Central Bankers Bureaucratic Incentives And Monetary Policy
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Central Bankers Bureaucratic Incentives and Monetary Policy
Author | : E. Froedge Toma,M. Toma |
Publsiher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
Total Pages | : 256 |
Release | : 2012-12-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9789400944329 |
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By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it.
Bankers Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics
Author | : Christopher Adolph |
Publsiher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 389 |
Release | : 2013-04-15 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9781139620536 |
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Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions
![Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions](https://youbookinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/cover.jpg)
Author | : Philip Keefer,David Stasavage |
Publsiher | : Unknown |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2004 |
Genre | : Electronic Book |
ISBN | : OCLC:1375633764 |
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Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions. The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: · The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries. · Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances. · The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized. The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify the conditions under which regulatory reforms can be effective.
Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions
Author | : Philip Keefer,David Stasavage |
Publsiher | : World Bank Publications |
Total Pages | : 54 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : Banca central |
ISBN | : 9182736450XXX |
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Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions.
Compendium of Staff Studies on Monetary Policy
Author | : Robert E. Keleher |
Publsiher | : Unknown |
Total Pages | : 92 |
Release | : 1998 |
Genre | : Inflation (Finance) |
ISBN | : PSU:000033129723 |
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105 2 Joint Committee Print Compendium of Staff Studies on Monetary Policy November 1998
Author | : Anonim |
Publsiher | : Unknown |
Total Pages | : 96 |
Release | : 1998 |
Genre | : Electronic Book |
ISBN | : MINN:31951D003790148 |
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Bankers Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics
Author | : Christopher Adolph |
Publsiher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 389 |
Release | : 2013-04-15 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9781107032613 |
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Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.
Central Bank Autonomy
Author | : Kevin Corder |
Publsiher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 216 |
Release | : 2014-04-08 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 9781135675295 |
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First Published in 1998. The Federal Reserve System, the nation's central bank, is directed by statute to maintain maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. This volume explores the Central Bank Autonomy, looking at preferences of central bankers, reserve requirements, open market transactions, credit control, macroeconomic outcomes, policies and capital market flows.