Body Law And The Body Of Law

For some legal philosophers, if a law is procedurally correct, enacted in ways constitutionally recognised and agreed upon, then the content is of no significance. It is a “good” law, no matter what it does or justifies. The question of one's consent or opposition to any particular law is extraneous to the legality and is regarded merely as a political matter. The assumption is that a certain procedure and logic in law creation has taken place, and the law can be altered by a change in political leaders in a subsequent political election. However, this view and assumption obscure an uncomfortable fact. Some laws can be “bad” or “immoral.” Critical legal theory suggests that there are often two (or more) sets of laws, and it makes no difference if Lady Justice is blindfolded or not. Laws change in the process of history, in part, because societal norms change. As common understandings of morality evolve, law adapts itself to the new moral environment. Norms can change slowly or rapidly, even within a lifetime. This book examines both social and legal norms and theories of how they are both created. Christine M. Hassenstab investigates how laws on sterilization, birth control and abortion were created, by focusing on the act of legislation; how the law was driven by scientific and social norms during the first and closing decades of the 20th century in the USA (especially in the state of Indiana) and Norway. The primary focus of Body Law and the Body of Law is the sociology of law and how and why the law changes. The author develops the notion “body law” for reproductive policies and uses sociological theories to untie the various strands of social history and legal history and looks at two cases of legislation. The book is divided in to two main sections. The first examines eugenic laws in the USA state of Indiana and Norway during the first decades of 20th century. The second part is about the birth control and abortion debate in both countries throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Christine M. Hassenstab is a lawyer and sociologist. She served as a criminal defense attorney for 15 years (1987—2001) in Seattle, Washington. Currently, she is an adviser in the EU Grants Office at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway.

Issues that are drawn from, and bear on, disciplines including philosophy, law and legal studies, feminist studies, social and political theory, communication studies, critical theory and cultural studies.

When part of a person's body is separated from them, or when a person dies, it is unclear what legal status the item of bodily material is able to obtain. A 'no property rule' which states that there is no property in the human body was first recorded in an English judgment in 1882. Claims based on property rights in the human body and its parts have failed on the basis that the human body is not the subject of property. Despite a recent series of exceptions to the 'no property rule', the law still has no clear answer as to the legal status of the body or its material. In this book, Wall examines the appropriate legal status of bodily material, and in doing so, develops a way for the law to address disputes over the use and storage of bodily material that, contrary to the current trend, resists the application of property law. Wall assesses when a person ought to be able to possess, control, use, or profit from, his or her own bodily material or the bodily material of another person. Bodily material may be valuable because it retains a functional unity with the body or is a material resource that is in short supply. With this in mind, Wall measures the extent to which property law can represent the rights and duties that protects the entitlement that a person may exercise in bodily material, and identifies the limits to the appropriate application of property law. An alternative to property law is developed with reference to the right of bodily integrity and the right to privacy.

Explains why lawyers seeking gender progress from primary legal materials should start with the common law.

The most basic assertions about our bodies--that they are ours and distinguish us from each other, that they are private and have boundaries, races, and genders--are all political theories, constructed in legal texts for political purposes. So argues Alan Hyde in this first account of the body in legal thought. Hyde demonstrates that none of the constructions of the body in legal texts are universal truths that rest solely on body experience. Drawing on an array of fascinating case material, he shows that legal texts can construct all kinds of bodies, including those that are not owned at all, that are just like other bodies, that are public, open, and accessible to others. Further, the language, images, and metaphors of the body in legal texts can often convince us of positions to which we would not assent as a matter of political theory. Through analysis of legal texts, Hyde shows, for example, how law's words construct the vagina as the most searchable body part; the penis as entirely under mental control; the bone marrow that need not be shared with a half-sibling who will die without it; and urine that must be surrendered for drug testing in rituals of national purification. This book will interest anyone concerned with cultural studies, gender studies, ethnic studies, and political theory, or anyone who has heard the phrase "body constructed in discourse" and wants to see, step by step, exactly how this is done.

Do you own your body? Advances in science and the development of genetic databases have added an aura of modern controversy to this long-standing and, as yet, unresolved problem. In particular, English law governing separated human tissue (including organs, DNA and cell-lines) is unsatisfactory. Despite the enactment of the Human Tissue Act 2004 UK, it remains uncertain what property rights living persons can claim over tissue separated from their bodies. The development of clear legal principles is necessary to protect the rights of individuals while also enabling the efficient use of such materials in medical research. Part I of Law and the Human Body traces the evolution of English, Australian, United States and Canadian law in relation to human tissue separated from living persons and dead bodies. This includes a comprehensive examination of the Human Tissue Act 2004 UK as well as prominent judicial decisions, including Re Organ Retention Group Litigation [2005] QB 506, Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc 8 NY 3d 43 (NY CA 2006) and Washington University v Catalona 490 F 3d 667 (8th Cir 2007). Analysis demonstrates that, although property rights and non-proprietary interests in separated human tissue are recognised in limited circumstances, no principled basis has been accepted either at common law or by statute for the recognition of these rights and interests. Part II of this book develops and defends a principled basis in English law for the creation and legal recognition of property rights and non-proprietary interests in separated human tissue. Significantly, the analysis and principles presented in Law and the Human Body have application across common law and civil law jurisdictions worldwide.