Cataloguing Of Issues In Civil Military Relations In Pakistan

In The Absent Dialogue, Anit Mukherjee examines the relations between politicians, bureaucrats, and the military in India and argues that the pattern of civil-military relations in India hampers the effectiveness of the Indian military. Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews with high ranking officials, as well as archival material, this book sheds new light on both India's political and military history, as well as democratic civilian control and military effectiveness more generally.

This book offers a comprehensive study of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It asks how and why the Pakistan military has acquired such a salience in the polity and how it continues to influence decision-making on foreign and security policies and key domestic political, social and economic issues. It also examines the changes within the military, the impact of these changes on its disposition towards the state and society, and the implications for peace and security in nuclearized South Asia.

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.

Develops a framework to explain shifts in judicial assertiveness towards militaries, using Pakistan as an illuminating case study.

This volume examines the role of the military, the most influential actor in Pakistan, and challenges conventional wisdom on the causes of political instability in this geographically important nuclear state. It rejects views that ethnic and religious cleavages and perceived economic or political mismanagement by civilian governments triggers military intervention in Pakistan. The study argues instead that the military intervenes to remove civilian governments where the latter are perceived to be undermining the military’s institutional interests. Mazhar Aziz shows that the Pakistani military has become a parallel state, and given the extent of its influence, will continue to define the nature of governance within the polity. Overall, Military Control in Pakistan is a timely reminder and an important resource for both scholars and policy makers, clearly demonstrating the need to refocus attention on the problem of an influential military whilst drawing appropriate conclusions about issues ranging from democratic norms, political representation and civilian-military relations.

Taking an explicitly comparative theoretical approach, Saeed Shafqat presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He begins by describing the history of military hegemony in this volatile South Asian country and then examines the breakdown of military control, assessing the rise of the Pakistan People's Party and th