Clausewitz And Torgau Link Up On The Elbe

There has been a great deal of speculation and questions raised as to why the United States and the Western Allies allowed the Soviets to capture the Nazi capital of Berlin. This study will address a number of reasons why the U.S. did not challenge the Soviets for Berlin. In prosecuting World War II, the Soviets never forgot Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Stalin, who was determined to liberate every East European capital, suspected that the Allies might try a headlong rush to Berlin in April and May 1945. He therefore decided to take diplomatic and military steps to make sure the Allies would not participate in the capture of the German capital. Recent translated material made available through glasnost, provides evidence that the top USSR priority in the closing days of WWII in Europe was to block the Allied advance to Berlin and only then systematically take the city of Berlin.

In Prussian Military Thought 1815-1830: Beyond Clausewitz Jacek Jędrysiak offers a new perspective on the Prussian army after the Napoleonic wars in order to better understand the classic text On War by Carl von Clausewitz.

A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies.

In Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure in a work that features the very best of campaign military history.