international organizations.

Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that prove shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper-level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and accountants.

This book explores the concept of beneficial ownership in equity law, the domestic tax laws of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, as well as its varied and increasing uses in international tax law. By analysing the evolution of beneficiary rights in equity and the use of beneficial ownership wording in tax law, the book draws a roadmap for dealing with beneficial ownership in both national and international tax law. This approach highlights those common misconceptions that can be avoided by understanding the origins of the concept and its engagement with equity, as well as the differences with tax law. However, the book does not limit itself to dealing with theoretical discussion, but also offers an instructive and detailed practical case study. Offering both academic commentary and a practitioner focus, the book will be of the utmost interest to scholars and practitioners from common and civil law countries dealing with tax and estate law, particularly given beneficial ownership's increasing relevance.

This book provides a clear and concise explanation of withholding tax and how to leverage best practice to generate improved investment performance. It gives practical guidance to financial service firms and investors to help them understand the issues involved, trends and practicalities of maximizing returns on investment.

This report contains the 2018 Peer Review Report on the Exchange of Information on Request of Guernsey.

This book is a continuation of Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Reconstructing Corporations, Shareholders, Directors, Owners, and Investors. The author extends his analysis of contract law, property law, agency law, trust law, and corporate statutory law and applies that analysis to defy conventional concepts and theories in economics, finance, investment, and accounting and expose the artificial boundaries established by decades of research founded on indefensible assumptions and fallacious conclusions. Using the Humpty Dumpty principle, where words mean what the authors want them to mean, economists have created "strange new worlds" where contract law, property law, agency law, and corporate statutory law no longer apply. The author dismantles the theory of the firm by proving the theory of the firm wilfully and intentionally ignores fundamental contract law, property law, agency law, and corporate statutory law. Contrary to the theory of the firm, shareholders do not own corporations, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. The author proves that by property law and corporate law, capital is not privately owned by capitalists but by corporations. Entire economic and social systems have been constructed that have no basis in law. With the advent of publicly traded corporations, the capital is there, but both capitalists and capitalism have been rendered extinct. This book will appeal to researchers and graduate and upper-level undergraduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as legal scholars, attorneys and accountants.

This publication contains the 2023 Second Round Peer Review on the Exchange of Information on Request for Paraguay. It refers to Phase 1 only (Legal and Regulatory Framework).