Cash Use Across Countries And The Demand For Central Bank Digital Currency

The level and trend in cash use in a country will influence the demand for central bank digital currency (CBDC). While access to digital currency will be more convenient than traveling to an ATM, it only makes CBDC like a bank debit card—not better. Demand for digital currency will thus be weak in countries where cash use is already very low, due to a preference for cash substitutes (cards, electronic money, mobile phone payments). Where cash use is very high, demand should be stronger, due to a lack of cash substitutes. As the demand for CBDC is tied to the current level of cash use, we estimate the level and trend in cash use for 11 countries using four different measures. A tentative forecast of cash use is also made. After showing that declining cash use is largely associated with demographic change, we tie the level of cash use to the likely demand for CBDC in different countries. In this process, we suggest that one measure of cash use is more useful than the others. If cash is important for monetary policy, payment instrument competition, or as an alternative payment instrument in the event of operational problems with privately supplied payment methods, the introduction of CBDC may best be introduced before cash substitutes become so ubiquitous that the viability of CBDC could be in doubt.

Cash use in most countries is falling slowly. On the margin, younger adults favor cash substitutes over cash. For older adults it is the reverse. Revealed preference tied to a changing population age structure seems to be the main influence on the demand for cash and why it is falling. Cash use may continue to fall, and card use (the main cash substitute) may fall by more, if CBDC is issued. The extent of this reduction depends on the demand for retail CBDC and the incentives (primarily transaction fees) that can play a determining role in CBDC adoption and use.

Digitalization is reshaping economic activity, shrinking the role of cash, and spurring new digital forms of money. Central banks have been pondering wheter and how to adapt. One possibility is central bank digital currency (CBDC)-- a widely accessible digital form of fiat money that could be legal tender. This discussion note proposes a conceptual framework to assess the case for CBDC adoption from the perspective of users and central banks. It discusses possible CBDC designs, and explores potential benefits and costs, with a focus on the impact on monetary policy, financial stability, and integrity. This note also surveys research and pilot studies on CBDC by central banks around the world.

This paper marks the launch of a new IMF series, Fintech Notes. Building on years of IMF staff work, it will explore pressing topics in the digital economy and be issued periodically. The series will carry work by IMF staff and will seek to provide insight into the intersection of technology and the global economy. The Rise of Digital Money analyses how technology companies are stepping up competition to large banks and credit card companies. Digital forms of money are increasingly in the wallets of consumers as well as in the minds of policymakers. Cash and bank deposits are battling with so-called e-money, electronically stored monetary value denominated in, and pegged to, a currency like the euro or the dollar. This paper identifies the benefits and risks and highlights regulatory issues that are likely to emerge with a broader adoption of stablecoins. The paper also highlights the risks associated with e-money: potential creation of new monopolies; threats to weaker currencies; concerns about consumer protection and financial stability; and the risk of fostering illegal activities, among others.

This paper examines key considerations around central bank digital currency (CBDC) for use by the general public, based on a comprehensive review of recent research, central bank experiments, and ongoing discussions among stakeholders. It looks at the reasons why central banks are exploring retail CBDC issuance, policy and design considerations; legal, governance and regulatory perspectives; plus cybersecurity and other risk considerations. This paper makes a contribution to the CBDC literature by suggesting a structured framework to organize discussions on whether or not to issue CBDC, with an operational focus and a project management perspective.

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.

Financial inclusion is a key policy objective that central banks, especially those in emerging and low-income countries, are considering for retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). If properly designed to address the barriers to financial inclusion, CBDCs have the opportunity to gain acceptance by the financially excluded for digital payments. CBDC can then serve as an entry point to the broader formal financial system. CBDC has special aspects that may benefit financial inclusion, such as being a risk-free and widely acceptable form of digital money, availability for offline payments, and potentially lower costs and greater accessibility. However, CBDC is not a panacea to financial inclusion, and additional experience is needed to fully understand its potential impact.

Against the backdrop of a rapidly digitalizing world, there is a growing interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) among central banks, including in the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA) region. This paper aims to support ME&CA policymakers in examining key questions when considering the adoption of a CBDC while underscoring the importance of country-specific analyses. This paper does not provide recommendations on CBDC issuance. Instead, it frames the discussion around the following key questions: What is a CBDC? What objectives do policymakers aim to achieve with the issuance of a CBDC? Which inefficiencies in payment systems can CBDCs address? What are the implications of CBDC issuance for financial stability and central bank operational risk? How can CBDC design help achieve policy objectives and mitigate these risks? The paper provides preliminary answers to these questions at the regional level. A survey of IMF teams and public statements from ME&CA policymakers confirm that promoting financial inclusion and making payment systems more efficient (domestic and cross-border) are the top priorities in the region. Payment services through CBDCs, if offered at a lower cost than existing alternatives, could spur competition in the payment market and help increase access to bank accounts, improve financial inclusion, and update legacy technology platforms. CBDCs may also help improve the efficiency of cross-border payment services, especially if designed to address frictions arising from a lack of payment system interoperability, complex processing of compliance checks, long transaction chains, and weak competition. At the same time, CBDCs could negatively impact bank profitability while introducing a substantial operational burden for central banks. However, the exact economic and financial impacts of CBDCs need further study and would depend on estimates of CBDC demand, which are uncertain and country- dependent. CBDC issuance and adoption is a long journey that policymakers should approach with care. Policymakers need to analyze carefully whether a CBDC serves their country’s objectives and whether the expected benefits outweigh the potential costs, in addition to risks for the financial system and operational risks for the central bank.