Cognitive Processes And Economic Behaviour

In recent years the understanding of the cognitive foundations of economic behavior has become increasingly important. This volume contains contributions from such leading scholars as Adam Brandenburger, Michael Bacharach and Patrick Suppes. It will be of great interest to academics and researchers involved in the field of economics and psychology as well as those interested in political economy more generally.

Psychologists studying cognitive processes and personality have increasingly benefited from the wealth of theory, methodology, and decision making paradigms used in economics and game theory. Similarly, for the economists, personality traits and basic cognitive processes offer a set of coherent explanatory constructs in economic behavior. Given the debate on preference invariance and behavioral consistency across contexts and domains, the papers in this topic shed light on the existence and effect of stable sets of idiosyncratic features on economic decision-making. While the effects of personality and cognition on economic decisions remain under-explored, the papers contributed in this topic offer more than a stimulus for further research. The general message could be that personality and cognitive processes offer the stable idiosyncratic ground on which individual decisions are made.

The social sciences study knowing subjects and their interactions. A "cog nitive turn", based on cognitive science, has the potential to enrich these sciences considerably. Cognitive economics belongs within this movement of the social sciences. It aims to take into account the cognitive processes of individuals in economic theory, both on the level of the agent and on the level of their dynamic interactions and the resulting collective phenomena. This is an ambitious research programme that aims to link two levels of com plexity: the level of cognitive phenomena as studied and tested by cognitive science, and the level of collective phenomena produced by the economic in teractions between agents. Such an objective requires cooperation, not only between economists and cognitive scientists but also with mathematicians, physicists and computer scientists, in order to renew, study and simulate models of dynamical systems involving economic agents and their cognitive mechanisms. The hard core of classical economics is the General Equilibrium Theory, based on the optimising rationality of the agent and on static concepts of equilibrium, following a point of view systemised in the framework of Game Theory. The agent is considered "rational" if everything takes place as if he was maximising a function representing his preferences, his utility function.

This book elaborates on a multidimensional model of decision-making that applies to how individuals make "mundane decisions." Decisions about pursuing relationships, exercise, work, or anything where people might have to "invest" time or behavioral effort are examples. The author utilizes cognitive-developmental theory to understand how children and adolescents make sense of economic inequality. This modern portfolio theory model of decision-making applies economic concepts to everyday life and may help us understand why individuals differ in their willingness to take risks. It also contributes to our knowledge of personality disorders such as depression and mania. For Further Information, Please Click Here!

In the last two decades there has been a flourishing research carried out jointly by economists, psychologists and neuroscientists. This meltdown of competences has lead towards original approaches to investigate the mental and cognitive mechanisms involved in the way the economic agent collects, processes and uses information to make choices. This research field involves a new kind of scientist, trained in different disciplines, familiar in managing experimental data, and with the mathematical foundations of decision making. The ultimate goal of this research is to open the black-box to understandthe behavioural and neural processes through which humans set preferences and translate these behaviours into optimal choices. This volume intends to bring forward new results and fresh insights into this matter.

The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of human behavior that goes beyond monetary rewards. In particular, it investigates social influences in individual’s decision making in situations that involve coordination, competition, and deciding for others. Further, it compares how monetary and social outcomes are perceived. The common theme of all studies is uncertainty. The first four essays study individual decisions that have uncertain consequences, be it due to the actions of others or chance. The last essay, in turn, uses the advances in research on decision making under uncertainty to predict behavior in riskless choices. The first essay, Fairness Versus Efficiency: How Procedural Fairness Concerns Affect Coordination, investigates whether preferences for fair rules undermine the efficiency of coordination mechanisms that put some individuals at a disadvantage. The results from a laboratory experiment show that the existence of coordination mechanisms, such as action recommendations, increases efficiency, even if one party is strongly disadvantaged by the mechanism. Further, it is demonstrated that while individuals’ behavior does not depend on the fairness of the coordination mechanism, their beliefs about people’s behavior do. The second essay, Dishonesty and Competition. Evidence from a stiff competition environment, explores whether and how the possibility to behave dishonestly affects the willingness to compete and who the winner is in a competition between similarly skilled individuals. We do not find differences in competition entry between competitions in which dishonesty is possible and in which it is not. However, we find that due to the heterogeneity in propensity to behave dishonestly, around 20% of winners are not the best-performing individuals. This implies that the efficient allocation of resources cannot be ensured in a stiff competition in which behavior is unmonitored. The third essay, Tracing Risky Decision Making for Oneself and Others: The Role of Intuition and Deliberation, explores how individuals make choices under risk for themselves and on behalf of other people. The findings demonstrate that while there are no differences in preferences for taking risks when deciding for oneself and for others, individuals have greater decision error when choosing for other individuals. The differences in the decision error can be partly attributed to the differences in information processing; individuals employ more deliberative cognitive processing when deciding for themselves than when deciding for others. Conducting more information processing when deciding for others is related to the reduction in decision error. The fourth essay, The Effect of Decision Fatigue on Surgeons’ Clinical Decision Making, investigates how mental depletion, caused by a long session of decision making, affects surgeon’s decision to operate. Exploiting a natural experiment, we find that surgeons are less likely to schedule an operation for patients who have appointment late during the work shift than for patients who have appointment at the beginning of the work shift. Understanding how the quality of medical decisions depends on when the patient is seen is important for achieving both efficiency and fairness in health care, where long shifts are popular. The fifth essay, Preferences for Outcome Editing in Monetary and Social Contexts, compares whether individuals use the same rules for mental representation of monetary outcomes (e.g., purchases, expenses) as for social outcomes (e.g., having nice time with friends). Outcome editing is an operation in mental accounting that determines whether individuals prefer to first combine multiple outcomes before their evaluation (integration) or evaluate each outcome separately (segregation). I find that the majority of individuals express different preferences for outcome editing in the monetary context than in the social context. Further, while the results on the editing of monetary outcomes are consistent with theoretical predictions, no existing model can explain the editing of social outcomes.

The Cognitive Basis of Institutions: A Synthesis of Behavioral and Institutional Economics synthesizes modern research in behavioral economics with traditional institutional economics. This work emphasizes that institution and agent are inextricably linked, and that both cognitive and institutional processes coalesce to influence human decision-making. It integrates cognition and institution through the behavioral economics theoretical lens of bounded rationality. Methodologically, it develops game-theoretical, complexity and neuroeconomic solutions to unite study of the two areas. The work concludes by proposing general implications for the economic study of decisions using the cognitive-institutional approach, also providing specific recommendations for public policy. Reveals how institutional structures and individual actions interact and coevolve cognitively Connects individual decision-making, decision-making processes and institutional formation Unites our understanding of cooperative ‘prosocial’ behavior with the institutional dynamics that may create it Discusses the implications of the behavioral-institutional paradigm for paternalism and libertarianism in public policy

This book seeks to explain long-term economic development and institutional change in terms of the cognitive features of human learning and communication processes. Martens links individual cognitive processes to macroeconomic growth theories, including economies of scale and scope, and to theories of institutional development based on asymmetric information in production processes and economies of scale in enforcement technology. With considerable flair, Bertin Martens has applied the hot new area of psychological and behavioural economics to notions of growth and development and has created a unique and impressive volume.