Central Bank Transparency Code Review Guidance Note

This document provides guidance and practical suggestions for conducting reviews of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) to IMF staff and experts conducting reviews, as well as to the central banks participating or intending to participate in the CBT review.

This paper reports to the Executive Board on the outcomes of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) pilot reviews. The pilot CBT reviews helped central banks evaluate their transparency practices and strengthen dialogue with external stakeholders. The CBT pilots provided valuable information on the resources required for the reviews going forward. Staff will continue to offer CBT reviews to the rest of the membership. The staff will report back to the Board in FY2026 on the progress of the CBT reviews and an update to the Code following five years of implementation.

The paper reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), which is linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI), for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked that the CBT should remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.

The paper responds to a request made by the Executive Board at the time of the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked staff that the new code remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the Global Financial Crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.

The Bank of Uganda (BOU) is implementing transparency practices that are broadly aligned with the good practices for central banks. The BOU’s initiatives on a comprehensive communication strategy and broad use of tools underpin the commitment to transparency and its accountability for the price stability mandate. The BOU seeks to improve public accountability and intends to use the results of the CBTC review to further improve its communications and transparency practices.

The global financial crisis has had a significant impact on low-income countries (LICs)’ debt vulnerabilities. Recent debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) indicate that external and fiscal financing requirements have increased. In addition, standard measures of a country’s capacity to repay debt?GDP, exports, and fiscal revenue?are expected to be permanently lower. On average, debt ratios are therefore expected to deteriorate in the near term, particularly for public debt.

This Note provides guidance for staff on the treatment and use of allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). It presents a consistent framework for IMF country teams to assess the macroeconomic implications of the SDR allocation at the country level, covering the following areas: • Statistical and accounting treatment. • General macroeconomic implications and advice. • Debt sustainability analysis. • Transparency and accountability. • Reserve management. • Implications for Fund-supported programs.

This note provides guidance to staff on the implementation of the Fund’s Transparency Policy. The objectives of the policy include strengthening the Fund’s effectiveness by providing the public with access to Fund views and deliberations, thus informing public debate and building traction for the Fund’s advice, supporting the quality of surveillance and of programs, by subjecting the Fund to outside scrutiny, and enhancing the Fund’s legitimacy by making the institution more accountable. A Transparency Policy Decision (referred to in the remainder of this note as “the Decision”) sets out rules for the modification and publication of all Board documents.