Central European Constitutional Courts In The Face Of Eu Membership

This title explores German legal influence on other systems of constitutional justice, concentrating on the impact of the Federal Constitutional Court's approach on constitutional courts in Hungary and Poland.

The onset of the 2004 EU enlargement witnessed a number of predictions being made about the approaches, capacity and ability of Central European judges who were soon to join the Union. Optimistic voices, foreshadowing the deep transformative power that Europe was bound to exercise with respect to the judicial mentality and practice in the new Member States, were intertwined with gloomy pictures of post-Communist limited formalism and mechanical jurisprudence that could not be reformed, which were likely to undermine the very foundations of mutual trust and recognition the judicial system of the Union is built upon. Ten years later, this volume revisits these predictions and critically assesses the evolution of Central European judicial mentality, institutions and constitutionality under the influence of the EU membership. Comparatively evaluating the situation in a number of Central European Member States in their socio-legal contexts, notably Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, the volume offers unique insights into the process of (non) Europeanisation of national legal systems and cultures.

After the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the newly democratized countries of this region joined two main pan-European political and legal structures: the Council of Europe and the European Union. This book shows how the Eastward enlargement of these two structures fostered the 'constitutionalization' both of the Council of Europe and of the EU. Prompted by the enlargement of the Council of Europe and the admission of a number of countries which brought unique and often more substantial problems onto the Court's agenda, the main judicial body of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, became a quasi 'constitutional court' of Europe. This book demonstrates that this was primarily as a result of the widening of its agenda and the resulting need to make activist decisions about the compatibility of national laws with the European Convention. In terms of the EU, the book shows that the enlargement (first prospective, and then, actual) has been an important agenda-setter for the constitutionalization of the EU; in particular, for openly placing the issue of fundamental rights on the EU agenda as a legitimate and indispensable matter of concern for the EU. But the 'constitutional synergies' were a two-way street: the accession to both pan-European structures has also affected the development of democratic constitutionalism in CEE states. It has raised difficult issues regarding the relationships between national sovereignty, democracy, and human rights that CEE policy makers have grappled with; these issues and responses by CEE member states have had implications for the 'old' EU member states as well. These dynamics are explored through various case studies, providing a new perspective on the development of legal norms and institutions within European supranational bodies.

In several EU Member States, constitutional courts have reviewed European law on its compatibility with national constitutional law. These judgments deal with issues of major importance such as EU democratic legitimacy, the protection of fundamental rights, and the status of national sovereignty within the EU. Yet should national courts decide such issues of key constitutional significance for the EU? Or is it more democratic to leave these matters to political institutions that represent Europe's citizens and are politically accountable to them? In Judging European Democracy, Nik de Boer argues that the national courts' review of European law can actually constrain democratic debate over the EU's constitutional underpinnings. Rather than opening up a space for discourse or addressing democratic problems with the EU's decision-making process, national courts risk taking sides in good faith political disagreements among elected legislators about constitutional questions relating to the EU, thus distorting, rather than protecting, the democratic decision-making process. Judging European Democracy uniquely combines constitutional and political theory with an in-depth case study of the German Constitutional Court, the EU's most authoritative constitutional court. Based on an extensive analysis of parliamentary debates, EU policy documents, and interviews with politicians, policymakers, and constitutional court judges, the case study shows how the German Constitutional Court has distorted political debate and democracy in the EU. Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers involved in political theory, political science, EU constitutional law, and European integration will find this book compelling.

This book examines EU enlargement by studying how domestic constitutional evolution in the new member states contributes to European integration. In contrast to the usual top-down analytical pattern, it reverses the paradigm by looking at constitutional developments and dynamics from the bottom-up, studying how domestic constitutional evolution contributes to European integration. The authors analyze constitutional trends from the perspective of 'new Member States' as policy-makers and not strictly as policy-takers. The issue of conditionality is also explored in a discussion of the extent to which pre-2004 and 2007 conditionality has had lasting effects at the level of constitutionalization of different areas and norms and if so, of what kind. The exploration of Europeanization effects in recent Member States substantiates and demonstrates how enlargement has been an important driving-force for the effective export of EU legal rules in this region. The book utilizes a comparative approach to highlight the merits and obstacles created by the growing diversity in the constitutional rules and patterns of the new Member States. It also contains a section that places the CEE constitutionalizing map in a broader comparative European and global context, establishing links with similar transitional regimes in the continent and elsewhere.

Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership explores German legal influence on other systems of constitutional justice, concentrating on the impact of the Federal Constitutional Court’s approach to EU integration on constitutional courts in Hungary and Poland.