Capital Structures And Portfolio Composition During Banking Crisis

This paper constructs a theoretical framework that rationalizes banks’ short- and long-run adjustment dynamics—in portfolio composition and in the capital structure—following a period of financial distress. The model captures stylized facts about banks’ behavior following a shock to the capital base—namely, the rush to liquidity and credit crunch. Bank panel data show that Argentine domestic retail banks underwent a period of adjustment of six quarters following the Mexican devaluation crisis, reducing their risk-exposure since, owing to bank capital scarcity, depositors became less prone to tolerate bank default risk. Foreign-owned banks suffered a milder shock and adjusted immediately.

This paper constructs a theoretical framework that rationalizes banks` short- and long-run adjustment dynamics in portfolio composition and in the capital structure following a period of financial distress. The model captures stylized facts about banks` behavior following a shock to the capital base namely, the rush to liquidity and credit crunch. Bank panel data show that Argentine domestic retail banks underwent a period of adjustment of six quarters following the Mexican devaluation crisis, reducing their risk-exposure since, owing to bank capital scarcity, depositors became less prone to tolerate bank default risk. Foreign-owned banks suffered a milder shock and adjusted immediately.

Master's Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 1.3, University of Frankfurt (Main) (Chair of Banking and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration), language: English, abstract: As the last global financial crisis has shown, macroeconomic shocks have huge impacts on numerous economic sectors. The distortions caused by the crisis led to world-wide declines in trade, output and employment. This paper takes special emphasis on bank leverage ratios. Our longitudinal sample ranges from 2004 to 2015, including 5,069 observations of 483 banks in the United States and Europe. Our investigations are based on a modified Gropp and Heider (2010) style linear two-way error component model that uses leverage determinants of non-financial firms to describe bank capital structure. It is investigated how bank capital structure and its determinants respond to the financial crisis. The results show that the financial crisis had strong impacts.

Using a multi-country panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk-adjusted ratio; the leverage ratio; the Tier I and Tier II ratios; and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk-adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.

The effect of bank capital on lending is a critical determinant of the linkage between financial conditions and real activity, and has received especial attention in the recent financial crisis. We use panel-regression techniques - following Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994) - to study the lending of large bank holding companies (BHCs) and find small effects of capital on lending. We then consider the effect of capital ratios on lending using a variant of Lown and Morgan's (2006) VAR model, and again find modest effects of bank capital ratio changes on lending. These results are in marked contrast to estimates obtained using simple empirical relations between aggregate commercial-bank assets and leverage growth, which have recently been very influential in shaping forecasters' and policymakers' views regarding the effects of bank capital on loan growth. Our estimated models are then used to understand recent developments in bank lending and, in particular, to consider the role of TARP-related capital injections in affecting these developments.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.