Causation In Decision Belief Change And Statistics

The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be called "causal decision theory". 1 Decision problems such as Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision theorists.

This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.

This book presents a summary of recent work on the interface between artificial intelligence and statistics. It does this through a series of papers by different authors working in different areas of this interface. These papers are a selected and referenced subset of papers presented at the 3rd Interntional Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, Florida, January 1991.

The proceedings of the Second International Conference on [title] held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 1991, comprise 55 papers on topics including the logical specifications of reasoning behaviors and representation formalisms, comparative analysis of competing algorithms and formalisms, and ana

Belief revision is a topic of much interest in theoretical computer science and logic, and it forms a central problem in research into artificial intelligence. This book contains a collection of research articles on belief revision that are right up to date and an introductory chapter that presents a survey of current research in the area and the fundamentals of the theory.

A whole new crop of worms from the philosophy of science can. Based on a two-year study, 15 essays look over the shoulder of scientists in biomedicine, economics, neuropsychology, physics, and other disciplines, and comment on how and why they devise, use, and legitimize their theories. Annotation c

Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory: Utility Theory and Causal Analysis provides the theoretical background to approach decision theory from a statistical perspective. It covers both traditional approaches, in terms of value theory and expected utility theory, and recent developments, in terms of causal inference. The book is specifically designed to appeal to students and researchers that intend to acquire a knowledge of statistical science based on decision theory. Features Covers approaches for making decisions under certainty, risk, and uncertainty Illustrates expected utility theory and its extensions Describes approaches to elicit the utility function Reviews classical and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference based on decision theory Discusses the role of causal analysis in statistical decision theory