Beyond Visual Range

In respect of its largest defence projects there are early signs that the Ministry of Defence has begun to make realistic trade-offs between cost, time, technical requirements and the amount of equipment to be purchased. Nevertheless, the continuing variances to cost and time show the MOD needs to do consistently better. This report, which gives a progress review of the 16 largest defence projects, shows that in the last year there has been a total forecast slippage of 139 months and increase in costs of £468 million. This means that, since the projects were approved, costs have increased by £6.6 billion (around 12 per cent more than the planned cost) and the projects have been delayed by 468 months, taking almost a third longer than originally expected. It would be unrealistic to expect MOD and industry to identify every risk at the start of technically challenging projects. However, the continuing problems indicate that MOD has more to learn from historic. The MOD is accepting the capability risk and some wider costs resulting from these project delays and is having to make difficult decisions about long-term capabilities. The MOD has made a significant investment in new and upgraded helicopters to address the shortfall identified in the NAO's 2004 report. The MOD has also spent £787 million on air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft to support current operations and address capability gaps, such as those caused by the previously reported delays to the A400M transport aircraft. However, capability gaps remain

On December 18, 1972, more than one hundred U.S. B-52 bombers flew over North Vietnam to initiate Operation Linebacker II. During the next eleven days, sixteen of these planes were shot down and another four suffered heavy damage. These losses soon proved so devastating that Strategic Air Command was ordered to halt the bombing. The U.S. Air Force's poor performance in this and other operations during Vietnam was partly due to the fact that they had trained their pilots according to methods devised during World War II and the Korean War, when strategic bombers attacking targets were expected to take heavy losses. Warfare had changed by the 1960s, but the USAF had not adapted. Between 1972 and 1991, however, the Air Force dramatically changed its doctrines and began to overhaul the way it trained pilots through the introduction of a groundbreaking new training program called "Red Flag." In The Air Force Way of War, Brian D. Laslie examines the revolution in pilot instruction that Red Flag brought about after Vietnam. The program's new instruction methods were dubbed "realistic" because they prepared pilots for real-life situations better than the simple cockpit simulations of the past, and students gained proficiency on primary and secondary missions instead of superficially training for numerous possible scenarios. In addition to discussing the program's methods, Laslie analyzes the way its graduates actually functioned in combat during the 1980s and '90s in places such as Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Iraq. Military historians have traditionally emphasized the primacy of technological developments during this period and have overlooked the vital importance of advances in training, but Laslie's unprecedented study of Red Flag addresses this oversight through its examination of the seminal program.

This is a companion volume to the main report (HCP 85-I, ISBN 9780102963342)

This is a companion volume to the main report (HC 489-I, ISBN 9780102965506)

Driven by sustaining demands from industrial automation, space applications and the lack of labor forces, robotics has received increasing attention from researchers in the field of automation and control. Optimizing control schemes is critical to fully exploit the potential of industrial and daily-use robots. Usually, accuracy and repeatability are measured to evaluate the performance of a robot, and deviation of the two parameters from normal status would inevitably leads to positional error and creates a problem for the process. Moreover, the repeatability of a robot is different in various parts of the working envelope, fluctuating with speed and payload. Due to the inherent complexity, an advanced learning methodology is crucial to the self-learning and fast adaptation to disturbances.

This is a companion volume to the main report (HC 1520-I, ISBN 9780102976786)

The Major Projects Report 2007 covers cost, time and performance data for military equipment projects in the year ended 31 March 2008. 20 of the largest projects are examined where the main investment decision has been taken by the Ministry of Defence (the MoD) along with ten projects still in the Assessment Phase. Six projects are new to this report: future lynx; modernised target acquisition designation sight/pilots night vision sensor; naval extrememly high frequency/super high frequency satellite communication terminals; Typhoon future capability programme; advanced jet trainer project and project Eagle