British Generalship On The Western Front 1914 1918

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.

Many Great War histories tell the reader what happened on the Western front but few spell out why. In this book, the author looks at the battles through the eyes of the generals who were charged with winning them and examines the accusations that have surrounded them for over 70 years. The tragedy of the death toll on the Western Front gives weight to the argument against them, but what were the near unsurmountable problems that stood between the generals and final victory? How much of what the general public believes about the First World War is really true? This book aims to illuminate the bitter controversy.

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.

Discusses the conditions and casualties of trench warfare, and questions the strategy of Field-Marshall's Haig and Plumer and the leadership of Lloyd George.

The popular perception of callous, incompetent generals presiding over the bloody, futile attacks of World War I has been proved to be simplistic. A team of leading historians provides fresh assessments of key figures, such as Haig.

On the Western Front during the First World War, 490 men won the British Empire's highest award for gallantry, the Victoria Cross. A companion for any visitor to the First World War battlefields in France and Flanders, this reference book lists every VC recipient from 1914 to 1918 in alphabetical order.

Marshal Foch, the Generalissimo of the Allied Armies during the last stages of the First World War, commenting on the victories won during the Hundred Days when the Germans were driven back on the Western Front, said Never at any time in history has the British army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive. The scale, speed and success of this offensive have provided historians with fertile ground for interpretation and debate. How did the British Expeditionary Force, having endured the bitter disappointments and heavy losses at Aubers Ridge, Loos, the Somme, Passchendaele, Cambrai and during the German spring offensives of 1918 turn the tide of the war and comprehensively defeat the enemy in the field? This is the fascinating question that Michael Senior tackles in this lucid and thought-provoking study. He considers the reasons for the stunning British victories and examines the factors that underpinned the eventual success of the BEF. In particular he shows how tactical and technical developments evolved during the course of the war and merged in a way that gave the British a decisive advantage during the final months of the fighting. Innovations in guns and gunnery, in shells, aircraft and tanks, and a massive increase in industrial output, played key parts, as did the continuous process of adaptation, experimentation and invention that went on throughout the war years. The result was an army that could take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity presented by the failure of the German spring offensive of 1918. Michael Senior provides a challenging and controversial analysis of the underlying reasons for the success of the BEF. It is essential reading for anyone who is keen to learn about the extraordinary development of the British army throughout the war and to understand why, and how, the Germans were beaten.