Cognition And Fact

Within the last ten years, the interest of historians and philosophers of science in the epistemological writings of the Polish medical microbiologist Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961), who had up to then been almost completely unknown, has advanced with great strides. His main writings on epistemological questions were published in the mid-1930's, but they remained almost unnoticed. Today, however, one may rightly call Fleck a 'classical' figure both of episte mology and of the historical sociology of science, one whose works are comparable with Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery or Merton's pioneer ing study of the relations among economics, Puritanism, and natural science, both also originally published in the mid-1930's. The story of this book of 'materials on Ludwik Fleck' is also the story of the reception of Ludwik Fleck. In this volume, some essential materials which have been produced by that reception have been gathered together. We will sketch both the reception and the materials.

Edwin Hutchins combines his background as an anthropologist and an open ocean racing sailor and navigator in this account of how anthropological methods can be combined with cognitive theory to produce a new reading of cognitive science. His theoretical insights are grounded in an extended analysis of ship navigation—its computational basis, its historical roots, its social organization, and the details of its implementation in actual practice aboard large ships. The result is an unusual interdisciplinary approach to cognition in culturally constituted activities outside the laboratory—"in the wild." Hutchins examines a set of phenomena that have fallen in the cracks between the established disciplines of psychology and anthropology, bringing to light a new set of relationships between culture and cognition. The standard view is that culture affects the cognition of individuals. Hutchins argues instead that cultural activity systems have cognitive properties of their own that are different from the cognitive properties of the individuals who participate in them. Each action for bringing a large naval vessel into port, for example, is informed by culture: the navigation team can be seen as a cognitive and computational system. Introducing Navy life and work on the bridge, Hutchins makes a clear distinction between the cognitive properties of an individual and the cognitive properties of a system. In striking contrast to the usual laboratory tasks of research in cognitive science, he applies the principal metaphor of cognitive science—cognition as computation (adopting David Marr's paradigm)—to the navigation task. After comparing modern Western navigation with the method practiced in Micronesia, Hutchins explores the computational and cognitive properties of systems that are larger than an individual. He then turns to an analysis of learning or change in the organization of cognitive systems at several scales. Hutchins's conclusion illustrates the costs of ignoring the cultural nature of cognition, pointing to the ways in which contemporary cognitive science can be transformed by new meanings and interpretations. A Bradford Book

How do we understand numbers? Do animals and babies have numerical abilities? Why do some people fail to grasp numbers, and how we can improve numerical understanding? Numbers are vital to so many areas of life: in science, economics, sports, education, and many aspects of everyday life from infancy onwards. Numerical cognition is a vibrant area that brings together scientists from different and diverse research areas (e.g., neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, comparative psychology, anthropology, education, and neuroscience) using different methodological approaches (e.g., behavioral studies of healthy children and adults and of patients; electrophysiology and brain imaging studies in humans; single-cell neurophysiology in non-human primates, habituation studies in human infants and animals, and computer modeling). While the study of numerical cognition had been relatively neglected for a long time, during the last decade there has been an explosion of studies and new findings. This has resulted in an enormous advance in our understanding of the neural and cognitive mechanisms of numerical cognition. In addition, there has recently been increasing interest and concern about pupils' mathematical achievement in many countries, resulting in attempts to use research to guide mathematics instruction in schools, and to develop interventions for children with mathematical difficulties. This handbook brings together the different research areas that make up the field of numerical cognition in one comprehensive and authoritative volume. The chapters provide a broad and extensive review that is written in an accessible form for scholars and students, as well as educationalists, clinicians, and policy makers. The book covers the most important aspects of research on numerical cognition from the areas of development psychology, cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and rehabilitation, learning disabilities, human and animal cognition and neuroscience, computational modeling, education and individual differences, and philosophy. Containing more than 60 chapters by leading specialists in their fields, the Oxford Handbook of Numerical Cognition is a state-of-the-art review of the current literature.

A speech for the defence in a Paris murder trial, a road-safety slogan, Hobbes' political theory; each appeals to reason of a kind, but it remains an oblique and rhetoricalldnd. Each relies on comparisons rather than on direct statements, and none can override or supersede the conclusions of ethical reasoning proper. Nevertheless, just as slogans may do more for road safety than the mere recital of accident statistics, or of the evidence given at coroners' inquests, so the arguments of a Hobbes or a Bentham may be of greater practical effect than the assertion of genuinely ethical or political statements, however true and relevant these may be. Stephen Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, 1950. The International Colloquium on Cognitive Science (ICCS), held in Donostia - San Sebastian every two years since 1989, has become one of the most important plazas for cognitive scientists in Europe to present the results of their research and to exchange ideas. The seventh edition, co-organized as usual by the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information (ILCLI) and the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, both from the University of the Basque Country, took place from May 9 to 12, 200 1, addressing the following main topics: 1. Truth: Epistemology and Logic. 2. Rationality in a Social Setting. 3. Music, Language, and Cognition. Vlll TRUTH, RATIONALITY, COGNITION, AND MUSIC 4. The Order of Discourse: Logic, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric.

This book focuses on elementary and middle school children’s understanding of mathematics as well as the cognitive aspects involved in the development of mathematical knowledge, skills, and understanding. Children’s success in and understanding of mathematics stem from factors beyond the mathematics curriculum. Researchers are increasingly becoming aware of the necessity to consider a complex set of variables when accounting for large individual differences in mathematics achievement. These chapters contribute to how both researchers and educators can consider the multidimensionality of skills involved in developing mathematical knowledge in the middle school years as well as to how this knowledge can be used to enhance practices in the mathematics classroom. Topics include the cognitive and spatial skills involved in mathematics knowledge, the role of motivation in mathematics learning, the neurological processes and development of children’s mathematics skills, the development of understanding of arithmetic and fraction concepts, the factors relating to children’s word problem success, and techniques to promote mathematics understanding. This book and its companion, Mathematical Teaching and Learning, take an interdisciplinary perspective to mathematical learning and development in the elementary and middle school years. The authors and perspectives in this book draw from education, neuroscience, developmental psychology, and cognitive psychology. The book will be relevant to scholars/educators in the field of mathematics education and also those in childhood development and cognition. Each chapter also includes practical tips and implications for parents as well as for educators and researchers.

A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, “shored up” and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. “Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher,” Chemero writes in his preface, adding, “I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought.