Churchill Master And Commander

'Masterful research, impeccable detail, with a beautifully flowing narrative of which Churchill himself would have been proud.' - Professor Peter Caddick-Adams From his earliest days Winston Churchill was an extreme risk taker and he carried this into adulthood. Today he is widely hailed as Britain's greatest wartime leader and politician. Deep down though, he was foremost a warlord. Just like his ally Stalin, and his arch enemies Hitler and Mussolini, Churchill could not help himself and insisted on personally directing the strategic conduct of World War II. For better or worse he insisted on being political master and military commander. Again like his wartime contemporaries, he had a habit of not heeding the advice of his generals. The results of this were disasters in Norway, North Africa, Greece and Crete during 1940–41. His fruitless Dodecanese campaign in 1943 also ended in defeat. Churchill's pig-headedness over supporting the Italian campaign in defiance of the Riviera landings culminated in him threatening to resign and bring down the British Government. Yet on occasions he got it just right: his refusal to surrender in 1940, the British miracle at Dunkirk and victory in the Battle of Britain, showed that he was a much-needed decisive leader. Nor did he shy away from difficult decisions, such as the destruction of the French Fleet to prevent it falling into German hands and his subsequent war against Vichy France. In this fascinating new book, acclaimed historian Anthony Tucker-Jones explores the record of Winston Churchill as a military commander, assessing how the military experiences of his formative years shaped him for the difficult military decisions he took in office. This book assesses his choices in the some of the most controversial and high-profile campaigns of World War II, and how in high office his decision making was both right and wrong.

Masters and Commanders describes how four titanic figures shaped the grand strategy of the West during the Second World War. Each was exceptionally tough-willed and strong minded, and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet each knew that he had to win at least two of the others over in order to get his strategy adopted. The book traces the mutual suspicion and admiration, the rebuffs and the charm, the often explosive disagreements and wary reconciliations which resulted.

On the eve of World War II, the British army was more an international police force than a combat ready fighting force. This book examines its transformation in a look at Great Britain's top commanders in the field.

How far did personality affect the grand strategy of the Second World War? Award-winning historian Andrew Roberts lays bare the four political masters and military commanders of the Western Allies - Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall and Lord Alanbrooke - between Pearl Harbour and VE-Day, coming to a number of startling conclusions. Employing verbatim accounts of Churchill's War Cabinet meetings never before reporduced in book form, as well as using the private papers of sixty-seven contemporaries of the four men, the inside story is told of the great war wartime conferences, explaining why and how the Allies attacked when and where they did. The two masters (Churchill and Roosevelt) and two commanders (Marshall and Alanbrooke) were strong-willed and tough-minded and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet in order to get their strategies adopted, each needed to persuade at least two of the other three, and certainly not be so outmanouvered that he ever found himself in a minority of one. Roberts reveals the dynamic behind the collective decisions upon which the lives of millions ultimately depended.

From Nigel Hamilton's acclaimed World War II saga, the astonishing story of FDR's yearlong, defining battle with Churchill in 1943, as the war raged in Africa and Italy. 1943 was the year of Allied military counteroffensives, beating back the forces of the Axis powers in North Africa and the Pacific—the “Hinge of Fate,” as Winston Churchill called it. In Commander in Chief, Nigel Hamilton reveals FDR’s true role in this saga: overruling his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordering American airmen on an ambush of the Japanese navy’s Admiral Yamamoto, facing down Churchill when he attempted to abandon Allied D-day strategy (twice). This FDR is profoundly different from the one Churchill later painted. President Roosevelt’s patience was tested to the limit quelling the prime minister’s “revolt,” as Churchill pressured Congress and senior American leaders to focus Allied energy on disastrous fighting in Italy and the Aegean instead of landings in Normandy. Finally, in a dramatic showdown at Hyde Park, FDR had to stop Churchill from losing the war by making the ultimate threat, setting the Allies on their course to final victory. In Commander in Chief, Hamilton masterfully chronicles the clash of nations—and of two titanic personalities—at a crucial moment in modern history.

Who was Winston Churchill? Even fifty years after his death, he is one of the most iconic figures in British history. As a young man he was a maverick journalist; his many positions in politics before 1940 marked him as a courageous but foolhardy man. Yet it is Churchill’s record in war, which has recently been questioned, that confirms his genius as a military commander and national leader—someone who understood the dangers of Nazi Germany before 1939 and someone uniquely capable to lead the empire through the turmoil of the Second World War. Christopher Catherwood argues that it was Churchill’s stand in 1940-41 that saved Britain and that only he was able to bring together the allies that eventually defeated Hitler in 1945. Catherwood has produced a challenging yet lively reassessment of the life and career of Winston Churchill, lion of British history and flawed hero.

How far did personality affect the grand strategy of the Second World War? Award-winning historian Andrew Roberts lays bare the four political masters and military commanders of the Western Allies - Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall and Lord Alanbrooke - between Pearl Harbour and VE-Day, coming to a number of startling conclusions. Employing verbatim accounts of Churchill's War Cabinet meetings never before reporduced in book form, as well as using the private papers of sixty-seven contemporaries of the four men, the inside story is told of the great war wartime conferences, explaining why and how the Allies attacked when and where they did. The two masters (Churchill and Roosevelt) and two commanders (Marshall and Alanbrooke) were strong-willed and tough-minded and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet in order to get their strategies adopted, each needed to persuade at least two of the other three, and certainly not be so outmanouvered that he ever found himself in a minority of one. Roberts reveals the dynamic behind the collective decisions upon which the lives of millions ultimately depended.