Building Partner Capacity Security Force Assistance

This paper examines the current Building Partner Capacity and Security Force Assistance capabilities and capacities within the United States Army as well as Department of Defense. The current operational environment calls for us to look at history, policy, doctrine and other academic proposals to identify capability and capacity gaps. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Security Assistance, does the U.S. Army have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win the counterinsurgency of the future? This paper analyzes this construct and provides a framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned from OIF and OEF as well as providing military, police and governance structure as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm will help the United States gain access, influence and build capacity throughout this new world order.

The Civil Response Corps (CRC) would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC is a product of the efforts of State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, good governance, and a market economy. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance and Stability Operations, does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win through all phases of conflict?

We remain a nation at war in an era of persistent conflict, but we do not stand alone. Our nation has many multinational partners, equally committed to freedom, rule of law and stability. It is clear that we are stronger when we act with partners in today's operating environment. Therefore, security force assistance is no longer an "additional duty." It is now a core competency of our Army. As distinctions separating war and peace blur and challenges to security increase, we must seek to help our multinational partners successfully confront their security challenges. Security force assistance builds our multinational partners' capability to defeat regular, irregular, and hybrid threats prevalent in an era of persistent conflict. The two pillars of security force assistance are the modular brigade and Soldiers acting as advisors. Their tactical efforts build partner capability and improve the security situation. Over time, U.S. forces and partners foreign security forces collectively set the conditions to defeat common threats and ultimately achieve strategic success. This manual addresses common characteristics and considerations for conducting security force assistance and clarifies what units and individual advisors must understand to work "by, with, and through" their counterparts. Since every situation and foreign security force is unique, units and individuals conducting security force assistance must carefully analyze the operational environment, especially the relationships of foreign security forces and their population. Conducting successful security force assistance requires adaptive units led by wellinformed, culturally astute leaders. FM 3-07.1 provides commanders, staffs, and advisors with the common doctrine for achieving this goal. Conducting foreign security assistance requires great skill in building relationships and "leading from behind." We must all increase our understanding of this important mission.

In an era of persistent conflict, the United States supports the internal defense and development of international partners, regardless of whether those partners are highly developed and stable or less developed and emerging. While many of these partners are nations, they can also include alliances, coalitions, and regional organizations. U.S. support to these partners ranges from providing humanitarian assistance to major combat operations. U.S. support includes conducting conflict transformation, bolstering partner legitimacy, and building partner capacity. A vital part of these three aspects of U.S. support is assisting partner security forces. Security force assistance (SFA) is not new for Army forces. In fact, General George Washington's Inspector General of the Army acted as an advisor for Army forces. Baron Friedrick Wilhelm von Steuben instilled discipline and professionalism into an army that previously lacked formalized training. His 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, adapted from the Prussian army, formed the doctrinal backbone of the Continental Army throughout the Revolutionary War. Additionally, the lineage of the Army's operations field manual, FM 3-0, can be traced to this document. As a benefactor of advisors such as von Steuben, the Army has since undertaken what is called SFA several times throughout its history. Army doctrine defines security force assistance as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07). SFA is part of the FM 3- 0 construct of full spectrum operations. Similarly, it is conducted across the spectrum of conflict or in any of the operational themes. SFA is normally part of a larger security sector reform effort, while in other instances, SFA is not tied to reform but to building partner capacity. Three general situations exist in which SFA may occur: an internally focused bilateral relationship, an externally focused bilateral relationship, and a multilateral relationship. Consequently, SFA supports the appropriate partner's plans. When SFA supports a host nation, it also supports that host nation's strategy. If SFA supports a host nation's externally focused efforts, it must support the host nation's national security strategy. SFA may support regional security forces, such as those of the African Union or the Organization of American States. In these cases, SFA supports that organization's plans. This field manual (FM) is the Army's doctrinal publication for security force assistance (SFA). It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how U.S. forces contribute to SFA. It focuses on the brigade combat team (BCT) conducting SFA and advising foreign security forces. It is based on lessons learned from previous advising efforts and recent combat operations with a view to the future. It supports the Army Education System instruction on the theory and conduct of SFA. The two primary audiences for this manual are leaders in BCTs conducting SFA and Soldiers assigned as advisors. The BCT is the largest fixed tactical organization and the key formation of the Army's modular organization. Army modularity allows commanders to add selective units to assist the BCT as it conducts SFA. The BCT and higher echelons provide the framework for advisors to function and accomplish the mission—developing foreign security forces and, when appropriate, working by, with, and through foreign security forces to achieve the desired end state of the host nation's internal defense and development. Thus, Soldiers assigned as advisors are the key element of SFA. This FM provides the conceptual framework for conventional forces to conduct SFA within the construct of full spectrum operations, across the spectrum of conflict. It addresses SFA at operational and tactical levels.

"Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the U.S. government has engaged in numerous efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners to address security-related threats -- an objective that has become increasingly prominent in U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy in recent years. Much of U.S. assistance intended for this purpose has been undertaken as security cooperation efforts by DOD and as security assistance efforts by State, with the help of various implementing partners. However, according to the RAND Corporation (RAND), the rapid growth of legal authorities and efforts associated with security cooperation and assistance has led to redundancies, limitations, and gaps. RAND also noted that this rapid growth of legal authorities and programs has led to expanding demands on DOD staff who must navigate through them as well as through unsynchronized processes, resources, programs, and organizations to execute individual initiatives with partner nations. Members of Congress have raised questions about the proliferation and duplication of efforts to build partner security capabilities and the supporting legal authorities. In addition, Members of Congress have raised questions about whether DOD security cooperation efforts lack strategic direction and may not act in concert with other efforts. House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for GAO to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities. DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists. In this report, GAO provides its fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners' capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort's name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect. GAO compiled this inventory primarily from DOD and State sources and worked with DOD and State to resolve any discrepancies and add additional efforts. This inventory may not represent the complete universe of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts to build partner capacity and their associated authorities, because of, among other things, possible lack of accurate reporting in the primary sources and difficulties involved in identifying all associated authorities for each effort. To mitigate these concerns, GAO provided multiple iterations of the inventory to DOD and State for their review and incorporated their comments as appropriate"--Preliminary page.

Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization.

Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization.