Board Of Trade Journal Volume 26

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V. 36. 1 December 1801 to 3 March 1802.

In July 1862, the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade used their significant influence to organize perhaps the most prominent Union artillery unit in the Western Theater. Enlistees were Chicagoans, mainly clerks. During the Civil War, the battery was involved in 11 major battles, 26 minor battles and 42 skirmishes. They held the center at Stones River, repulsing a furious Confederate attack. A few days later, they joined 50 other Union guns in stopping one of the most dramatic offensives in the Western Theater. With Colonel Robert Minty's cavalry, they resisted an overwhelming assault along Chickamauga Creek. This history chronicles the actions of the Chicago Board of Trade Independent Light Artillery at the battles of Farmington, Dallas, Noonday Creek, Atlanta, in Kilpatrick's Raid, and at Nashville, and Selma.

A detailed study of the revolution in Bank of England policy resulting from the government's response to the 1954-55 balance-of-payments crisis, this is a first independent analysis. The author investigates the evolution of official thinking and appraises the impact of monetary policy in this crucial period. Peter Kenen reaches the unexpected conclusion that the Bank's orthodox monetary policies played a relatively small part in the redress of payments disequilibrium, and that its most effective weapons were its most heterodox. Finally, he proposes ways in which the Bank of England can better control the credit base.